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This dissertation argues that between 1950 and 1985 a diverse collection of 
residents from the Houston, Texas metropolitan area used debates about the planning, 
construction, and meaning of transportation structures—primarily highways and mass 
transit systems—as opportunities to claim political power and to influence the future of 
their neighborhoods and city. As they contested these systems, Houstonians articulated 
competing notions of the politics of mobility. In addition to concrete political decisions 
about transportation, this term also encompasses the daily transportation decisions of 
Houstonians and the meanings those residents ascribed to the infrastructure that carried 
them across the city. The politics of mobility uniquely illuminates the intersection of 
politics, culture, and urban development in Houston.  
Who wielded the power to make choices about Houston’s transportation networks 
and how the balance of that power changed over time are central questions of this 
dissertation. Until the late 1950s and early 1960s, a collection of nearly all white and 
male elected officials, professional planners, and private developers held immense power 




of citizens outside that group forced leaders to acknowledge, if rarely embrace, the 
perspectives that citizens held about transportation and the politics of mobility. By the 
mid-1970s, aided by changes in federal oversight and citizen participation regulations, as 
well as by their own assertions of political power, an increasingly diverse set of 
Houstonians—African American, ethnic Mexican, and white, urban and suburban, rich 
and poor—possessed more influence over the city’s transportation choices. By engaging 
in these debates, Houstonians challenged the city’s racial, economic, and decision-
making status quo. 
The choices made in Houston’s struggle over the placement of highways and the 
creation of a public transit authority sheds light onto the foundations of Houston’s unique 
built environment and offers a model for understanding similar forces at work in other 
auto-centric southern and western, “Sunbelt” cities, such as Los Angeles and Atlanta. 
Further, these conflicts illuminate why older cities in the Northeast and Midwest and 
younger ones in the West and the South developed such divergent urbanization patterns 
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Speaker after speaker rose to address the elected officials presiding over an April 
1983 public forum at St. Patrick’s Catholic Church in Houston, Texas. The diverse 
collection of Houstonians in attendance came to weigh in on two pending transportation 
plans for Houston and Harris County. The first called for the construction of a 
countywide toll road system. The second would build a heavy rail mass transit network. 
Both systems planned to use an old rail corridor just blocks from the church for a route. 
Residents from this corridor, a mixture of white-collar and blue-collar African American, 
white, and Latino Houstonians, feared that the building of the projects would threaten 
their homes and daily lives.1 Cognizant of the destruction caused by earlier road 
construction in neighborhoods throughout Houston, corridor residents preferred the rail 
option, believing it would be less disruptive and better serve their communities. One 
homeowner exclaimed, “We don’t want the toll road to come in and uproot our homes for 
the benefit of just a few people. We don’t want it to come in and devastate our 
community.” Houstonians whose homes sat removed from proposed routes, including 
many white-collar, white suburbanites with long daily commutes, felt differently. These 
residents worried about their taxes going to support a system that would provide them 
with little service. Lee Swanson, one such suburbanite, campaigned for the toll roads 
                                                
1 A note on the terminology used to label the racial identities of different Houstonians. White will be used 
throughout to describe Houstonians of European descent. Black and African American will be used 
interchangeably to describe Houstonians of African descent. Following the lead of several scholars, I will 
use ethnic Mexican to describe Houstonians who either have roots in or directly migrated from Mexico. 
Ethnic Mexicans dominated Houston’s Latino population until the 1980s. Latino will be used when this 
dissertation discusses both ethnic Mexicans and Central American populations after 1980. For use of ethnic 
Mexican, see Stephen J. Pitti, The Devil in Silicon Valley: Northern California, Race, and Mexican 
Americans (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); David Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: 
Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995); Maximilian Krochmal, “Labor, Civil Rights, and the Struggle for Democracy in Mid-




arguing that they were the “best solution” for Houston’s traffic problems. Far from 
disrupting lives, Swanson maintained that the road would instead “tie the [metropolitan] 
community together.” As the hour grew later, patience grew thin. Citizens on both sides 
of the debate interrupted speakers with cheers and boos.2 Houstonians came to the forum 
with competing understandings of community and through arguments about the proposals 
articulated those visions. The meeting changed few minds. The projects, framed by 
residents as either catastrophes or solutions, represented the latest iteration of a decades-
long debate over the shape of the city.  
The profound mix of anxiety and hope that Houstonians attached to the two 
potential modes of mobility hinted at the broader significance transportation structures 
assumed in the burgeoning metropolises of the American Southwest and West after 1950. 
Highways served as the primary purveyor of movement for these cities until the 1970s, 
when mass transit options reemerged after a postwar decline. This study frames 
Houstonians’ changing understandings and uses of these networks between 1950 and 
1985 as central to Houston’s larger “politics of mobility.” More than simply concerned 
with decisions about transportation, this term encompasses the daily movements of 
Houstonians and the meanings those residents ascribed to the systems that carried them. 
It considers how access to or denial of mobility affected the lives of citizens in ways that 
went beyond just getting to jobs, schools, or stores. In totality, the term acknowledges 
that mobility could possess deeper, contradictory meanings for residents: freedom or 
oppression, modernity or backwardness, privilege or poverty. Through these meanings, it 
illuminates the intersection of politics, culture, and urban development in Houston. 
                                                
2 Northeast News, April 26, 1983, Central Chancery Files (CCF), Archives of the Archdiocese of 
Galveston-Houston, Houston, Texas (AAGH); “City Council Hearing on Hardy Toll Project Draws 
300,” North Freeway Leader, April 28, 1983, CCF, AAGH. 
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More than anything else the politics of mobility revolves around power. Who 
wielded the power to make choices about Houston’s transportation networks and how the 
balance of that power changed over time are central questions of this dissertation. Until 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, a small, mostly white and male group of business leaders, 
elected officials, and developers dictated Houston’s transportation choices. However, 
shifts in the city’s economic and demographic makeup, political transformations caused 
by the end of segregation and the suburbanization, as well as Houstonians’ divergent 
ideas about the form and function of the city’s built environment all changed the tenor of 
debates around the politics of mobility. Non-elite citizens from across the metropolitan 
area began to question the planning power held by leaders. Houstonians whose 
neighborhoods absorbed the majority of costs of early highway construction demanded 
that the costs of future projects be spread evenly across the city. By engaging in such 
debates, Houstonians challenged the city’s racial, economic, and decision-making status 
quo. 
This dissertation argues that between 1950 and 1985 Houstonians used debates 
about the planning, construction, and meaning of transportation structures as 
opportunities to claim political power and to influence the future of their neighborhoods 
and city. As they contested the place of highways and mass transit systems within the 
Houston metropolitan area (HMA), Houstonians articulated competing notions of the 
politics of mobility.3 These divisions arose during a period when Houstonians also 
contended with national historical events ranging from the Civil Rights Movement to the 
                                                
3 Here, the Houston Metropolitan Area will be defined as consisting of Harris County and the six counties 
that border it, rather than attempting to follow the changing definitions of metropolitan areas as defined by 
the US Census Bureau and United State Office of Management and Budget. 
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_statpolicy, last 
accessed December 10, 2013.  
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fiscal and political conservative turn of the 1980s. These larger events influenced 
Houstonians’ transportation choices by altering the city’s historically top-down decision-
making process in ways that gave citizens greater say over the direction of Houston’s 
development. This dissertation is the first study to devote its full focus to the investment 
citizens put into debating transportation structures and to argue that this determination 
influenced the shape of the political and built environments of Houston and other 
southwestern and western metropolises.  
Houston makes an excellent subject for a study of the politics of mobility and its 
meaning to Americans because its rapidly expanding territorial footprint and its growing 
postwar population led officials to construct a transportation network dominated by 
highways. The city underwent immense change between 1950 and 1985. Its Cold War-
centric economy, intimately tied to the petroleum industry and the space race, brought 
migrants to the city in droves. Over three decades, Harris County, of which Houston is 
the county seat, saw its population increase by 198 percent, expanding from 806,201 in 
1950 to more than 2,409,547 in 1980. White Houstonians accounted for the raw majority, 
growing from 656,249 in 1950 to 1,701,711 in 1980, a 159 percent increase. But rates of 
growth among non-white populations were even higher. Latino Houstonians, 
predominantly of Mexican origin, rose by 275 percent, from 40,000 people in 1950 to 
more than 150,000 in 1980. The population of African Americans leapt by 250 percent, 
from 125,400 in 1950 to more than 440,000 in 1980. In addition, during the 1970s and 
1980s the in-migration of Central American, Middle Eastern, and Asian immigrants 
increased the diversity of the city and county considerably.4 In attempts to build a city 
                                                
4 Arnoldo De León, Ethnicity in the Sunbelt: Mexican Americans in Houston (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2001), 98; Robert D. Bullard, Invisible Houston: The Black Experience in Boom 
and Bust (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 23; Social Explorer, 
www.socialexplorer.com, 1950 and 1980 Harris County Census, last accessed March 10, 2014; Stephen 
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that could accommodate this growth, officials constructed a transportation system that 
centered on the automobile. In 1950, the city possessed one highway, the Gulf Freeway, 
which ran between Houston and Galveston and put just over twenty-six miles of 
highway-standard roadways in Harris County. By 1985 the county had nearly 300 miles 
of highways, with an additional 200 miles planned. The jump in the number of registered 
vehicles from 306,870 in 1950 to 2,215,625 by 1985 showed that most Houstonians 
embraced the city’s approach.5  
Beyond reflecting the simple magnitude of growth in a highway-centric 
southwestern city after World War II, though, debates around Houston’s transportation 
structures shed light on those that occurred in other cities such as Los Angeles and 
Atlanta. These conflicts illuminate differences in development between older cities of the 
Northeast and Midwest and younger ones in the West and the South, which led to these 
cities divergent physical forms and transportation practices. The construction of 
Houston’s highway network also shows how postwar southern cities implemented spatial 
boundaries based on racial identities and economic class both before and after the end of 
legal segregation. These boundaries, combined with the weaker political position of 
African Americans and ethnic Mexicans prior to the 1960s, help explain why the 
environmental and cognitive costs of postwar economic and infrastructural development 
fell mostly, but not exclusively, onto poorer, communities of color. Finally, the city’s 
diversification through immigration, the steadily increasing political power of African 
                                                                                                                                            
Klineberg and the Center for Houston’s Future, “An Historical Overview of Immigration in Houston, 
Based on the Houston Area Survey,” Kinder Institute for Urban Research, Rice University, 2008, available 
at http://kinder.rice.edu/reports/, last accessed December 2, 2013. 
5 Mileage total see Erik Slotboom, Houston Freeways: A Historical and Visual Journey (Cincinnati, OH: 
C.J. Krehbiel, 2003); Houston Chamber of Commerce, “Houston Facts, 1965” H-Freeways-Gulf Freeway 
Vertical File (VF), Houston Metropolitan Research Center (HMRC); Houston-Galveston Regional 
Transportation Study 1980, H-Traffic-1980-1984 VF, HMRC. On registrations, Houston Chamber of 
Commerce, “Motor Vehicle Registrations in Harris County, 1950-1984,” H-Chamber of Commerce-
Statistics VF, HMRC. 
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Americans and ethnic Mexicans from total disenfranchisement to full-fledged political 
participation, and the suburbanizing of a predominantly white population combined to 
make Houston’s metropolitan politics incredibly complex. Houston’s transportation 
debates occurred within this fraught context and exploring how Houstonians used debates 
about mobility to mediate racial, economic, and political divisions elucidates the 
changing nature of power and governance in urban America and can contribute to the 
cultivation of more inclusive decision-making in cities today.  
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
This study builds on the definition of mobility proposed by geographer Timothy 
Cresswell, who conceptualizes the term as the combination of physical movement, 
representation, and practice.6 To Cresswell, the particular combination of these three 
factors in a given time or place constitutes a specific “constellation of mobility” that 
touches on every element concerning a location’s transportation system. Houston, then, 
possesses a unique “constellation,” one shaped by the specifics of Houstonians’ 
movements through the city and by the meanings those residents ascribed to that 
movement. Cresswell’s mobility encapsulates the actions of those moving, but his focus 
is not on the structures that allowed that movement to occur. Geographer J.B. Jackson 
argued that roads themselves warranted close study as simultaneously physical, cultural, 
and technological pieces of the landscape.7 Echoing Jackson, Houston’s roads and mass 
transit systems will be viewed as formative elements of the city’s culture, politics, and 
urban structure. Linking Cresswell’s observations about the act and significance of 
                                                
6 Timothy Cresswell, “Toward a Politics of Mobility,” in Mari Hvattum, Janike Kampevold Larsen, Brita 
Brenna, and Beate Elvebakk, eds., Routes, Roads and Landscapes (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 
2011), 163-177. 
7 John Brinckerhoff Jackson, “Roads Belong in the Landscape,” in Jackson, Discovering the Vernacular 
Landscape (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984).  
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mobility with those forwarded by Jackson about the role and meaning of physical 
infrastructure, this study shows that city residents consciously participated in defining 
both the act of moving and the systems that allowed it.    
Most recent transportation historiography concentrates on national and state level 
policymaking; however, “Power Moves” takes up historian Paul Barrett’s call for 
historians to focus on local mobility practices and decision-making. The collection of 
works that have begun this task demonstrate that transportation debates represented 
important access points to civic power in many cities.8 In their 2006 work, Best 
Transportation System in the World, Mark Rose, Paul Barrett, and Bruce Seely argue that 
the federal government stood as the most influential actor in American transportation 
history.9 These authors and Raymond Mohl have also noted, though, that shifts in 
American transportation policy during and after the 1970s resulted in the federal 
government’s devolution of decision-making power to state and local actors in order to 
remove itself from controversial infrastructure fights.10  
Other works have picked up Rose and Mohl’s later point by featuring local 
histories, but these have either relied on examples from numerous cities or focused on 
projects in specific historical periods. Because they do not make a longitudinal 
investigation of a single location, these studies do not adequately investigate the 
                                                
8 For a review of some new works that fit this pattern see, Kyle Shelton, “Power, Governance, and 
Contested Mobilities: New Turns in United States Historiography,” Mobility in History, 5 (1), January 
2014, 127-133. For a broader review of American mobility historiography see Michael Fein, “A Political 
Turn: Highways and Mass Transit in American Mobility History,” Mobility in History, 1 (1), 2009, 117-
122; Paul S. Barrett, The Automobile and Urban Transit: The Formation of Public Policy in Chicago, 
1900-1930 (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1983). 
9 Mark H. Rose, Paul S. Barrett, and Bruce E. Seely, The Best Transportation System in the World: 
Railroads, Trucks, Airlines, and American Public Policy in the Twentieth Century (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 2006). 
10 Mark H. Rose and Raymond Mohl, Interstate: Highway Politics and Policy since 1939, 3rd edition 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2012.) 
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influence of local politics on national and state planning efforts.11 By prioritizing 
Houston’s transportation history over that of Texas or the United States and focusing on 
the actions of Houstonians rather than state or national actors, this study inverts the 
typical framework of transportation histories and builds a case for highlighting the 
significance and uniqueness of local iterations of broader transportation policy.  
With that aim in mind, this project asks historians to see highways and mass 
transit systems as integral and contested elements of postwar cities, rather than only as 
utilitarian pieces of the built environment constructed to meet political demands or in 
reaction to broader societal shifts.12 Several scholars have already shown how urban 
residents’ active attempts to control the shape and use of the street in the early twentieth 
century connected to larger fights over urban space.13 Likewise, the sheer scale of 
postwar transportation structures made their construction and contestation an important 
element of fights over city planning, political power, and economic development. The 
influence the structures had on the lives of Houstonians went deeper than just shaping 
                                                
11 Joseph F. DiMento and Cliff Ellis, Changing Lanes: Visions and Histories of Urban Freeways 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2013); Alan A. Altshuler and David Luberhoff, Mega-Projects: The 
Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment (Washington, D.C.; Cambridge, Mass.: Brookings 
Institution Press; Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2003); Michael R. Fein, Paving the Way: New York 
Road Building and the American State, 1880-1956 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008); Zachary 
M. Schrag, The Great Society Subway: A History of the Washington Metro (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2006).  
12 Elihu Rubin, Insuring the City: The Prudential Center and the Postwar Urban Landscape (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012); Amy Debra Finstein, “Lofty Visions: The Architectural Intentions 
and Contrary Realities of Elevated Urban Highways in America, 1900-1959” (Ph.D., University of 
Virginia, 2009); Christopher W. Wells, Car Country: An Environmental History (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2012.); Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (New York: 
Verso, 2006). An important exception to these patterns is Eric Avila, The Folklore of the Freeway: Race 
and Revolt in the Modernist City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), which considers the 
cultural responses of citizens to freeway construction.  
13 Peter D. Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 2008); Brian Ladd, Autophobia: Love and Hate in the Automotive Age (Chicago, Ill.: University 
of Chicago Press, 2008). Clay McShane, Down the Asphalt Path: American Cities and the Coming of the 
Automobile, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Barrett, The Automobile and Urban Transit.  
 9 
such larger practices, though. The myriad components of Houston’s transportation 
network—overpasses, elevated freeways, train tracks, and bus yards—created 
consequences of divergent scales in the places where they were built. The destruction of a 
house for a roadway exacted a different toll than the running of a rail line run through an 
existing right-of-way. Documenting Houstonians’ responses to the proposed or actual 
presence of these structures gives a better sense of how elements of the built environment 
affected the daily lives of residents. Furthermore, investigating patterns in the placement 
of structures with the greatest negative consequences hints at how larger political and 
economic realities shaped choices about the built environment.  
Historians Matthew Klingle and Hal Rothman adopt, in part, a deeper cultural 
approach to their studies of the built environment. In his work, Klingle calls for bringing 
an “ethic of place” to scholarship in order to clarify how former and current meanings of 
specific spaces converge. Similarly, Rothman shows that the emergence of a new 
economic, political or social force within a community—in his case tourism—could alter 
that place’s identity and create new “scripts” that allowed different economic and social 
opportunities to emerge.14 My understanding of the concept of the politics of mobility 
picks up on Klingle and Rothman’s perspectives and offers a new narrative for studying 
the creation, meaning, and changing nature of urban space. The planning and building of 
roadways and mass transit systems altered Houstonians relationship to place by installing 
physical boundaries across the city and, at the same time, permitting movements that 
transgressed those borders. To contend with such changes Houstonians wrote new 
“scripts” for their neighborhoods and the city as a whole. While physical structures 
                                                
14 Matthew Klingle, Emerald City: An Environmental History of Seattle (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 2007); Hal Rothman, Devil’s Bargains: Tourism in the Twentieth-Century American West 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998). 
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regimented space in particular ways, Houstonians use and contestation of those structures 
endlessly redefined their place in city.  
Houston possesses a number of unique characteristics that differentiate it from 
both its Sunbelt peers and other American cities. While the city benefitted from many of 
the same forces that drove general postwar Sunbelt expansion—significant federal 
investment, low labor costs, and a business-friendly environment—it also displayed 
different growth patterns. Houston exercised greater autonomy in its annexation practices 
than almost any other American city. This ability, combined with the city’s famous lack 
of zoning, made Houston’s development and approach to transportation, unique.15  
After World War II, as many scholars of the West and Southwest have shown, 
urban politics morphed into metropolitan politics. During this transition, transportation 
debates became a primary site of contention between central cities and their suburbs. Yet, 
most recent work on the suburb-city relationship has focused on metropolitan 
fragmentation, the rise of suburban conservatism, or tax revolts.16 Houston’s specific city-
suburb dynamic and urban metropolitan transportation in general, offer new ways to 
explore how cities and suburbs simultaneously grew together and apart during the second 
half of the twentieth century. Houston’s ability to avoid metropolitan fragmentation by 
                                                
15 On characteristics of Sunbelt development, Carl Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth and Politics 
in Sunbelt Cities, Rev. ed (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); David R. Goldfield, 
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16 See Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 
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University Press, 2006); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American 
Right (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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absorbing growing areas before they could incorporate allowed city officials and 
residents to hold more power in metropolitan debates than counterparts in other major 
cities. This reality fostered a political balance in the HMA because neither city nor 
suburban populations possessed a large enough metropolitan majority to dictate terms to 
the other until the 1980s.17 Unlike other particularly fractious metropolitan debates, 
addressing transportation problems in Houston remained a bipartisan effort until the 
1980s. Even as the Republican Party rose to prominence in the Houston suburbs and 
gained some strength within the city itself during the 1960s and 1970s, officials from 
both major parties remained committed to Houston’s economic and physical growth and 
shared a general vision about how its transportation system could help achieve that goal. 
Only in the late 1970s and 1980s, when suburbanites pushed their representatives to 
campaign for more highways and resisted contributing tax revenue to cities to pay for 
mass transit systems, did partisan politics become directly linked with Houston’s 
transportation debates.  
Transportation networks likewise help clarify the connections and gaps between 
city and suburbs because they brought simultaneous proximity and distance to the 
relationship. Highways and mass transit tied suburbs and the city together by allowing 
commuters to reach downtown in shorter periods of time. Yet, for as much as these 
structures shrunk the time gap between central office buildings and suburban homes, they 
also lengthened the social, economic, and racial disconnects between Houstonians.  
Highways helped construct physical and cognitive borders between groups by 
facilitating a process of mostly white suburbanization and, after the end of legal 
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segregation in 1964, by helping Houstonians mark discrete parts of the HMA as black, 
white, or ethnic Mexican, as rich or poor. Many scholars have shown that white urbanites 
responded to the falling away of race-based boundaries in the 1960s by re-inscribing 
separation through physical distance and economic exclusivity.18 The 
compartmentalizing of Houston into areas understood to be home to residents of a 
particular racial group or income level magnified the stakes of infrastructure 
development. Because such spatial differentiation separated Houstonians physically and 
mentally from other areas of the city, it allowed Houstonians to vociferously defend their 
own communities and property values from damaging infrastructure projects, while at the 
same time they could support the construction of highways through the heart of a 
community a few miles away. Few saw reason to lament the destruction of 
neighborhoods so distant from their own. The political power held by various 
Houstonians also effected the routing of highways as officials most often ran roadways  
through areas of concentrated poverty or communities of color where they believed 
political resistance would be less formidable. 
Defying officials’ expectations, however, a diverse set of actors from across the 
city attempted to address the most pressing needs of their communities and participate in 
the governance of the city by challenging Houston’s transportation decisions. Most 
scholarship on Sunbelt cities, including that of Harvey Molotch and Joe Logan, Sarah 
Elkind, Joe Feagin, and Amy Bridges continues to fixate on the choices made by officials 
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and elites, while eliding those made by non-elites.19 City leaders won many battles over 
growth and have rightfully been highlighted as central to urban power structures, but in 
no city did these groups come out winners in every conflict, nor did they operate in a 
vacuum. Neighborhood-level pushback by citizens in transportation debates, including 
that which was spurred by the civil rights and environmental justice movements, led to 
compromise and to some outright victories against the perceived powers of the city. 
Sociologist Robert Bullard and historian Eileen McGurty have shown how African 
Americans used a rhetoric of environmental justice and the momentum of the Civil 
Rights Movement to dispute the placement of damaging land-uses such as garbage 
incinerators within their communities.20 These protests articulated a form of 
environmentalism quite different from the more mainstream iteration, which concentrated 
on large-scale ecological conservation.21 Similarly, highways brought a number of 
problems to the neighborhoods they crossed. Not only did they mean immediate 
displacement for those in their path and a forced reshaping of neighbors’ notions of place, 
but the traffic they carried also caused spikes in air and noise pollution and increased the 
likelihood and severity of pedestrian accidents. Houstonians took up fights against 
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highways and other infrastructure to protest both their lack of input into their planning 
and to protect their homes and families from the negative consequences they could bring.  
While Houston’s African American and ethnic Mexican communities certainly 
bore the brunt of the construction of the city’s built environment, citizens throughout the 
Houston metropolitan area felt the impact of highways and mass transit systems, albeit it 
unequally and on different terms. Robert Bullard, Tom Lewis, and Raymond Mohl 
discuss the influence of highways on black and ethnic Mexican communities and 
working-class central city populations, but by focusing almost exclusively on these 
groups, scholars have only told part of the story.22 Roads ran through the suburbs as well, 
and despite the fact that during the 1960s and 1970s Americans were increasingly 
defining cities and suburbs as black and white spaces, in reality, as scholars such as 
Andrew Wiese and Becky Nicolaides have shown, each location consisted of a mixture of 
citizens.23 Houston’s suburbs were both white- and blue-collar. African Americans and 
ethnic Mexicans made homes in suburban Montgomery County and elite whites lived 
close to the nearly all-black Third Ward. These complex settlement patterns and the 
widespread presence of highways meant that projects altered the homes and communities 
of a broad population of Houstonians. That these roads affected the lives of nearly all 
Houstonians, even if those changes remained uneven, shows why so many Houstonians 
attempted to shape decisions about their routes and use.  
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THE POLITICS OF MOBILITY AS METHOD 
This study focuses in equal measure on the highways and mass transit networks 
that crisscrossed Houston, on the benefits and consequences that came with their 
construction, and on the forces and actors that imbued these networks with meaning. 
These elements comprise the foundation of Houstonians understanding of the politics of 
mobility. As geographer Jason Henderson has pointed out, these politics are never just 
concerned with transportation decisions; rather, they play a broader role in determining 
the physical and cognitive organization of the landscape.24  
Highways, train tracks, and other pieces of the city’s built environment shaped the 
lives of Houstonians who used or encountered them on a daily basis. More than simply 
determining where and how a Houstonian could travel, these systems imposed a tangible 
order onto the cityscape that stretched far beyond the corridors through which they ran.25 
Unlike other oft-studied urban history topics such as education, electoral politics, or 
employment, transportation and mobility could not be avoided. An urbanite could opt not 
to vote or not attend school, but one had to move to get to the grocery store, doctor’s 
appointments, or work. Scholars have shown how the use and evolution of transportation 
structures, and an individual’s experiences upon them, transformed the urban and 
suburban built environment, changed urban planning practices, and altered societal 
notions of technology, speed, and time.26 This study highlights the role these structures 
played in shaping individual’s conceptions of place. Concerns about how the presence or 
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absence of a highway, bus route, or train track might impact their homes or the character 
of their neighborhoods motivated Houstonians to engage with debates about mobility.  
Transportation structures and their uses are simultaneously ephemeral and 
permanent parts of urban life. A pedestrian’s route may change on a daily basis or a 
commuter may take the same drive each morning for decades. Mobility practices can 
shift with the turn of the wheel or the acceleration of a gait. Yet, all these uses are carried 
out on a system of semi-permanent pieces of the cityscape. Overpasses and sidewalks are 
built to last. Steel, concrete, and asphalt persist for years. As much as these elements are 
defined by their uses, their placement, form, and intended purpose reflect power. Those 
who dominated decision-making in given moments also determined how and where 
highways and transit systems would be built. In many ways the transient, yet solid nature 
of transportation structures imitates the city writ large. The meanings of spaces can 
change in a moment. So too can seemingly permanent structures be demolished. 
Buildings, roads, and cities continue to be made and remade, if only to be imagined and 
forgotten anew by those who look upon them.  
Houstonians, like all Americans in the postwar period, ascribed both vernacular 
and formal definitions to highways and mass transit systems they encountered. A road 
that to some marked a boundary—or barrier—between two communities for others 
served as a link between two end points. Elected officials and planning professionals 
designed routes and passed laws that established rules for the use of roadways and public 
buses, yet users could violate those regulations by speeding, resisting segregated riding 
rules, or contesting the construction of the systems themselves.27 For much of the 1900s, 
access to mobility, particularly automobility, meant access to freedom from protective 
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parents, stifling hometowns, meddling employers, or crowded cities.28 This driving-as-
autonomy message made highways a sign of American ingenuity and individualism. It 
was appropriated and put to use by young Americans, car companies, and even the 
government.29 Highways became problematic in the 1970s as an increasing number of 
Americans worried about the environmental problems they created and their detrimental 
influence on urban form, issues that contributed to the reemergence of mass transit. Such 
shifts illustrate how seemingly unchanging parts of the urban landscape can reveal a great 
deal about the larger space they inhabit and the society that built and used them.  
Despite the open road’s hold on the postwar American psyche, securing access to 
that dream and to even more basic forms of mobility during the twentieth century was far 
from a given; rather, it was linked to power relations and often dependent upon one’s 
race, age, class, and gender.30 Car ownership rates among African Americans, for 
example, while on the rise in the 1950s, remained about half that of white Americans, 
making this group more dependent upon public transportation.31 In Houston, African 
Americans fought against segregation on city transit systems throughout the first half of 
the twentieth century and into the postwar period. As the size of the metropolitan area 
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grew in the 1950s, carless Houstonians recognized that access to adequate transportation 
was a necessity and the topic began to take on added importance in city debates. Bus 
riders of all races complained to the private companies throughout the decade as service 
faltered. Some African American residents in the Acres Home community felt so 
underserved by the white-owned bus companies that they ran their own bus between 
downtown and the subdivision for a decade between 1958 and 1968.32 As discussed in 
Chapter Four, African Americans and ethnic Mexicans rejected the city’s first attempt to 
make a public transit authority because they doubted that it would serve their needs. 
These actions, similar to those occurring across the nation in the 1950s and 1960s, 
demonstrated that Houstonians with circumscribed access to mobility not only recognized 
this denial, but acted to correct it.  
This study’s simultaneous focus on massive elements of the built environment 
and the cultural and political responses to those components by a variety of Houstonians, 
required the innovative use of a wide collection of visual, oral history, and written 
sources. Maps, historic photographs, aerial imagery, and Houston city directories helped 
to paint a picture of how Houston’s transportation structures altered the landscape of the 
city over the course of this study. Sanborn Fire Insurance Company maps captured 
images of neighborhoods before and after roads came through, giving a graphic sense of 
transition. On top of these visual sources, written government documents—city council 
minutes, county election results, and environmental impact statements—all provided 
valuable insight into how the official perspective toward transportation was formed. 
Documents created by the Houstonians who resisted or championed specific modes of 
movement also proved fruitful. Hand-drawn signs warning about the dangers of a road’s 
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construction and community newspaper stories about the need for rail illustrate how 
residents viewed the debates in which they participated. 
Beyond archival research, oral histories comprise an important element of this 
dissertation because they illuminate the impact that highways and mass transit projects 
had on people’s lives in ways that the textual archive cannot. Interviews allowed 
Houstonians to discuss the shifting character of their communities before and after the 
building of transportation structures. To augment the significant oral history collections 
in local archives, I conducted eleven interviews. These were split evenly between: 1) 
Houstonians who experienced the rise of transportation structures from the perspective of 
private citizens; and 2) Houstonians who participated in their construction as both private 
citizens and public officials. In order to find subjects for these interviews, I canvassed 
community organizations in areas on which my dissertation focused (e.g. the Fifth Ward 
near Interstate 10), sought interviewees who represented particular groups whose 
perspectives I hoped to include (e.g. African Americans), or who participated in specific 
groups related to my project (e.g. The Metropolitan Organization). To find interviewees 
whose professional life overlapped with aspects of my project I interviewed several 
former METRO officials, a former highway commissioner, and a land use lawyer.  
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 “Power Moves” use two sections of three chapters each to cover the 
transportation debates that occurred in the city between 1950 and 1985. The section 
division is drawn between chapters that deal solely with decisions about roadways 
between 1950 and 1970 and those that consider a series of mass transit referenda that 
occurred between 1973 and 1983. The first section, “Roads to Live By,” considers 
Houston’s embrace of highway construction, the effects of that building program, and the 
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first instance of successful citizen pushback against a roadway. This section demonstrates 
how the political process that shaped the city’s transportation network slowly 
democratized between 1950 and 1970 as citizens became more engaged. The second 
section, “Transit Debates,” looks at referenda held in 1973, 1978, and 1983 that 
considered the idea of building a mass transit system in Houston. The debates around 
these votes demonstrated how politics and decision-making about transportation in the 
city had changed since 1950. The choices those citizens of the HMA who voted in the 
three referenda made structured the area’s transportation system—and the city itself—for 
decades to come. 
Chapter One provides the historical context of Houston’s postwar rise to national 
prominence and highlights the central position that transportation structures played in 
enabling its ascent. In particular, it explains how the city made highways its primary 
purveyor of mobility by the early 1950s. It draws a picture of Houston’s political climate 
and establishes the state of Houstonians’ engagement with the politics of mobility in the 
immediate postwar period. Highlighting the positions of corporate leaders, suburban real 
estate developers, and elected officials, this chapter demonstrates the top-down nature of 
decision-making in 1950s Houston. It also examines the political priorities championed 
by this leadership group. From resistance to zoning to an embrace of annexation, the 
common thread between these practices was the encouragement of economic growth and 
the maintenance of tight control over city politics in order to maintain elite influence. It 
concludes by describing the HMA’s postwar highway development and the changes it 
brought to Houston’s physical shape.  
Chapter Two picks up on the opening chapter’s discussion of the construction and 
planning of the city’s transportation system by focusing on three major road projects built 
during the 1950s and early 1960s. The process of developing these highways displayed 
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how elite Houstonians and officials drove the planning process, and, for the most part, 
ignored the concerns of everyday Houstonians. By looking closely at projects that cut 
through central city neighborhoods populated by African Americans and at the planning 
of a road through an all-white suburb, this chapter will demonstrate citizens’ relative lack 
of power in transportation planning during the postwar period and the broad effects 
highways had on residents’ lives. While roads shaped all parts of the city, the projects 
that ran through African American and ethnic Mexican areas undeniably took a larger 
physical toll, displacing far more residents and claiming many more homes through 
eminent domain. Citizens throughout the HMA could do little to change this initial round 
of construction, but as this chapter concludes, the actions residents took to resist these 
seemingly inevitable projects shifted the way Houstonians engaged in debates about 
mobility and the networks that allowed it. 
Chapter Three documents a shift in whose vision of the politics of mobility 
influenced the city’s transportation choices. Along with Chapter Four, this chapter acts as 
the hinge for the dissertation. It captures one of the earliest examples of successful citizen 
pushback against top-down decision-making in Houston. Focused on a proposal to 
construct a highway through the predominantly ethnic Mexican East End, this chapter 
examines how citizens conceptualized and organized against the roadway, what 
arguments they advanced, and why they succeeded in blocking the roadway. East Enders 
resisted highway plans by employing a rhetoric that called for democratic self-
determinism, environmental justice, and civil rights. Combined with changes to federal 
laws about public works oversight and a nationwide funding crisis, the resistance of 
citizens helped derail the highway project.33 This signaled one of the first times that 
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Houstonians successfully implemented their own visions for mobility and served as a 
rebuttal to the previously unimpeachable planning power of city elites and officials. 
Chapter Four represents the first chapter of Section II, “Transit Debates.” At the 
same time that East Enders debated the construction of the highway, all Houstonians 
considered the merits of creating the city’s first publicly owned mass transit agency, the 
Houston Area Rapid Transit Authority (HARTA). Emerging at a time when cities across 
the United States were considering rail-based mass transit systems as a way to ease traffic 
congestion and address environmental problems, the HARTA vote represented the city’s 
first postwar opportunity to alter its approach to mobility. The city’s changing political 
atmosphere manifested itself in the debate as a unique coalition of African American, 
ethnic Mexican, and working-class white suburbanites opposed the plan and helped to 
reject the HARTA proposal. This unique political alliance demonstrated the peculiarities 
of the HMA’s metropolitan power structure and challenges historical narrative about the 
relationship between cities and suburbs in the 1970s.   
Chapter Five considers the city’s second attempt to create a mass transit authority 
and shows that defining the politics of mobility remained a truly metropolitan debate. The 
lead up to the vote to create the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Houston and Harris 
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County (METRO), saw a similar alliance of black, ethnic Mexican, and, this time, 
wealthier suburban whites who lived in areas that the transit authority would serve, once 
again influence the outcome of a metropolitan vote. These groups used their political 
power to gain concessions before helping to approve METRO. The Authority’s 
inauguration not only signaled the continued importance of citizen input to transportation 
planning, but also offered black and ethnic Mexican Houstonians another opportunity to 
assert their own political desires into HMA-wide discussions. 
Chapter Six, the final chapter, documents how the debate around two additional 
transportation referenda led to the dissolution of the fragile alliance of the city’s citizens 
of color and white suburbanites. The referenda consisted of a second attempt to create a 
rail system and a vote to commission a Harris County toll road authority. A powerful 
civic group, The Metropolitan Organization (TMO), came out on the side of the rail plan. 
An interracial network of church groups from within the city’s inner loop, the group 
believed rail held greater promise for central city residents than the toll road proposal. 
Supporters of the tollway plan, mostly white suburbanites from both affluent and 
working-class municipalities, decided that they no longer wanted to support Houston-
based transit systems. They supported toll roads that could bring them into downtown 
with ease. The debate laid bare the tensions between city and suburban citizens that had 
remained dormant in Houston for longer than other cities and showed the staying power 
of auto-centric planning. In the end the toll road plan won out. For the next two decades 
transportation development in the HMA remained road-based and suburb-oriented. 
Despite Houston’s history of balanced metropolitan politics, the 1983 outcomes made it 
clear that white suburbanites possessed the ability to implement their visions of the 
politics of mobility and this reality shaped the city’s approach to transportation in the 
ensuing twenty years.  
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Through these chapters this dissertation will trace how a wide variety of 
Houstonians engaged in debates about mobility and the nature of transportation structures 
in order to shape the city in ways that served their interests. Over thirty-five years 
Houston transitioned from a city dominated, but not controlled, by a small cohort of 
white elites into a metropolitan area whose multiethnic electorate weighed in on the 
choices of both the city and wider HMA. The decisions Houstonians made about their 
transportation networks and the visions those choices projected, held increasingly 
important roles in shaping the physical city. Houstonians never agreed upon what 
mobility meant, but by striving to define and secure it for themselves, they formulated 
Houston’s unique system and built the structures along which Houstonians still move 
today.
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Building a Highway Metropolis:  
The Origins and Advent of Houston’s Postwar Growth  
This is Houston. It is a city that refuses to stand still for anybody. It is a city where the 
old—except in its sturdiest forms—quickly disappears, in which the new quickly 
becomes the old, in which change is relentless and rushing. It is a city on the move, with 
few to observe its movement, for most of its citizens are moving with it, moving too 
swiftly to stand aside and watch…Pause, if you safely can, somewhere beside the Gulf 
Freeway. The movement will dazzle you. But do not stand still too long…you might get 
run over. Or—what is worse in Houston—you surely will get left behind. 
W.D. Bedell, Houston Post, 1957 
Despite its growing pains it was clear to almost every observer between 1945 and 
1960 that Houston represented the future of urban America. The city and its inhabitants 
seemed to never stop moving. From home to work, from city center to suburb, along local 
streets and smooth new highways, Houstonians’ movement, both their economic and 
physical mobility, provided the city with the essential elements of its postwar reputation. 
Its pulsating activity orbited around symbols of the city’s growth: the headquarters of 
national petroleum companies that dominated downtown; the massive oil refineries and 
petrochemical companies along the ship channel; the nascent but bustling medical center; 
lot after lot and subdivision after subdivision of suburban tract housing; and the 
expanding road network that connected all these places. Behind this movement stood an 
economic boom that began during World War II and persisted in the decades after the 
war. This growth brought hundreds of thousands of migrants to the city—whites and 
African Americans from East Texas and Louisiana, ethnic Mexicans from the Rio Grande 
Valley and Northern Mexico, and increasingly, white Americans from beyond the South 
and the Southwest. These people brought their own life experiences, politics, and visions 
for the future with them and added them to Houston’s already complicated mixture. 
Housing these newcomers required a massive residential build up that transformed the 
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ranches and fields around the city into homes and subdivisions, and made vast amounts 
of wealth for real estate speculators. Lucrative wartime industries—especially 
petrochemicals and petroleum refining—transitioned into postwar operation and drove 
the expansion of Houston’s economy.1  
As national media profiles of the city hinted, though, Houston’s rapid 
transformation from city to metropolis did not come without problems. Writing for the 
Saturday Evening Post in 1947, George Sessions Perry described the city as groping its 
way toward greatness: “it is an incipient heavyweight champion in its pimply-faced 
adolescence, virile, disordered, in selected spots beautiful, but primarily awesome and 
unstoppable.”2 Houston’s population increase and outward physical expansion gave the 
city a reputation of strength, yet those very forces also precipitated some of Houston’s 
most pressing infrastructural and political challenges. Suburban residential development 
placed immense service demands on local governments. City departments worked 
diligently to build and expand sewage and water networks, local streets, and drainage 
systems, but the construction of these systems and other infrastructure lagged throughout 
the city. Suburban municipalities absorbed thousands of the area’s migrants and with 
their newfound numbers challenged Houston’s dominance of metropolitan politics. The 
combination of the city’s longtime resistance to zoning and the Houston Metropolitan 
Area’s (HMA) rapid growth resulted in a volatile mixture of land uses and complicated 
local planning efforts. An accumulation of automobiles led to congested highways and 
demands for new transportation structures. Changing demographics forced city 
                                                
1 Joseph A. Pratt, The Growth of a Refining Region (Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press, Inc, 1980), 99-107. Real 
estate boomed in the 1950s and 1960s with both residential and commercial construction on the rise in the 
suburbs and downtown, Joseph A. Pratt and Walter Buenger, But Also Good Business: Texas Commerce 
Banks and the Financing of Houston and Texas, 1886-1986 (College Station: Texas A&M University, 
1986), 222-226. 




politicians and their elite allies to scramble to maintain the status quo and to protect their 
power. When Houstonians attempted to address these issues, they disagreed over what 
their city needed and how it should grow. 
Houstonians did not experience the benefits of the city’s growth or the pains of its 
problems in equal measure. White-collar and blue-collar white residents found gainful 
employment in a number of industries and benefitted from access to cheap homes 
throughout the HMA. African American and ethnic Mexican residents, on the other hand, 
faced differing forms of discrimination that prevented them from accessing the spoils of 
Houston’s postwar growth—higher-paying jobs and better housing—at the same rates as 
white Houstonians. The majority of blacks and ethnic Mexicans continued to work in 
low-level oil industry jobs, as laborers at places such as the Port of Houston, or as service 
workers. Blacks remained disenfranchised until the 1960s. Race-based segregation 
limited their access to public resources and kept them confined to particular areas of the 
city. Houstonians of Mexican origin, while enfranchised and defined as white throughout 
most of the twentieth century, nonetheless faced discrimination based upon their 
nationality and confronted similar economic and social boundaries as blacks that 
prevented them from securing public resources.  
Compounding the effects of such discrimination, black and ethnic Mexican 
Houstonians confronted the negative consequences of Houston’s growth on a daily basis. 
The poor physical condition of neighborhoods populated by these Houstonians 
demonstrated that Houston officials neglected communities of color in order to focus 
resources on white, wealthier parts of the city. The Houston government invested little 
public money toward improving these areas prior to the 1960s. Streets were often 
unpaved or lacked proper drainage; healthcare, education, and recreation facilities were 
woefully inadequate. However, continued in-migration of black and ethnic Mexican 
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immigrants changed the political dynamics of the city beginning in the late 1950s. 
Backed by the electoral power of a growing constituency and empowered by state and 
national level civil rights victories, these Houstonians clamored evermore insistently for a 
seat at the city’s table.3  
This chapter argues that the construction of the HMA’s highway network and the 
contemporaneous, interconnected expansion of suburban development between 1945 and 
1960 both triggered and reflected changes taking place within the HMA because of its 
demographic and territorial growth. The geographic spread of residents, and the 
subsequent shift in mobility priorities, resulted in a diffusion of political power 
throughout the HMA, weakening Houston officials once nearly complete control of 
metropolitan decision-making and necessitating a greater degree of metropolitan-wide 
planning than ever before. To both the elected officials contending with growth and the 
residents creating it, highways seemed to provide a solution to many of the problems the 
HMA faced. The construction of highways not only transformed the way Houstonians 
moved, but also rearticulated how residents interacted with one another and understood 
their city by reshaping its built environment. Citizens projected a variety of meanings 
onto the planning and construction of the city’s highways, articulating their own 
understandings of the politics of mobility. With near unanimity they recognized 
transportation structures as vital to the future of the city. Yet, what Houstonians could not 
agree upon, and what became increasingly contested over the course of the remainder of 
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the twentieth century, was who would hold the power to determine the shape these 
structures took and whose interests they would serve.  
The diverse set of Houstonians who participated in postwar growth and 
transportation discussions offered competing expectations for mobility. Elected officials 
and wealthy elites, an overwhelmingly white and male group, viewed mobility as central 
to ensuring that the HMA continued to grow economically and physically. For this reason 
they worked diligently to remove constraints caused by traffic congestion or limited 
infrastructure. For suburbanites, again predominantly white and middle- to upper-class, 
but also consisting of working-class whites in municipalities along the ship channel, 
mobility meant easy access to sites of employment, recreation, and consumption. They 
expected politicians and planners to provide them with roads that could take them from 
their driveway to points throughout the HMA in their private automobiles and at low 
cost. For city residents, people from a number of racial groups and economic classes, 
mobility was more complicated. After the war, Houstonians in the central city could 
access the city’s limited private bus companies, but by that point all who could afford 
them, mostly white Houstonians and a smaller percentage of wealthier blacks and ethnic 
Mexican Houstonians, owned private cars. Like their suburban counterparts, car-owning 
Houstonians pressured officials to provide the infrastructure they required. HMA car 
owners supported investment in roads and did not raise a fuss as the city’s private mass 
transit system deteriorated. Other city residents, mainly from lower economic stations 
and predominantly black or ethnic Mexican, relied on walking or buses for their daily 
movements. Even if they experienced segregation on the buses, as blacks did until the 
1960s, or if the systems failed to adequately meet the service demand in their 
neighborhoods, as was the case with both populations, the systems were essential to the 
daily movements of black and ethnic Mexican Houstonians. The decline of the city’s bus 
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system and the splintering of neighborhoods by roadways, then, meant a great deal of 
disruption to riders and pedestrians alike. Unfortunately for members of these groups, in 
the immediate postwar period they possessed very little political power, or at least not 
enough to cancel out the demands of their more influential counterparts.  
Between 1945 and 1960 elected officials, their professional staffs, and a small, 
but influential coterie of elites—leaders from the Houston Chamber of Commerce, 
executives of major corporations, land and real estate developers, and oilmen—
dominated, but never completely controlled, local decision-making.4 Martin Melosi 
argues that one of the main distinctions between pre- and postwar Houston was that the 
postwar infrastructure decisions of city officials rippled outward to affect the 
development of the HMA in ways they had not prior to the war.5 Highways captured the 
metropolitan influence these leaders possessed exceedingly well. Houston leaders hoped 
that road construction would stimulate the HMA economy by driving suburban 
development and increasing land values. Moreover, they intended for the building of the 
highway system to secure their control over the entire HMA by linking outlying citizens 
and communities evermore closely to the central city.6 The immense influence of 
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Houston leaders during the postwar period made their choices about roadways, and 
mobility in general, the de facto choices of the entire metropolitan area.  
While officials may have touted highways as beneficial for all Houstonians, few 
non-professional, non-elite residents played a role in their planning during the 1950s and 
1960s. This dearth of citizen oversight mirrored national patterns in highway decision-
making and reflected the realities of Houston politics.7 Not only did officials, usually 
planners and engineers, decide what systems would be built and where they would run, 
they also determined which parts of Houston and which Houstonians would receive the 
benefits or suffer the consequences of their construction. However, non-elite Houstonians 
were not entirely absent from the process of creating the HMA’s transportation network 
or its meaning during this period. Citizens influenced the city’s embrace of highways by 
buying cars, demanding auto-centric infrastructure, and moving to the suburbs. Further, 
as the consequences of road development—displacement, traffic noise, and altered 
neighborhoods—became clear after their construction in the early 1960s, affected citizens 
complained and expressed hesitancy about further implementation. As later chapter will 
show, this hesitancy would grow into outright resistance by the late 1960s and 1970s.  
ANTECEDENTS TO HOUSTON’S POSTWAR GROWTH 
As the quote that opened this chapter makes clear, Houston’s postwar expansion 
and seemingly ever-changing urban landscape fascinated the American public during the 
1950s. Postwar portraits of Houston, however, too often depicted the city as an overnight 
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sensation and ignored the decisions and policies that jumpstarted its ascent from regional 
capital to international metropolis during the preceding half century. Stepping away from 
the glossy magazine versions of Houston allows one to see the roots of the city’s 
economic and physical development. Many of the same processes and actors that shaped 
Houston’s growth between 1900 and 1945 remained influential as the city entered the 
postwar period. Understanding their places is essential to understanding the decisions 
Houstonians made about mobility in the 1950s.   
Between 1900 and 1960, Houston’s economic elite—a group of white, male 
bankers, real estate developers, lumber and cotton magnates, and oilmen—dominated 
decision-making in Houston. This group generally remained outside elected office, but 
close political allies like mayor Oscar Holcombe, who served off and on as mayor for 
thirty-three years between 1921 and 1956, often acted on their behalf.8 Jesse Jones, one 
of the city’s leading businessmen and its most influential citizen from the 1920s to the 
1950s, never sought elected office but nonetheless parlayed his business success and 
influence into an important role in the national Democratic Party. His financial acumen 
was so respected that Republican President Herbert Hoover appointed him to the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932. President Franklin Roosevelt made him 
chairman of the organization in 1933 and United States Secretary of Commerce in 1940. 
These positions put a Houstonian in charge of millions of dollars in federal funds during 
the Great Depression.9 In addition to Jones other leaders such as M.D. Anderson and Will 
Clayton, owners of one of the world’s largest cotton-trading companies; brothers George 
and Herman Brown, owners of the construction company Brown and Root; and Gus 
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Wortham, owner of American General insurance, each supported important local, state, 
and federal politicians, including Lyndon B. Johnson and Albert Thomas during the 
1930s and 1940s. They maintained close relationships with these politicians as they 
moved into positions from which they would help develop Houston after World War II.10 
As the city grew in the postwar period, suburban developers joined this group of elites.   
The close relationship elites maintained with government officials from the local, 
state, and national level permitted them to implement their visions for the future of the 
city during the postwar period. They justified their influence by maintaining that their 
actions were selfless, aimed not at enriching themselves, but instead intended to improve 
the city as a whole.11 While these elites financially benefitted from many of the reforms 
and policies they supported, initiatives to modernize the city’s banking system and update 
its infrastructure systems also stoked Houston’s general advancement and growth.12 Such 
results allowed elites to paint themselves as Houston-first boosters and to gain even more 
decision-making power.13 From their position of influence elites could also criticize 
practices or policies such as zoning, higher taxation, or the enshrinement of civil and 
labor rights that they believed threatened either their own economic and political interests 
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or the economic growth of the city. By resisting such policies and spurning progressive 
social practices elites helped foster an undemocratic atmosphere in Houston where the 
votes and concerns of working-class and poor Houstonians of all races were routinely 
ignored by elected officials and their elite supporters.14 
Neither the city’s rapid growth nor the wealth of many of its elites would have 
been possible without Houston’s access to an abundance of natural resources and the 
links created between the city and global economies from the early 1900s onward.15 Prior 
to 1900, agricultural products such as lumber and cotton buoyed Houston’s economy and 
were packaged in the city before being sent to either Galveston or New Orleans for sale. 
Then, in the early 1900s, three key developments placed the city at the center of the 
Texas oil boom and changed its economy drastically.16 The destruction of Galveston by a 
hurricane in 1900, the discovery of oil outside of Houston at Spindletop in 1901, and the 
construction of a deep-sea port and ship channel in the 1910s propelled Houston’s 
transformation into an “energy-intensive metropolis,” in which the oil industry 
inextricably shaped the economy and the physical environment.17 By the 1930s, oil was 
the largest producer of wealth in the region. The nation’s petrochemical industry came to 
Houston during World War II. Seemingly overnight dozens of refineries and factories 
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populated the shorelines of the ship channel all the way to Galveston Bay.18 The 
concentration of the oil industry and its derivatives drew secondary, supply-chain 
businesses to the city, increasing oil’s economic footprint.19  
The construction and improvement of transportation networks aided the 
development of Houston’s resource-based economy and influenced the built environment 
of the city. Prior to 1900 Houston was mainly a railway hub and collection point for 
inland resources.20 Rail continued to be a major freight system for the city well into the 
twentieth century. After a hurricane destroyed Galveston in 1900, though, Houston had 
an opportunity to take water-borne commerce away from its regional rival. Local 
business leaders and Houston elected officials at the city and national level leapt at the 
chance. Using a mix of funds from Houston and the federal government they created a 
deep-sea port and the Houston Ship Channel in the 1910s.21  
While the ship channel and freight railways influenced the industrial and 
economic development of the city, commuter transportation shaped the city’s residential 
and commercial patterns. Houston’s first mass transit firm, the Houston City Railway 
Company, began to operate a horse-drawn streetcar in 1868. By 1891, electrified 
streetcars were the norm and by 1927 track mileage had reached a peak of ninety miles. 
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These lines spurred the development of residential neighborhoods farther from 
downtown, with streetcar suburbs popping up in River Oaks, Houston Heights, and 
Magnolia Park. By the mid-1920s, private automobiles began to eat into ridership and 
private bus companies with more flexible routes competed with the streetcars for patrons. 
By 1940, all of Houston’s streetcars were gone, driven out by the combination of low 
ridership and financial problems.22 By World War II, auto transit—both car and bus—
dominated the city, but Houston lacked a formal highway plan until the 1940s. State and 
city officials recognized that roads, like rail before them, offered an opportunity to 
connect the city to the hinterlands and hoped that highways would afford the HMA 
access to the nation’s flowering trucking industry.23 Leaders began to seriously formulate 
plans for a metropolitan road system during the war. The construction of the first 
highways and the growing number of private automobiles, combined with the poor 
management of the private bus companies, caused a free fall in bus ridership during the 
1950s. By the end of the decade, bus companies, like streetcars before them, struggled to 
maintain service levels. 
Regulations, and their absence, also influenced the city’s built environment during 
the twentieth century. Houston’s lack of a zoning ordinance, for example, led to several 
physical outcomes for the city. Residents considered enacting zoning regulations four 
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times between 1927 and 1965, but each time voters rejected proposals.24 Many elite 
businessmen, particularly real estate developers, argued against zoning because they 
believed it compromised the city’s adherence to free-market principles. Driving that 
argument was the fact that the absence of rigid zoning rules allowed developers to 
determine the direction of the city’s growth by placing commercial and residential 
projects in any area they wished.25 The fact that development was unencumbered by 
zoning also encouraged a state of constant transition in Houston’s built environment, with 
structures going up or coming down on a nearly daily basis. The construction of 
highways through Houston neighborhoods in the 1950s and 1960s, and the displacement 
they caused, then, were not anomalies, but rather another iteration of the city’s changing 
landscape. Houstonians were not of one mind about such patterns, as demonstrated by 
resistance to highways, historic preservation drives, and campaigns for zoning. The city’s 
lax land-use regulations also complicated attempts to plan future infrastructure systems.26  
The absence of zoning and other such regulations did not affect the lives of 
Houstonians in the same way. Several residential neighborhoods, particularly those 
populated by wealthier white Houstonians, relied on segregation, distance, high property 
values, and deed restrictions or restrictive covenants to protect the character of their 
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neighborhoods during the twentieth century.27 For the first half of the century, de jure 
segregation kept African Americans hemmed into historically black neighborhoods in the 
city center. De facto segregation and economic limitations likewise kept Houstonians of 
Mexican origin concentrated in particular parts of the city. After the U.S. Supreme Court, 
in Shelley v. Kraemer, outlawed explicitly racial restrictions in 1948, previously white 
communities near black and ethnic Mexican neighborhoods began to integrate. Without 
legal justification for keeping these groups out, white residents attempted to organize 
neighbors to prevent home sales to blacks or ethnic Mexicans and resorted to violence to 
keep black families from moving into their neighborhoods. In 1953, for example, the 
home of the first black family to move into the previously all white Riverside subdivision 
was bombed.28 As it became clear that even such drastic measure would not keep blacks 
and ethnic Mexican Houstonians out of formerly white neighborhoods, whites moved to 
subdivisions away from traditionally black and ethnic Mexican neighborhoods, hoping 
that distance and high home prices would keep their neighborhoods exclusive. By 
rewriting restrictions to prevent residents from renting rooms, creating businesses, or 
using properties for any practices deemed detrimental to the property values and peace of 
mind of their neighbors, communities hoped to keep home values high enough to make it 
difficult for lower-income residents to purchase a home. This approach was particularly 
effective in the city’s most economically exclusive neighborhoods such as River Oaks. 
Residents here put a great deal of resources toward maintaining deed restrictions. Less 
prosperous neighborhoods could not defend deed restrictions to the same extent and this 
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contributed to white flight and slow integration in areas nearest African American and 
ethnic Mexican neighborhoods.29  
Since Houston’s founding in 1836, the city has been framed, by Houstonians and 
non-Houstonians alike, as a model of free-market capitalism.30 This reputation persisted 
into the decades between 1950 and 1985 and Houston’s postwar elected officials and 
elites continued to promote the city as a bastion of laissez-faire capitalism. They argued 
that the hard work and business acumen of residents, combined with a commitment to 
limited government and low taxation, could foster economic success. Despite building a 
reputation for both themselves and the city as a champion of the free market, though, 
after World War II much of Houston’s infrastructure growth depended upon the financial 
support of the federal and Texas governments. Houston officials and elites coveted 
investment in roads, oil pipelines, and the port, because they believed this would 
encourage economic growth. At the same time, officials and elites resisted public 
subsidies for social programs such as public housing because they worried that the 
federal oversight attached to such programs could threaten their political hold on the city. 
They also thought that investing in lower-income areas might led to further questioning 
of the political status quo. To justify these concerns they argued that these practices 
would result in higher taxes and make Houston beholden to federal dollars.31  
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Despite their public dislike of federal money, this funding was essential to the rise 
of some of Houston’s most important postwar elites. The Brown brothers would not have 
been the major players they were after World War II without wartime contracts their 
company, Brown and Root, received to build oil pipelines and construct ships for the 
Navy. Similar contracts continued after the war, when they rebuilt war-damaged areas 
and constructed North Atlantic Treaty Organization airbases throughout Europe. The 
corporation used this momentum to become one of the largest construction companies in 
the nation. By the 1960s, Brown and Root was one of only two construction firms in the 
U.S. to have revenues of more than $1 billion.32 The Browns were not alone in receiving 
federal support during World War II. Like other southern and southwestern cities, 
Houston as a whole received significant federal investment. Between contracts let to 
businesses like Brown and Root, the building of two oil pipelines, and support for the 
petrochemical industry, the federal government sent nearly $265 million to Houston 
during the war.33 This was a huge investment for a city supposedly allergic to federal 
money and one that helped to vault Houston into the postwar period with a strong 
economy. Infrastructure continued to be a major source of federal and state investment 
into Houston during the 1950s and 1960s as the interstate system was planned and 
constructed. Even as city officials accepted millions of dollars to support Houston’s 
roads, they continued to resist funds for social programs until the mid-1960s when civil 
rights agitation and federal policy changes forced leaders to accept more funding.  
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The people of the HMA celebrated the arrival of the millionth Houstonian on July 
3, 1954. The same day, developer Frank Sharp announced plans to open a huge suburban 
development, Sharpstown, in southwest Houston.34 The timing of the two events 
demonstrated the link between Houston’s decades of population growth and the 
explosion of suburban developments oriented around new highways. Articles celebrating 
Houston’s population achievement framed the success as both a result of wise past 
decisions and as an indication of its promising future. The Houston Post drew a straight 
line from the city’s four decades of “industrial and business growth” since the building of 
the ship channel to its huge postwar population influx. Further down that line stood the 
hundreds of new residential subdivisions like the ones Sharp announced on “Millionth 
Day.” These communities succeeded because they met the needs and expectations of the 
professional Americans flocking to Houston and of those Houstonians looking to move 
out of the city to its environs.35 Newsweek viewed the city’s millionth person and the 
announcement of Sharpstown as evidence of the effectiveness of Houston’s approach to 
development. According to the magazine, over the past fifty years Houston had advanced 
from a “piece of muddy nothing in the middle of nowhere,” to a towering city that 
everyday looked more and more like “the shape and shadow of America’s future.”36 
Oil, and the wealth it created, remained a key cog in Houston’s economy and 
culture after the war, often influencing the development of new parts of the city. Oil-rich 
businessmen and major petroleum companies invested in the burgeoning medical center 
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and bet heavily on suburban real estate development. As companies poured their 
resources into the city, they also injected the interests of their firms into Houston’s future. 
When Humble Oil—which later became ExxonMobil—created a real estate subsidiary, 
Friendswood Development Corporation, in the late 1950s, the company directly 
connected its corporate interests to city and metropolitan growth. Humble executives 
pushed for highway access to their real estate holdings, supported laws that made 
development easier, and actively campaigned to bring the new National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) space center to Houston in the early 1960s. The siting of 
the center next to Friendswood’s first major subdivision development created a financial 
windfall for the company.37  
Oil companies were not alone in attempting to influence and gain from the 
Houston’s growth. Corporations such as Prudential Insurance chose to build in the 
growing medical center area in hopes of gaining from early entry into what many 
believed would become a second downtown. Prudential’s choice proved prescient; by 
1960 the medical center contained over $94 million of taxable value and another $30 
million was in development.38  
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Transportation, and the commerce it allowed, continued to hold a central place in 
the city’s economic expansion after the war. By the late 1940s, Houston’s port handled 
the second most cargo by weight in the United States, trailing only New York City, 
making it the center of trade in the American South. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
had invested nearly $50 million in widening and dredging the channel.39 In the late 
1950s, port officials predicted that the transportation hub would only continue to grow.  
Looking forward, port manager J.B. Turner declared that Houston would continue to be a 
“Doorway to the World.” Indeed, as it had for decades before, the city and its port 
benefitted from their position at the tip of a funnel that collected the raw materials and 
trade products “from its own surrounding territories and the great hinterlands available to 
it,” refined and repackaged them and then sent them into onto global markets.40 In 1963, 
nearly 11 percent of the city’s workforce was employed at the port or an ancillary 
business.41  
Booming commerce and an expanding oil-based economy brought migrants to the 
city in droves. For decades prior to 1945, rural black Texans and Louisianans, ethnic 
Mexican immigrants from the Rio Grande Valley and northern Mexico, and white 
Americans from throughout Texas and the South came to the city for a variety of 
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reasons.42 After the war, though, Harris County experienced greater raw population 
increases than it had in the 1920s and 1930s, when the city grew at its fastest rate because 
of the oil boom. Once again, oil was central to this movement. Jobs in refining, 
petrochemicals, engineering, and secondary industries drew hundreds of thousands to the 
city.43 In addition to oil, the mass implementation of air conditioning, the expansion of 
manufacturing, and the suburban real estate boom contributed to the growth of Houston 
and other southern and southwestern cities.44 The population of Houstonians of Mexican 
origin rose from 20,000 people in 1940 to more than 75,000 in 1960, an increase of 275 
percent. The population of African Americans leapt from 86,000 to more than 215,000 by 
1960, an increase of 150 percent. The white population of Harris County rose from 
405,000 in 1940 to well over 918,000 by 1960, growing by more than 127 percent.45 
These three groups remained the most significant populations in the city until the late 
1970s when large numbers of Asian, Middle Eastern, and Central American immigrants 
began to come to the city.46   
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As a result of chain migration, personal preference, and Houston’s patterns of 
segregated housing, the majority of these migrants found homes in established racially 
homogenous neighborhoods.47 A small percentage of African American and ethnic 
Mexican migrants took advantage of suburban developments or settled in working-class 
municipalities like Pasadena, but white migration to those areas dwarfed that of both 
groups. The vast majority of African American and ethnic Mexican migrants settled in or 
near the central city where they encountered vibrant, yet underserved, neighborhoods.  
The central city neighborhoods that accommodated black and ethnic Mexican 
migrants most readily displayed the strain of the city’s expanding population, but 
migration taxed Houston’s entire infrastructure.48 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, 
officials scrambled to construct systems that could keep the city operating smoothly. The 
concentrated settlement patterns of black and ethnic Mexican communities also ensured 
that when highways cut through them that many residents would feel the consequences. 
Suburban areas, on the other hand, generally avoided significant disruption, allowing 
suburbanites to dodge most negative experiences with highways early on in their 
construction. While economic growth and higher rates of employment contributed to a 
larger tax base and brought national acclaim, the mass movement of people to Houston’s 
suburbs also threatened the city’s position as the most dominant city within the HMA. 
Houston officials worried that a failure to provide services to new subdivisions would 
result in these areas joining competing municipalities through annexation. This would 
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lead to Houston losing out on a chance to increase its tax base while helping a 
surrounding municipality grow. To avoid this outcome, officials worked closely with 
developers to create systems that could alleviate service problems. At the same time, city 
leaders expanded their annexation regimen to block the expansion of competing 
municipalities and turned to highway building to tie new developments to the city.49  
By the mid-1950s suburban residential development had become one of 
Houston’s most important industries. Real estate had been a major wealth creator for the 
city’s developers for decades, but prior to the 1930s the majority of that investment 
remained focused in and around the central business district. As the city grew, suburban 
speculation rose. David Bintliff, a prominent financier and developer, for example, began 
building subdivisions in the 1920s. During the 1930s and 1940s, Bintliff bought and sold 
several ranch properties in the southwestern part of the city, eventually owning and 
selling the land that later became Sharpstown. As it became clear that Houston would 
continue to thrive in the postwar period, Bintliff and other developers eagerly snapped up 
land surrounding it that would eventually be annexed by Houston or form part of another 
municipality. By the late 1950s real estate was a primary driver of the city’s economy and 
a huge wealth producer.50 
The rush to develop the thousands of acres of farmland around Houston caused a 
significant change to the landscape of Harris County. Over a twenty-year period the 
county became progressively more urban as Houston expanded. The transition away from 
agricultural land use happened relatively quickly. Harris County reached the peak of its 
farm acreage in 1954 when 690,046 acres, about 60 percent of land in the county, was 
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part of one of its 3,869 farms. By 1974, after steady suburban development, the county 
housed 1,478 farms that covered 483,310 acres, less than 40 percent of the county’s total 
area.51 The expanding territory of Houston’s corporate limits contributed to the shrinking 
of agriculture in Harris County. As Houston’s population grew from 627,311 to 
1,364,569 between 1940 and 1960, the city’s jurisdictional boundaries expanded from 
seventy-three square miles to more than 340.52 Within this increasingly large city, growth 
seemed to be occurring with little to no plan. Commenting on the nature of Houston’s 
expansion in the 1950s, French journalist Pierre Voisin wrote that every developer “is 
doing just as he pleases, building here and there…Houston is spreading like a spilled 
bucket of water.”53  
Behind the seemingly relentless expansion of the city, though, real estate 
speculators and elected officials worked closely to put a number of governance systems 
in place to accommodate and regulate suburban growth.54 Municipal utility districts 
represented one such structure. These districts permitted developers to take on debt in 
order to provide service infrastructure to subdivisions not connected to the city’s 
networks. The creation of a special district required a vote of subdivision residents and 
the approval of the state legislature. Once a district existed, developers could finance 
improvements and pass on debt to residents through taxation and fees. Developers often 
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abused this system by installing a friend or family member as the sole resident of an 
undeveloped subdivision, holding the “election,” which was guaranteed to pass, and then 
securing state approval. The Texas Legislature and local governments, far from stopping 
these abuses, encouraged them by approving districts whose elections occurred under 
dubious circumstances. Officials saw these entities as tools that could help stoke 
economic growth and operate as stopgaps for public service shortfalls. These districts 
blossomed around Houston after World War II, with sixty-two cropping up between 1949 
and 1960, by far the most in any metropolitan area of the state.55  
The advent of these districts led to the emergence of a common, yet problematic 
suburban growth pattern, what architect Lars Lerup, has termed leapfrog development.56 
This pattern emerged as developers built subdivisions in unincorporated areas with low 
land values instead of purchasing more expensive acreage next to existing subdivisions or 
within the city. This resulted in disconnected developments leapfrogging one another. 
This setup made the provision of essential services nearly impossible and drove growth 
well beyond Houston city limits. Texas annexation laws further contributed to the 
expansive nature of Houston’s development by requiring annexing cities to take on the 
indebtedness of the areas they absorbed. For developers, this meant that they rarely had to 
pay off the debts they took on through municipal utility districts. These entities helped 
Houston provide services to underserved areas, but they also added millions in debt to 
municipal budgets and exacerbated metropolitan planning problems because developers 
took little interest in integrating subdivisions into larger comprehensive plans. Once areas 
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were annexed, such lack of foresight created a number of headaches for planners, 
officials, and residents.57 
Houston and its satellite towns all recognized that annexation offered one of the 
easiest ways to capitalize on the area’s growth. The desire to control valuable areas 
precipitated a massive annexation competition that dominated metropolitan politics for 
the next two decades. Prior to 1963, any Texas home rule city had the power to annex 
land contiguous to it borders, a lax standard with the potential to inflame annexation 
battles. Before the war, no such competition existed because Houston’s satellite towns 
were small and the development that occurred did so within areas clearly controlled by 
one municipality or another. This reality kept Houston in charge of metropolitan affairs 
and limited the use of annexation. However, Houston’s satellite towns benefited from the 
same forces that propelled Houston’s growth during the war. Between 1940 and 1950, 
several municipalities incorporated and preexisting towns, like Pasadena and La Porte, 
grew significantly. The expansion desires of these small cities presented roadblocks to 
Houston’s growth.58  
Recognizing that as neighboring municipalities grew they would begin to hem in 
Houston’s metropolitan influence, city leaders acted on their advantages while they 
could. Between 1945 and 1958 the Houston City Council used annexation to absorb a 
huge amount of land, including nearly all the subdivision development that had occurred 
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beyond the city’s boundaries during and immediately after the war. In 1948, 
approximately 85 percent of all subdivision platting occurred outside of the city limits.59 
Motivated to bring this development into the city and add it to its tax rolls the Houston 
City Council enacted the city’s largest annexation ordinance to date in 1949, adding 
nearly 84 square miles of territory. The action brought 139,114 people into the city, and, 
just as importantly, prevented them from incorporating or joining another municipality. 
Even such a large action did not allow Houston to stay ahead of the area’s growth, 
however. By 1956, Houston officials passed another annexation ordinance and this time 
they expanded the city limits by another 184.8 square miles.60 With the two major actions 
Houston’s jurisdictional territory more than quadrupled in less than a decade.61  
In response to Houston’s second large-scale annexation, several industrial cities 
along the ship channel—La Porte, Pasadena, and Deer Park—began employing 
annexation in order to stake their own claims to areas of valuable development. One 
typical move saw Deer Park and La Porte annex the land on which several chemical 
plants lay in an unincorporated part of Harris County, a move that added nearly $250 
million in assessable property values to their tax rolls.62 The most direct challenge to 
Houston’s control of the metropolitan area occurred in 1960, when Pasadena, La Porte, 
Deer Park, and Lomax simultaneously passed ordinances that annexed 106 square miles 
of southeast Harris County and allowed Pasadena to breakout of the territorial box 
Houston officials had purposefully placed around Pasadena in earlier annexations to 
contain the smaller city’s growth. In the aftermath of this move area municipalities 
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passed dozens of annexation orders prompting Houston Post journalist James Holley to 
note that “before the wave of annexation ceased,” most of Harris County and the 
surrounding five other counties, “had been blanketed by annexation ordinances.”63  
The action of the smaller communities demonstrates the free-for-all nature of 
metropolitan growth in Houston during the 1950s and early 1960s. The competition 
complicated metropolitan planning efforts by turning neighboring municipalities into 
antagonists. Despite the fact that most disputes ended in Houston’s favor, small 
municipalities use of annexation demonstrated to Houston officials that they were no 
longer in complete control of the HMA. These conflicts presaged future negotiations and 
disagreements that would constitute the relationship between the city and its suburbs over 
the course of the 1960s and 1970s.  
Worried that the disruptive annexation battles could stymie metropolitan and 
statewide growth, state officials decided to enact legislation designed to end the 
competitions. Luckily for Houston officials, when the Texas Legislature passed the 
Municipal Annexation Act (MAA) of 1963, they gave Texas’ largest cities an advantage. 
The MAA quelled metropolitan annexation competition by assigning municipalities a 
defined extra-territorial jurisdiction (ETJ)—a territory outside of a city’s corporate limits 
which only that city could annex. The MAA determined ETJ sizes by population, which 
benefited large municipalities. The law established Houston’s control over all 
unincorporated or unclaimed land within five miles of its city limits and gave the city the 
right to expand its territory by ten percent each year.64 Suburban communities had much 
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smaller ETJs. With expansive new powers, Houston officials placed swaths of land into 
its ETJ, preventing suburban municipalities from encircling the city.  
The MAA gave Houston the flexibility to avoid many of the problems other 
American cities confronted with their suburbs. Central cities across the nation competed 
with their bedroom communities for desirable territories, but few controlled as much 
territory or possessed the ability to claim more as freely as Houston. In other locations 
suburban incorporation led to intense levels of metropolitan fragmentation. Historians 
Colin Gordon and Robert O. Self document this process in St. Louis and Oakland, 
respectively. In both locations, suburban municipalities annexed nearly all the land 
surrounding the central city, preventing the larger entity from expanding geographically 
or economically. The resultant stagnation of development contributed to economic 
declines in both cities.65 Houston’s ability to annex land during the postwar decades gave 
the city remarkable flexibility in its expansion. After passage of the MAA, new 
incorporations dropped decidedly within Harris County because Houston controlled most 
of the remaining unincorporated land.66 The MAA also allowed Houston to continue 
dominating metropolitan politics and development. After securing territory, Houston 
officials pushed for the construction of an effective highway system in order to 
consolidate that power. 
                                                
65 Colin Gordon, Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar 
Oakland (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003). The same is true for Los Angeles, see Juliet F. 
Gainsborough, “Bridging the City-Suburb Divide: States and the Politics of Regional Cooperation,” 
Journal of Urban Affairs, 23, no. 5, (2001): 497-512. For a discussion of non-Houston annexation policies 
in Sunbelt cities see Olga Smirnova and Jeremy Ingalls, “Influence of State Annexation Laws on the 
Growth of Selected Southern Cities,” Southern Geographer 47 (11) (May 2007): 83-97. For the importance 
of flexibility in annexation ability to city development see David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993).  
66 James Holley, “29 Cities in County—and that May Be All,” Houston Post, February 10, 1963, Box 38, 
Folder 5, GFC, SCLUH.  
 
54
“TRAFFIC JAMS OR FREEWAYS”: BUILDING HOUSTON’S HIGHWAY SYSTEM67 
“Transportation in Houston is the story of the motor vehicle,” declared Houston 
Post journalist Jim Mathis in 1958. “The city is built, some say, around four wheels and a 
gas tank instead of people.”68 While Mathis acknowledged the hyperbole in his statement, 
the underlying sentiment was not far from the truth. For all its roots in railroads and 
shipping, after 1940, Houston was an automobile city. By the late 1950s, observers 
seemed to have forgotten that streetcars, rail, and even horses had once used the streets of 
the now booming auto metropolis. No other aspect of Houston’s built environment so 
shaped the physical character of the city after 1945 as highways. As Houston grew into 
an international metropolis, so grew its highways.  
As historian Christopher Wells points out, highways and automobiles did not foist 
themselves onto Americans nor was the construction of roads what led to the embrace of 
auto-suburbs. Rather, it was the choices Americans made to turn to car travel and the 
auto-centric strategies, policies, and incentives implemented by governments at every 
level that made cars central to American lives and landscapes.69 While most Houstonians 
played little role in planning the initial elements of their road system, their embrace of 
automobiles necessitated its construction. In 1949 there were 290,000 registered vehicles 
in Harris County. By 1959, the number of registered vehicles had more than doubled to 
607,000, a number that forced officials to build a system that could serve them.70 
Officials built a system that responded to citizen demand, but they also constructed it to 
meet their own desired outcomes, which were not necessarily aligned with those of all 
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city residents. For Houston’s elected officials, businessmen, and developers this meant 
building a system that could keep the city physically growing and commerce moving—
and them in power. To meet those ends city and state highway planners built roads that 
tied the growing suburbs and industrial areas to the central city, allowing suburban 
workers to access the central business district with ease. They also laid out roadways to 
serve the Port of Houston, the ship channel, and the NASA center. While these roads 
afforded commuters and suburbanites a great deal of mobility, there were drawbacks. 
Some highways cut central city neighborhoods in two, creating new boundaries and 
restricting access to various parts of town, as happened in the Fifth Ward. Coupled with 
the decline of public transit, the suburb-centric construction of roadways resulted in some 
Houstonians becoming more immobile even as more transportation structures were built.  
Many Houston leaders viewed road construction and annexation as interlocking 
processes. Every mile of road constructed between the burgeoning suburban 
developments and the city allowed Houston to draw its outlying communities in and 
brought officials’ vision of an interconnected metropolitan area, with Houston at its helm, 
closer to reality. City leaders promoted metropolitan connectivity as key to development 
and argued that major projects like “highways, freeways, major thoroughfares, major 
drainage channels, and flood control projects” could bind the HMA together.71 Roads 
held a key position in bringing new business to the HMA as well. After World War II, 
relocating corporations—especially the all-important industrial concerns coming to the 
ship channel area—demanded road access.72 Road development also presented businesses 
whose headquarters sat in the central business district with a new set of challenges.  
Executives from these companies recognized the necessity of expanding into suburban 
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areas but also hoped to use roads to help stem the adverse effects of decentralization and 
inject energy back into downtown.73 Local elected leaders and their professional staffs 
worked in concert with state and national highway officials to formulate Houston’s 
highway system during the 1940s and 1950s. As they constructed the system, these 
leaders followed the contours put in place by Houston’s economic growth, the interests of 
powerful developers and elites, and the mobility needs of its suburbanizing population. 
The first major highway to open in Houston was the Gulf Freeway (now Interstate 
45), which connected Houston and Galveston. Discussion of the roadway began in the 
1930s, but action on the road’s construction did not start until the end of World War II, 
after passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944 earmarked adequate funding. 
Construction began in 1946 and the road opened in 1952.74 The building of the Gulf 
Freeway set a number of precedents for the future development of Houston and its 
roadways. The highway was immensely popular; so many drivers used it that within three 
years the road had reached its capacity and was often congested.75 Further, the freeway 
gave Houstonians a sense of how highways could benefit the city and their individual 
mobility. Its construction signaled Houstonians’ embrace of roads and oriented their 
transportation choices towards road building for several decades. Traffic snarls on the 
freeway elicited calls for expansion from citizens and officials alike, refrains that would 
accompany every new road project. The freeway also demonstrated to developers how 
valuable road access could be, as property values rose considerably along the roadway 
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and housing developments quickly sold out.76 Finally, the road became a national 
trendsetter for engineering and planning standards with its six lanes of at-grade traffic 
and frontage roads.77  
The construction and success of the Gulf Freeway spurred city, county, and state 
leaders to build a larger network of highways in and around Houston. The city’s rampant 
growth brought a sense of urgency to this planning. In a 1954 editorial in the Houston 
Chamber of Commerce’s monthly publication, Houston, Director of Transportation 
Eugene Maier called for a concerted effort to build new roads. Postwar growth, Maier 
maintained, had created service demands well above what “even the most imaginative 
public officials” could have forecast. Car registrations, population, and the size of the city 
all increased by huge margins during the early 1950s. Maier contended that a serious 
investment in highways might help alleviate the pressures created by these changes.78 
Scrambling to bring an effective system to the metropolitan area, state and local officials 
jointly approved the plans for a regional highway network in 1954 and announced it 
publicly in 1955.79 (See Figure 1.1) 
Financing the system presented officials with their next hurdle. Unlike the Gulf 
Freeway, the metropolitan highway plan upon its inception lacked a consistent funding 
stream. The City of Houston attempted to pass several bond issues to raise money for 
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right-of-way purchases and construction costs, but had mixed results as residents weighed 
the inconvenience of traffic against that of higher taxes.80 The State of Texas had accrued 
a large nest egg for road maintenance during the war by not spending on new projects, 
but could not foot the bill for the entire system.81  
 
Figure 1.1: 1954 Highway Map   
This map shows the original highway plans for the city. This map shows the Inner Loop, now 610, and 
several spoke highways including the Dallas and Gulf Freeway (I-45) from the lower right corner to upper 
middle, the Southwest/Eastex Freeways (US 59), and Katy and Port Arthur Highways (I-10). City of 
Houston Planning Department, City of Houston Annual Report 1954, CHPD, HMRC.  
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Only the passage of the federal Interstate Highway Act in 1956 brought funding 
stability to the regional road network. This act allowed officials from the State of Texas 
and Houston to purchase most of the required interstate right-of-way and begin 
construction on metropolitan roadways. Representing an even larger federal investment 
than the ship channel, the original cost estimate for Houston’s section of the interstate 
system was $243 million, a number that indicated the breadth of Houston’s road building 
project and represented nearly half of the allotment the state of Texas was scheduled to 
receive.82 Interstate funding also freed up local and state money for dedication to 
secondary highways and roads. The financial floodgates opened in the half-decade after 
the act’s passage. Counting expenditures from all levels of government, more than 
$305,300,000 was spent on Houston area roadways from 1956 to 1961.83  
As road planning and construction began, Houston business leaders recognized 
the importance of locating branches along or near the new roads. Executives from the 
city’s largest companies contemplated decentralizing their operations and worked closely 
with the developers of suburban shopping centers and local officials to ensure that their 
secondary locations would benefit from proximity to highways. When Foley’s 
Department Store decided to branch into the growing suburbs, for example, it opened 
direct lines of communication to the Texas Highway Department and to a privately 
owned bus company in order to ensure that its new location would be linked with the 
city’s transportation system. Foley’s leadership joined with Sharpstown founder Frank 
Sharp to push for the extension of a bus route down to the newly opened Sharpstown 
mall.84 They also monitored the construction status and changes to the Southwest 
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Freeway as it was built in the early 1960s, wanting to ensure that the road would 
adequately serve its branch store.85 When they scouted for a store in the southeastern part 
of the city, Foley’s officials concentrated only on sites that abutted the Gulf Freeway.86  
No part of the metropolitan area captured the economic and physical changes 
brought by the first stages of highway construction better than the Clear Lake area, 
southeast of the city. When the federal government and NASA announced the siting of 
the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Clear Lake in 1960, the area immediately 
became a hotbed for real estate development and jumped up the priority list for 
infrastructure expansion. The desirability of the area kicked off the annexation fight 
between Houston and Pasadena discussed earlier.87 The MSC decision was a boon to the 
Friendswood Development Corporation, which owned thousands of acres nearby and 
quickly announced plans to develop Clear Lake City, a residential community that would 
house and serve the predominantly white, professional MSC workers and their families.  
The growth potential of the MSC, Friendswoods’s Clear Lake City, and another Humble 
project, the Bayport Industrial Park, drove development around Clear Lake skyward in 
the early 1960s. 
The MSC and Clear Lake City developments necessitated an overhaul of the 
area’s highways and thoroughfares. The construction of these roads modeled the way 
officials used the structures to control the direction of metropolitan growth. In 1960, the 
Clear Lake area had a single two-lane market road and only the Gulf Freeway provided 
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highway access. As part of the MSC’s construction, NASA teamed with the State 
Highway Department to build NASA Road 1 and connect the MSC directly to the Gulf 
Freeway. (See Figure 1.2) Even with this roadway complete, the State Highway 
Department believed that the road network in the NASA area would need to be 
drastically expanded to serve workers and residents. Early in 1963, the department 
instituted a $100 million improvement plan to build “a network of good roads radiating in 
all directions” away from the MSC. Recognizing that many workers at the MSC and 
nearby industries would “prefer living away from the congestion of [the center’s] 
immediate vicinity,” highway officials offered a road plan that could easily bring 
commuting workers in from the surrounding suburban communities and even Houston 
itself.88 Included in the plan were several other state highways that would crisscross the 
Clear Lake area and connected commuters to the Gulf Freeway.  
 The roads built to service the MSC area altered the landscape of 
southeastern Harris County. As the secondary highways and thoroughfares were 
developed around and near the MSC, real estate speculation escalated and land values 
rose just as they had upon completion of the Gulf Freeway.89 Formerly small coastal 
towns like Kemah, Seabrook, and Taylor Lake quickly became larger communities filled 
with MSC workers.90 These communities promoted their road access to both 
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Figure 1.2: NASA Road 1  
Construction of the Manned Spacecraft Center and NASA Road 1 occurred simultaneously as officials 
knew the MSC would need adequate road access. Texas Department of Transportation, Communications 
Division, Media Production, Photo Library, Jack Lewis, photographer, April 1, 1963. 
the MSC and Houston as a primary reason to purchase a home in the community.91 Road 
expansion in the Clear Lake area was typical of the entire HMA. The expanded road 
network linked the city’s suburbs to Houston physically, economically, and cognitively. 
The roadways and the mobility they offered accelerated the dispersal of the metropolitan 
region by allowing Clear Lake and other suburbs to draw businesses and residents away 
from those parts of the metropolitan area less connected to the region’s roadways. 
At the same time that Houstonians were busily building up a road network, their 
once effective mass transit system was falling apart. As more Houstonians relied on cars 
for their daily mobility, fewer had reason to support mass transit. Like many other 
American cities throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Houston witnessed increasing numbers 
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of citizens voting with their feet and pocketbook: foregoing mass transit and blocking 
measures to expand it.92 These decisions, and the decline in transit service that 
accompanied them, created problems for Houstonians who relied on the cheap mobility 
of the bus system to reach jobs, recreation, and other essential services. The city’s 
streetcars ceased operation in 1940. Bus service peaked in 1947. Through the 1950s 
ridership fell and the private bus companies found themselves struggling financially.93 
With service declining on private buses, some discussion of creating a public transit 
authority began. This conversation, though, faced two obstinate realities. First, similar to 
zoning proposals, many Houstonians and elected officials viewed public ownership of 
transit as an unwanted form of government intervention. Second, the majority of city, 
county, and state officials, as well as citizens, saw highways as the unquestioned future of 
the city’s transportation system. While some Houstonians discussed the possibility and 
merits of mass transit systems, gathering the necessary momentum for the creation of a 
publically owned mass transit system seemed nearly impossible in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s with highway-centric attitudes dominating the conversation.94 
CONCLUSION 
The combination of highway construction and outward urban growth in the 1950s 
and early 1960s drastically reshaped the Houston metropolitan area. Simultaneous 
suburban and highway development meant that non-central homes would remain tied to 
roadways and the city. The declining distance between individual Houstonians and the 
nearest highway marked the physical change highways brought to both suburban 
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communities like Clear Lake City and to central Houston. In 1960, 95 percent of 
Houstonians lived no more than 7.5 miles away from a freeway. Accounting for the roads 
that were under construction and looking forward to include future additions, projections 
concluded that by 1980, that distance would drop to 2.5 miles.95 This number presaged 
the central place roads would come to inhabit in Houston’s built environment within the 
next thirty years. As more and more roads were built and the highway network took 
shape, car rides and lane lines became a part of everyday life for most Houstonians.  
Houston’s pre- and postwar growth owed much to the city’s geographic position 
on a flat, easily developable plain and to leading Houstonians’ ability to capitalize on that 
position through adroit business practices and economic expansion. The choices of 
Houston’s elected leaders and elites to transform their natural landscape to serve their 
purposes, whether dredging Buffalo Bayou to make it into the Ship Channel or linking 
subdivisions to the city with highways, also helped the city grow. The city’s leaders were 
instrumental in directing Houston into and through the postwar period upon a wave of 
expansion. Whether elected officials or economic elites, Houston’s wealthiest and most 
powerful residents held tight to the reins of the city’s growth and applied their vision of 
mobility to the city as a whole. The rest of Houston’s citizens, though, were not 
powerless. Just as they pushed for roads through their purchase of cars and demand for 
mobility around the metropolitan area, as the city grew and prospered, non-elite 
Houstonians influenced its path. Highway development and mass transit debates that took 
place over the ensuing three decades of the city’s history offered citizens an avenue to 
assert their own ideas about the shape of the city, their rights to determine its future, and 
their conceptions of mobility. The remaining chapters weave these two strands—
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transportation structures and their place in struggles for political power—together. This 
will start with Chapter Two, which shows that as the highway department poured 
footings and planned overpasses, Houstonians became increasingly aware of how the 





Planning, Politics, and Consequences 
In May 1962, flyers appeared under the front doors of homes in Memorial Bend, a 
white upper-middle-class Houston subdivision several miles northwest of downtown. A 
plat map of the neighborhood framed the top third of the page. A thick red line ran 
through the middle of ordered properties and over the top of several cul-de-sacs. 
“Attention Homeowners and Taxpayers,” the headline read. “Are you aware that the City 
Planning Commission and Harris County are putting an eight-lane freeway, similar to the 
Gulf Freeway, through the Bend?”1 Concerned neighbors dropped the flyers at every 
home in Memorial Bend. Others spread the word through neighboring subdivisions. By 
the time the residents came before the Houston Planning Commission a month later they 
held a petition against the highway signed by more than 1000 area residents.2  
About that same time, across the city in the Fifth Ward, the predominantly 
African American community that sat just a few miles from downtown Houston, a 
hammering noise rousted Ramona Toliver from her home. Standing on her front porch, a 
startled Toliver found the source of the noise when she observed a Texas Highway 
Department surveyor driving several orange-flagged staves into her front yard. The 
markers came up just short of her front door and sat on both sides of her garage, drawing 
a line right through its middle. Toliver confronted the surveyor, who reported that the 
staves marked the outer edge of the new interstate that would soon be coming through the 
ward. The surveyor informed her that her house and garage stood in the projected path 
and that some, if not all of her property, would need to be taken to make way for the road. 
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This was the first Toliver had heard of the interstate; “[T]hey didn’t really announce it,” 
she recalled. Frustrated, Toliver demanded that the worker get his supervisor and an 
explanation.3 
As construction commenced on the ambitious highway system that city and state 
officials laid out in their 1955 plan, variations of these two scenes played out across the 
HMA. For the first time, citizens came face to face with the roadways they helped bring 
to fruition over the previous decade with their purchase of automobiles and their political 
support for roads. As officials announced the location of highways, however, many 
Houstonians learned that their homes and neighborhoods stood in the way. No longer 
dreaming of a potential system, but instead confronting an accumulation of alarming 
developments, citizens voiced growing concerns about highways starting in the late 
1950s. While residents from every walk of life confronted the costs of roadway 
construction, a small subset, those whose homes fell in or near the path of the roads, 
absorbed a preponderance of the negative effects. An accrual of consequences pushed 
these Houstonians to insist that plans be altered to save their homes and led others to call 
for an outright halt on road construction. However, the majority of Houstonians, powerful 
real estate developers, and city officials continued to push for new and wider roads. The 
tension among these viewpoints served to split Houstonians into two camps: those who 
generally supported road construction and those who opposed its unchecked expansion. 
Settling this debate took decades and the process became increasingly fraught as non-elite 
white, black, and ethnic Mexican Houstonians claimed more political power in the city’s 
decision-making. Through this conflict, Houstonians displayed competing visions for the 
future of the city’s transportation network and attempted to put their ideas of the politics 
of mobility to work in ways that matched those visions.   
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In the 1950s, Houstonians who attended Houston Planning Commission meetings 
to protest route plans or demanded to speak to construction foremen to argue about 
property lines bumped against the reality that they possessed little control over the city’s 
direction of growth. Because city officials and land developers carried out highway 
planning far removed from citizen oversight, Houstonians who questioned the city’s 
approach to road building struggled to gain traction in early transportation debates. 
Officials possessed definitive ideas about how roads would benefit the city and what 
shape those roads should take.4 Their notions rarely matched those forwarded by the 
citizens who protested the routes. At the same time that elected officials ignored the 
desires of citizens, they adhered closely to those of national groups—automobile 
manufacturers, the trucking industry, and drivers’ advocacy organizations like AAA—
and to local developers and business leaders whose interests were intimately tied to road 
construction.5 In this regard Houston was not an anomaly. Across the nation during the 
1950s, officials from the national, state, and local level planned and implemented 
thousands of miles of highways and interstates with little citizen input.  
The structure of the Interstate Highway Act, passed in 1956, encouraged officials 
to continue prioritizing urban expansion over the concerns of residents who stood in the 
way of roads.6 The act codified the power local and state leaders held in planning the 
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nation’s roadways by giving them complete control over routing decisions within urban 
areas.7  It also provided a federal-local funding structure, which guaranteed that the 
federal government would cover ninety percent of all interstate costs. This made 
interstates more palatable for localities that were wary of taking on debt. Because of the 
financial support attached to interstates, state officials concentrated on those projects and 
passed the costs for local highway and infrastructure development onto county and city 
governments. As Chapter One demonstrated, the territorial and population growth of the 
postwar period had already stretched Houston’s ability to meet the infrastructure 
demands of the city. The added burden of local road maintenance led city officials to 
devote the limited resources they did possess to building and maintaining routes that 
connected downtown to the suburbs or that served wealthier, more politically influential 
populations. These choices led to the continued neglect of transportation infrastructure in 
the poorest central city neighborhoods.8  
This chapter will consider four road projects located in two distinct parts of 
Houston—the quickly expanding, almost exclusively white, west side and the densely 
populated downtown Third and Fifth Wards, which in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
contained the majority of the city’s African American population. The west side of the 
city confronted the construction of Houston’s second ring road, the Outer Belt. Routes for 
Houston’s two bisecting interstates ran through the Third and Fifth Wards. These projects 
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not only demonstrated the physical impact roads brought to the areas through which they 
ran, but also reflected the range of reactions these structures elicited from Houstonians 
that lived there. As these examples will show, citizens had to struggle to be heard during 
the first stages of the construction process. Despite these difficulties, residents’ initial 
responses anticipated later calls for participation in city planning and, eventually, outright 
resistance to road projects. 
The routing and construction of highways through already settled parts of the city 
guaranteed that the roads would influence the lives of nearly all Houstonians. This 
counters the commonly held notion that the consequences of road construction fell solely 
onto the shoulders of disadvantaged groups. However, suburban and centrally located 
roads exacted very different costs on the parts of the city they crossed. It is undeniable 
that some residents confronted more severe consequences of road construction and that 
those residents were overwhelmingly poorer and usually black or ethnic Mexican.9 
Likewise, it is clear that officials dealt with the complaints they received from 
Houstonians from different parts of the city in different ways.  
The timeframes for the construction of these road projects created divergent 
experiences for the Houstonians who confronted them. The highways planned for 
predominantly white suburbs were more often than not projected routes that would not be 
built for decades. Rather than facing immediate displacement, suburban residents had 
time to plan for a road’s presence or to contest its location. Because these residents 
possessed significant political and economic resources, their complaints, even if 
ultimately rejected, gained the attention of city and county officials. The Texas Highway 
Department, on the other hand, deemed Houston’s downtown interstates priorities. As 
                                                
9 Jan Lin, “Ethnic Places, Postmodernism, and Urban Change in Houston,” The Sociological Quarterly, 36, 
No. 4 (Autumn, 1995): 629-647. 
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such, officials planned and constructed them quickly, often before citizen responses could 
coalesce. The consequences of immediate construction were dramatic because new 
highways divided neighborhoods and displaced thousands of residents. Black 
Houstonians, the population overwhelmingly affected by Houston’s interstate 
construction, possessed little political power when planning and construction began in the 
1950s. They nonetheless railed against the negative consequences caused by the 
roadways. While questions of electoral access and fights against segregation continued to 
dominate the focus of Houston’s iteration of the Civil Rights Movement, black 
Houstonians, like African Americans across the country, also contested problems of 
physical infrastructure, housing, and transportation. African Americans increasingly 
labeled such problems “environmental” issues and they would only become more 
prominent in later years.10 
Acknowledging the widespread, yet uneven, impact of infrastructure projects is 
essential to understanding how Houstonians conceptualized and engaged with the city’s 
politics of mobility after World War II. While the consequences of road building ranged 
in severity, the citizens affected by highways all felt wronged by the process. With the 
effects of the first stage of highway construction providing a common motivation, a 
diverse array of Houstonians expressed frustration with the city’s top-down development 
approach and agitated for a larger role in city planning. The expectations Houstonians 
                                                
10 On examples of protests about infrastructure problems and unequal access to transportation in Memphis, 
Laurie Green, Battling the Plantation Mentality: Memphis and the Black Freedom Struggle (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007): 204-5. On Atlanta, Ronald H. Bayor, Race and the Shaping of 
Twentieth-Century Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). On similar earlier 
fights in Houston, Guadalupe San Miguel, Brown, Not White: School Integration and the Chicano 
Movement in Houston (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001); Bernadette Pruitt, The Other 
Great Migration: The Movement of Rural African Americans to Houston, 1900-1941 (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2013); Robert D. Bullard, Invisible Houston: The Black Experience in Boom 
and Bust (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987); Arnoldo De León, Ethnicity in the 
Sunbelt: Mexican Americans in Houston (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001). 
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brought to this push varied. White residents, particularly suburbanites, wanted to easily 
access the city in private automobiles and aimed to protect their homes from future road 
projects. African American and ethnic Mexican residents of central Houston shared those 
desires with white Houstonians, but also made transportation inequality—in terms of both 
planning and provision—a central focus of their ongoing civil rights agendas.11 
THE ROAD PROJECTS 
The first two projects this chapter discusses revolve around the western segment 
of Houston’s second ring road, the Outer Loop (now State Highway 8). The original 
design for the road, which appeared on Houston-area highway plans in the early 1950s, 
called for it to encircle the city about twelve miles from downtown. Anticipating a road 
that would eventually be four lanes wide, city and county officials required that all 
developing subdivisions reserve a right-of-way of 150 feet for the road. The Memorial 
Bend Addition, platted in 1954, followed this requirement and commenced selling lots in 
1955. By 1960, however, officials decided that projections of the city’s growth required 
an expansion of previous road plans. They implemented new regulations that expanded 
the Outer Belt’s right-of-way to 300 feet and applied this width to already developed 
subdivisions. Plans that called for this width projected that it would allow for the eventual 
construction of a six-lane, at-grade highway. In Memorial Bend, this right-of-way would 
                                                
11 Many scholars have shown the massive impact infrastructure construction wrought on black and ethnic 
Mexican neighborhoods—Eric Avila, Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear and Fantasy in 
Suburban Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Rose and Mohl, Interstate; 
DiMento and Ellis, Changing Lanes; Joshua Cannon, “Huntsville, the Highway, and Urban 
Redevelopment: The Long Road to Connect Downtown Huntsville, Alabama to the Interstate Highway 
System,” Journal of Planning History 11 (1) (2012): 27-46. Others have shown the changes brought to 
white or wealthier neighborhoods: Jane Jacobs, Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1961); Christopher W. Wells, “From Freeway to Parkway: Federal Law, Grassroots 
Environmental Protest, and the Evolving Design of Interstate-35E in Saint Paul, Minnesota” Journal of 
Planning History 11 (1) (2012): 8-26. Addressing these two focuses together is essential to understanding 
citywide transportation politics and decision-making. McKinney, in “Superhighway Deluxe,” 
acknowledges the fact that the Gulf Freeway had a negative impact on the property of both wealthy and 
poorer Houstonians, 158. 
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claim as many as 30 homes. Residents of the community, nearly all middle- and upper-
class whites, objected to the plan. Citing their original plats and claiming that the road 
would lower their property values, many actively campaigned against the expansion. 
While they were ultimately unsuccessful, their pressure led the Houston City Council and 
Houston Planning Commission to consider their complaints.  
 A second set of Outer Belt decisions in west Houston demonstrated the amount of 
influence developers held at this time. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, developers R.E. 
Smith and Roy Hofheinz encouraged the Houston Planning Commission and the Harris 
County Commissioners Court to realign several parts of the Outer Belt. Smith and 
Hofheinz exemplified Houston’s elite. Each possessed a great deal of political influence 
and personal wealth. Hofheinz served terms as both Houston mayor and Harris County 
commissioner prior to his move into development. Smith owned real estate throughout 
the metropolitan area and in the mid-1950s he was one of Houston’s richest residents. 
Like developers before and after them, Hofheinz and Smith brought their economic and 
political power to bear on local decision-makers like the county court to seek alterations 
to the planning of the Outer Belt in ways that benefitted their interests. Contrasted with 
their dismissal of concerns from residents of Memorial Bend and the complete neglect of 
African American opinion in interstate planning, local officials gave quick and positive 
responses to these developers, reflecting the power they possessed.  
The other two projects involved the construction of Interstates 10 and 45 through 
downtown Houston. The routes for these roads ran directly through the central city Third 
and Fifth Wards. Despite the fact that the two wards and their respective main streets—
Dowling Street and Lyons Avenue—represented significant centers of black economic, 
political, and social life, officials made few attempts to prevent detrimental outcomes in 
these areas. The roads altered the physical landscape of both neighborhoods to a much 
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greater degree than the Outer Belt did in Memorial Bend or in other outlying areas. The 
changes forced residents of the wards to redefine their understandings of and connections 
to their communities. The roads also negatively affected the economic structures of both 
Wards, disrupting businesses and displacing many of the residents who patronized 
them.12  
Planning and construction for Interstate 10 from Loop 610 to downtown occurred 
between 1956 and 1966. The two miles of the road between Lockwood Drive and U.S. 
59, which was a depressed, below-grade highway of six lanes, displaced more than 330 
residences and businesses in the Fifth Ward. Construction on the northern end of 
Interstate 45, entering into downtown, followed the route of the original Gulf Freeway 
that opened in the late 1940s. Most of its route through the Third Ward was completed by 
1965, remaining at-grade for most of its path. Only a six-lane elevated section running 
between Dowling Street on the east and Allen Parkway on the west, known as the Pierce 
Elevated, and the interchange with State Highway 59 were constructed after 1965. The 
Pierce Elevated opened to traffic in 1967 and for the first time allowed highway users to 
go east-west through Houston without driving on city streets. At just over 3 miles long, 
the stretch of I-45 that included Pierce Elevated and ran from downtown to Scott Street 
on the east side of the Third Ward displaced nearly 560 residences and businesses.13  
                                                
12 Bullard, Invisible Houston, 30-31. For a discussion of the significance of the Third and Fifth Wards and 
their main drags to the black community of Houston, see Pruitt, The Other Great Migration. 
13 Displacement figures from Houston Chamber of Commerce, “Houston’s Regional Mobility: Plans into 
Action; North Corridor and Hardy Road,” July 1982, Box 1, Folder 8, RG F 18, Hardy Street Toll Road 
Controversy Collection (HSTCC), Houston Metropolitan Research Center (HMRC), 14. For detailed 
information on the completion dates and projects of the Houston area highways see Erik Slotboom, 




Figure 2.1: Map of Houston with 1960s Focus Areas  
This map of Houston area highways highlights the locations of the four projects discussed in this chapter. 
The blue and purple circles cover the westside highway projects on the Outer Belt. Blue is Memorial Bend 
and the purple is the area around the Outer Belt/US 59 Intersection. The orange covers Pierce Elevated and 
I-45 through the Third Ward. Green is I-10 through the Fifth Ward. Background map is “Status of 
Freeways” Houston-Galveston Regional Transit Study, 1984, Transportation Map Drawer TXR MC B3, 
HMRC. 
These four projects (Figure 2.1) exemplify several larger trends taking place in 
Houston during the 1960s and cover several of the experiences Houstonians’ had with 
road construction. What these examples show is that up through the late 1960s, when it 
came to highway decisions city and county governments prioritized official plans and the 
desires of development and real estate interests over the concerns of nearly all other 
private citizens. Only when Houstonians from across the metropolitan area rallied against 




THE OUTER BELT 
 Construction on the Outer Belt was not to begin until future suburban growth 
demanded it. Only a small number of homeowners in the right-of-way saw their homes 
immediately taken, so while the threat of the road was real for most residents, it was also 
distant. Despite these tempered effects, suburbanites in areas such as Memorial Bend 
considered the placement of the roads to be onerous and unfair. Residents moved to 
Memorial Bend with the goal of finding a peaceful neighborhood far from the noise and 
traffic of the central city. The projected road thwarted this vision. Residents complained 
that the projected highways threatened to change the character of their communities by 
enticing commercial businesses into residential zones and giving residents fewer reasons 
to maintain the condition of their homes. They argued that underdeveloped land further to 
the west along what was then Houston’s urban fringe offered a number of adequate 
alternative routes that would not displace settled subdivisions. Significantly, Memorial 
Bend residents were not anti-road as a rule, but instead were simply against the road 
cutting through their community. Whatever their larger position on roads, Memorial 
Bend residents protested the official and developer-driven growth model that had for so 
long determined the city’s direction. 
 Immediately after the Outer Belt’s appearance on the City of Houston’s Major 
Thoroughfare and Freeway plan in 1952, officials began tinkering with its size and path 
to contend with Houston’s population and territorial growth.14 The route ran a total of 
87.6 miles and sat six miles further out from the first ring road, Loop 610.15 In its very 
first iteration, the road only took a 120-foot right-of-way. However, Houston officials, led 
by Director of City Planning Ralph Ellifrit, worried that this width would not keep up 
                                                
14 Alfred Knapp, City of Houston Major Thoroughfare and Transportation Committee, “Response to 
Memorial Bend Movement of Highway Proposal,” June 18, 1962, CHPD, ESRC. 
15 Texas State Highway Commission Public Hearing Docket, March 6, 1969, Box 2002/101-35, Folder: 
Harris County, Texas State Archives (TSA). 
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with traffic demand as the city grew. While the initial width was being discussed, several 
pending housing developments along the route, including the Memorial Bend Addition, 
awaited platting approval. This logjam forced officials to make a decision about the right-
of-way. Ellifrit insisted that the right-of-way expand to 150 feet before platting occurred. 
The Harris County Commissioners Court and City of Houston agreed to do so in late 
1954.16   
 Between 1954 and 1960, real estate developers built seven subdivisions along the 
Outer Belt’s route between Buffalo Bayou and the Katy Freeway (Interstate 10). In the 
space of a few years, developers converted agricultural lands and forests into homes and 
created street grids.17 Following the “leapfrog” tendencies of developers, Memorial Bend 
and other subdivisions were located adjacent to undeveloped tracts of agricultural and 
wooded land. A 1955 Zingery fire hydrant map shows the nature of the landscape 
surrounding Memorial Bend during its platting.18 (Figure 2.2) The rural setting around 
the Memorial Bend addition—vacant fields, a still-wooded bayou, and few roads—
allowed developers to sell the community as a “Scenic Wooded Wonderland” where one 
could find “Country Living in a Metropolitan Area.”19  
 Promoters also sold the subdivision as luxurious, affordable, and desirable. 
Advertisements pointed to its award-winning architecture, its proximity to good schools, 
                                                
16 Letter from Ralph Ellifrit to Kyle Chapman, September 21, 1954, CHPD, ESRC.  
17 In 1954 the majority of the county was still classified as agricultural land, United State Department of 
Agriculture’s Census of Agriculture: Texas 1954, 
http://agcensus.mannlib.cornell.edu/AgCensus/homepage.do, last accessed November 18, 2013. 
18 Zingery Map Company, Hydrant Map, 1955, HMRC.  
19 Memorial Bend Advertisement, Houston Chronicle, November 11, 1957, HMRC. For a discussion of 
urbanization’s impact on Houston’s forest and tree cover see Diane C. Bates, “Urban Sprawl and the Piney 








Figure 2.2: 1955 Zingery Fire Hydrant Map 
The map shows Memorial Bend near the upper left corner. Note the empty land both north and south of the 
community. At its inception it was one of the furthest west developments in Houston. HMRC. 
The promotions also made it clear that Memorial Bend did not suffer from any of the 
numerous service problems that plagued other area developments: “Memorial Bend is 
one of the highest points in Harris County, insuring every homeowner of excellent 
drainage, plus every block has storm sewers, curbs, and gutters.”21 Unlike the slapdash 
developments popping up across Harris County, Memorial Bend came with all the 
                                                
20 Memorial Bend Advertisement, Houston Chronicle, February 15, 1959. Memorial Bend did have 
several significant modernist architectural designs. Betty Chapman, “Memorial Bend Subdivision 
Expanded City Style during 1950s,” Houston Business Journal, May 27-June 2, 2005; Michael Brichford, 
“Where the ‘50’s were Fabulous: A Driving Tour of Memorial Bend,” Cite, 57, (Spring 2003): 10-11. On 
Houston’s modern residential architecture in the 1950s, see Ben Koush, “Houston Lives the Life: Modern 
Houses in the Suburbs, 1952-1962,” (Master’s Thesis: Rice University, 2002). 
21 Memorial Bend Advertisement, Houston Chronicle, August 19, 1956, HMRC. 
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trappings of a modern subdivision. Despite these selling points, developers recognized 
that they would have little success if they could not convince potential buyers that their 
homes would remain connected to the city through area roadways. For this reason 
developers prominently remarked on the community’s connections to Houston via the 
Katy Highway and Memorial Drive. Almost every advertisement listed the driving time 
to downtown Houston or to other prominent amenities. These existing roadways allowed 
the Memorial Bend Development Company to sell the fact that the community offered 
residents enough distance to escape Houston’s problems, yet kept the city close enough to 
access it resources and employment opportunities. Allusions to the development of the 
Outer Loop, however, remained absent in advertisements because developers, operating 
under the earlier right-of-way decision, did not expect more than a thoroughfare to come 
through the area. 
 Developers of Memorial Bend and nearby subdivisions aimed to attract middle- to 
upper-class white Houstonians and white-collar migrants as buyers. Between 1954 and 
1960, Robert Puig, the developer of Memorial Bend, succeeded in bringing dozens of 
such families to his development. By mid-1955, forty-eight of 202 planned homes had 
been built and sold, with another fifty under construction. The Gregorys, a white, middle-
class couple, bought the first home. Appropriately for Houston, both Mr. and Mrs. 
Gregory worked at energy companies downtown, driving about a half hour each way.22 
The census tract that Memorial Bend was within demonstrated the success Puig and other 
developers had in recruiting their target buyers. In 1960 the tract was 99.3 percent white 
and 87 percent of the households made more than $8,000 a year, the equivalent of a little 
more than $62,000 in 2013.23 Promoters trumpeted the fact that most residents were 
                                                
22 “Memorial Bend Builders Push Big Program,” Houston Chronicle, September 25, 1955, HMRC. 
23 Income and racial statistics taken from Social Explorer records for Houston Census Tract 91 in 1950 and 
1960. See www.socialexplorer.com, last accessed October 24, 2013. 
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people of “high standing,” with “engineers, lawyers,” and architects buying homes. Such 
neighbors promised higher home values and offered the chance to raise one’s children 
among “good associates.” These statements gave the implicit promise of a racially 
exclusive neighborhood. Houston’s long history of racially homogeneous settlement 
patterns, discriminatory lending practices that benefitted whites over other racial groups, 
and high-priced homes helped make this insinuation a reality.24  
 When Puig and the Memorial Bend Development Company filed their subdivision 
plan with Harris County in December 1954, they made room for the Outer Belt’s 150-
foot right-of-way. The open strip of land split the J-curved subdivision in two, bisecting 
Butterfly and Tosca Lanes, before meeting Memorial Drive at its northern end. (Figure 
2.3) While 150 feet represented the typical highway right-of-way at that time, developers 
nonetheless left extra room on both sides by restricting structures from an additional 20 
feet on lots that bordered the road’s path.25 Given this buffer and the  
                                                
24 On lending practices by the FHA, see David P. Fruend, Colored Property: State Policy and White 
Racial Politics in Suburban America (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Colin Gordon, 
Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
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Washington Press, 2012); Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the 
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Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1983). Houstonians who lived in Memorial Bend included architects and developers, such as prominent 
architect Bill Caudill and Memorial Bend Developer Howard Edmunds, future Houston Texans owner 
Robert McNair, and other business owners and professionals. For a larger list see 
http://memorialbendarchitecture.com/notable.htm, last accessed December 3, 2013.  





Figure 2.3: 1954 Memorial Bend Subdivision Map 
The original 1954 platting map for Memorial Bend shows the Outer Belt as the wide road running bottom 
to top. Its right-of-way is listed at 150 feet. Each of the homes on the sides have an additional twenty feet 
built in case the right-of-way expanded. Box 4, MSS 118, Houston Subdivision Collection, HMRC.  
established 150-foot right-of-way, the Houstonians who bought homes in the subdivision 
over the next five years felt secure in their purchases. Like the developers themselves, 
they anticipated that at most a divided four-lane highway with a grassy median would 
replace the existing two-lane road. Even in this scenario, though, residents believed that 
the platting of their subdivision set the right-of-way in stone. However, neither city nor 
county leaders had formally approved the final building lines for the Outer Belt, leaving 
routing decisions unsettled.26 
 The unfinished road plans allowed officials to declare in 1960 that the Outer Belt 
required another 150 feet of right-of-way to accommodate future traffic. Such an 
                                                




adjustment meant the claiming of nearly thirty developed lots in Memorial Bend. 
Residential and commercial developers who had not yet built their projects in west 
Houston strongly supported the push to widen the Outer Belt. Led by Roy Hofheinz, 
these developers argued that taking a wider right-of-way before construction made 
economic sense for the city. They also recognized that altering the right-of-way would 
open the door to other alterations and aimed to influence the routing of the road to serve 
their interests. Residents of Memorial Bend, however, responded to the news with 
outrage and fear. Between 1960 and 1963, homeowners like Robert McNair and H.P. 
Powell, both respected white businessmen, peppered the Houston City Council with 
complaints. The choice that officials made during the ensuing conflict reflected the city’s 
growth priorities in the early 1960s.  
 In March 1960, Hofheinz and his employee Fernando Williams came before the 
Houston Planning Commission to ask that the body widen the Outer Belt’s right-of-way. 
Representing his business partner R.E. Smith, Hofheinz stood before the commission as 
the prototypical Houston developer—wealthy, male, white, and politically connected. 
The two men owned thousands of acres throughout the Houston metropolitan area, with 
numerous tracts in west Houston.27 When Hofheinz and his employee Fernando 
Williams—a man who worked for the planning department for nearly a decade before 
joining Hofheinz in the private sector—addressed the commission, like many other 
developers they held a number of advantages that typical Houstonians, including 
Memorial Bend homeowners, did not. They knew the commissioners personally. They 
understood the complicated process of city planning and how to navigate the different 
                                                
27 The dealings of Smith and Hofheinz were common features in Houston newspapers during the 1950s 
and 1960s. “Smith Tract Sold for $6 Million” Houston Post, July 23, 1964, Box 33, Folder 11, George 
Fuermann Collection (GFC), Special Collections Library University of Houston (SCLUH). The men also 
jointly developed the Astrodome area in the early 1960s. 
 
83
levels of government involved. And, finally, they recognized the vital importance of 
connecting residential and commercial developments to highways.  
 In their proposal to widen the Outer Belt, Hofheinz and Williams recounted the 
mistakes the city made during the right-of-way acquisitions that occurred during 
Hofheinz’s time as mayor. While buying land for the first loop project, the city 
encountered “delay and expense that resulted from increasing the standards for the 
development of the North Loop and consequent renegotiation with the same owners for 
wider and wider right-of-way.” To avoid repeating this problem, Hofheinz urged the 
commission to preemptively widen the right-of-way and to buy all the required land 
before construction started. Expanding the road plans to 300 feet, Hofheinz reminded the 
commission, would also make it wide enough for the Texas Highway Department to add 
the road to the formal state highway system in the future, saving local governments 
millions in maintenance costs that the state would take on.28  
 The questions members of the planning commission put to Hofheinz reflected the 
central role developers played in Houston’s growth politics. When asked if he was 
concerned about the right-of-way because of his own real estate interests in west 
Houston, Hofheinz responded that far from an attempt to secure a financial windfall for 
himself, his presence at the meeting and interest in the widening project were motivated 
by civic concerns. He insisted that he did not own right-of-way that he intended to sell 
along the route. He did, though, have land he would willingly donate for the road to the 
county or city if officials created tax deductions for such gifts. One can infer that 
Hofheinz’ hope that running the road near his property would raise its value gave rise to 
his willingness to facilitate its construction.29 The Houston Planning Commission 
                                                
28 Houston Planning Commission Minutes, March 15, 1960, Box 2, Folder 3, VPC, HMRC. 
29 Houston Planning Commission Minutes, March 15, 1960, Box 2, Folder 3, VPC, HMRC. 
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approved the widening just after the Harris County Commissioners Court, which 
Hofheinz also lobbied, voted the same way in December 1960.30  
 Over the next several years, residents of Memorial Bend challenged the validity 
of the change and developers continued to back it. The fight pitted two sets of property 
rights against one another. Given that land ownership was nearly sacrosanct in Texas, the 
fact that homes were being taken, especially the homes of white suburbanites was quite 
problematic. However, as with the homes of African Americans and other Houstonians 
downtown, the claiming of property was justified by promises of greater total growth. 
This selling point justified many of the choices Houston officials made in the 1950s and 
1960s. Most visible in the building of infrastructure, this line of reasoning also appeared 
in the construction of the Astrodome, the expansion of the Medical Center, and the 
embrace of suburbanization. Houstonians whose homes were not affected by these or 
other projects bought this justification, leaving those who experienced displacement or 
discomfort out in the cold. Furthermore, in the Memorial Bend case, the influence of the 
developers led to their property rights being treated with greater weight. Land ownership 
remained sacred, but only political influence kept it that way. 
 Testifying before the planning commission, Memorial Bend residents Robert 
McNair and H.P. Powell argued that altering the right-of-way after the original platting 
represented an egregious violation of their property rights.31 By the time they appeared in 
front of the commission, however, the county had already begun protective buying—
purchasing several homes along the right-of-way in Memorial Bend and slotting them for 
demolition. Undeterred, residents accelerated their campaign against the road. McNair 
and others organized the petition against the road and urged immediate action by their 
                                                
30 Houston Planning Commission Minutes, December 20, 1960, Box 2, Folder 3, VPC, HMRC.  
31 Letter from H.P. Powell to M.A. Walker, May 15, 1962, CHPD, ESRC; Houston Planning Commission 
Minutes, June 5, 1962, Box 2, Folder 5, VPC, HMRC.  
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neighbors to “stop this foolishness.” Many residents believed that the road negated the 
very reasons they purchased their homes in Memorial Bend—the promise of growing 
property values and country-like seclusion. Anti-Outer Belt residents also argued that a 
wider highway would lead to diesel trucks flying through the subdivision at all hours of 
the night and change the nature of the community by encouraging a shift from residential 
to commercial development.32 When residents presented the petition to the planning 
commission in 1962 they called for the entire Outer Belt to be moved several miles west, 
beyond the reach of current residential development.33    
  In his initial response to resident complaints, Director of Planning Ellifrit 
attempted to calm nerves by explaining that the construction of the road would not be 
immediate, but rather done in stages spread over several years. On the subject of moving 
the highway to the west, Ellifrit pointed out that a shift of one branch of the ring road 
would require the re-routing of the entire circuit, likely making the suggestion untenable. 
The chair of the Houston Planning Commission, Milton McGinty, also weighed in to ease 
worries about creeping commercialization and the physical toll the road would take on 
Memorial Bend. McGinty argued that leaving the road in its current state would 
exacerbate, not prevent, detrimental development because cars and trucks would use the 
route more as the city expanded. Wary of seeing plans derailed or delayed, officials 
attempted to calm the fears of residents by agreeing to study the proposed reroute.34 Even 
if the study was an appeasement, it represented an unprecedented acquiescence to citizen 
demands.  
 City and county officials conducted the reroute study and presented their findings 
to the planning commission two weeks after the initial request. They concluded that while 
                                                
32 “Attention Homeowners and Taxpayers!!” Memorial Bend Protest Flyer, CHPD, ESRC.   
33 Houston Planning Commission Minutes, June 5, 1962, Box 2, Folder 5, VPC, HMRC.  
34 Houston Planning Commission Minutes, June 5, 1962, Box 2, Folder 5, VPC, HMRC.  
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a functional substitute route existed to the west along Dairy-Ashford Road, the current 
alignment remained preferable because of its significantly lower costs and connection to 
other roads. The reroute would push the Outer Belt 2.75 miles further west and require 
nearly two times the number of grade separations. Further, estimates projected that while 
the new route would save approximately $900,000 in right-of-way costs, it would 
increase overall costs by $4.5 million. This cost ended discussion of the adjusted route. 
While they ultimately rejected residents’ requests, officials did attempt to appease some 
concerns by agreeing not to buy properties in the expanded right-of-way until 
construction was imminent. Additionally, they agreed to rent out already purchased 
properties, rather than demolish them. Although residents were disappointed in the 
overall outcome, they saw these two concessions as important to maintaining a 
semblance of normal life until construction began.35 
 That residents of Memorial Bend could not alter the highway plans despite their 
relative social and political power demonstrated that transportation decision-making was 
not simply a process of catering to interests of suburban whites. Indeed, the Houston 
Planning Commission and Harris County Commissioners Court likely responded to the 
request to consider a reroute because those making it were wealthy, white homeowners in 
the path of a road that officials projected would be built twenty years in the future. But 
even this group could not stop the project. The complaints of Memorial Bend residents 
proved that not all white suburbanites wholeheartedly supported highways. The ultimate 
decision showed that the effects of road construction were not restricted to the central 
city. For all the concessions they gained, white suburbanites along the Outer Belt 
witnessed the disruptive nature of infrastructure planning and in the future would have a 
major highway run through their subdivision. 
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 After helping to usher through the wider right-of-way, Roy Hofheinz and 
Fernando Williams continued to lobby the Houston Planning Commission. Throughout 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the developers worked to secure several realignments and 
adjustments to the Outer Loop. While smaller in scale and cost than the wholesale reroute 
proposed by Memorial Bend residents, Hofheinz and Williams’s requests for changes 
were not inconsequential. Their success in securing the alterations demonstrated the 
influence that developers held in Houston’s transportation decision-making.  
 The majority of the property Hofheinz and Smith owned in West Houston lay at 
or just to the north of the planned intersection of the Outer Belt and State Highway 59. As 
route plans were solidifying in the late 1950s, the developers asked the planning 
commission to tweak the route to accommodate their developments. Fernando Williams 
wrote to the commission in December 1958 and suggested a number of changes that 
would keep Smith and Hofheinz’ land as contiguous, and therefore as developable, as 
possible.36 In one proposed alteration, near the intersection of Beechnut Street and the 
Outer Loop, the developers asked that the road follow a straight trajectory rather than 
curve. This change, Williams argued, would allow a number of developments blocked by 
the current alignment to go forward.37 With another request, the developers sought to 
move the Outer Belt at Richmond Avenue 400 feet further west to create more than 200 
feet of developable property. In his letter Williams made it clear that he had also 
contacted county officials who “had no objections to the revisions as long as they are 
                                                
36 The fact that the aim of their visit to the Houston Planning Commission was to gain more land for Smith 
and Hofheinz was not hidden. Williams expressly stated that he was addressing a number of concerns the 
two developers had about the route and then listed the particular changes they wanted to see. Letter from 
Fernando Williams and Roy Hofheinz to Houston Planning Commission, December 22, 1958, CHPD, 
ESRC.  
37 Ibid.   
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requested by the Houston City Planning Commission.”38 Both government bodies 
implemented the requests. 
 The 1958 reroute request was just one of several that developers like Hofheinz, 
Smith, and Williams made for the route of the Outer Belt. In 1963, Williams returned to 
secure a smaller reroute. The request focused on the Outer Belt from Beechnut Street to 
Bellfort Drive. The developers sought a new alignment for this 2.1-mile section of road 
that would add 1200 feet to the route. They wanted the Outer Loop to follow an existing 
road instead of cutting through unimproved land they owned. They argued that building 
atop an established road would lower construction and right-of-way costs. As with earlier 
suggestions, Williams made it explicitly clear that the change would leave more 
developable land on their properties. In the case of this realignment, the new route would 
“cross their property at a more desirable angle,” keeping the property connected and 
viable for development.39 
 As Hofheinz had shown during the Outer Belt widening debate, developers and 
landowners often affected the outcome of planning decisions by donating property along 
road routes to guarantee that highways would follow paths that met their interests. Such 
actions negated the costs associated with realignment and made officials much more 
amenable to plan changes. In the case of the Bellfort Road request, city and county 
officials approved the shift after Hofheinz and Smith donated land that made it possible 
to alter the alignment at no extra cost.40  
 While the requests made by Williams, Hofheinz, and other developers in the early 
1960s did not ask officials to move entire highways, they nonetheless represented 
significant changes to proposed routes. Other west Houston stakeholders did not have the 
                                                
38 Letter from Williams and Hofheinz to Houston Planning Commission, December 22, 1958.  




ability to sweeten their requests with donated land, nor did their properties hold the same 
potential for increased tax revenues that undeveloped land did.41 The extended timeline 
of the Outer Belt’s construction and the relatively undeveloped nature of the landscape 
through which it ran made the road a uniquely negotiable project, but officials only truly 
negotiated with developers.  
 The Outer Belt projects captured the contentious nature of infrastructure 
development, even on the still developing edges of the city. Officials justified rejecting 
citizen complaints by asserting that they did not want to establish damaging precedents. 
Ralph Ellifrit maintained that if the city gave in to unhappy residents even once, it would 
complicate long-range planning, stymie suburban growth, and open the floodgates to 
future challenges.42 At a time when Houston officials prioritized economic and territorial 
expansion, embracing such a risk was far too dangerous. 
Given the amount of opposition and negotiation attached to the planning of a 
future roadway, one might expect that the two major interstates coming through 
downtown Houston would have fostered even greater debate. As the next section will 
show, however, officials approached these projects in a much different manner than the 
Outer Belt and the residents most affected by the roadways did not organize against the 
routes until it was too late to block construction.  
THE INTERSTATES AND THE WARDS 
 Most Houstonians shared a sense that roads and personal cars enabled access to 
broader forms of freedom. The meaning and definition of that freedom, though, was 
                                                
41 Owen Gutfreund discusses the power that such donations gave developers in several case studies in 
Twentieth Century Sprawl, 107. The relationship between the development of Sharpstown and state 
highway 59 also was shaped by land donations of landowners, see “Spiller Enlarges Offer of SW Freeway 
Right-of-Way” Houston Post September 6, 1957, H-Freeways-1950s Vertical File (VF), HMRC; “Freeway 
Give-Away,” November 1957, Houston, H-Freeways-1950s VF, HMRC.  
42 Houston City Council Minutes, January 27, 1965, HMRC. 
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where black and white Houstonians most diverged in their thinking about highways. For 
many black Houstonians, embroiled in campaigns against segregation in public spaces 
and on public transportation and well aware of similar drives across the nation, personal 
automobiles represented a chance to escape the discrimination and stress attached to a 
daily commute on public transit. Likewise, the ease of movement that automobiles 
afforded all drivers gave African American motorists a freedom of choice and control not 
available on other modes of transportation or on city streets where segregation laws 
governed their seat or step.43   
 Yet, the physical consequences wrought by the imposition of highways onto black 
neighborhoods stood in tension with this freedom. During the city’s booming 1950s, parts 
of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Wards still lacked adequate paving and drainage, suffered 
through service outages, and received little public support for improvements to parks, 
schools or hospitals. (Figure 2.4) The interstates came directly through the Third and 
Fifth Wards, causing hundreds of residential and commercial displacements and 
                                                
43 On treatment and discrimination of blacks on public transportation and African American responses see, 
Robin D. G. Kelley, “Congested Terrain,” in Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class 
(New York: Free Press, 1994), 55-75; Blair Kelley, Right to Ride: Streetcar Boycotts and African American 
Citizenship in the Era of Plessy v Ferguson (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
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wholesale turnover of neighborhood land uses. The physical transformation of 
neighborhoods caused significant shifts in the ways residents conceptualized and moved 
through their communities. As they considered their stance toward the city’s highways, 
African Americans had no unified response.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Fifth Ward Street, 1961 
This image shows the conditions of many of Houston’s African Americans communities. African 
Americans hoped that development might lead to improvements, but instead such physical issues allowed 
city and highway officials to justify building roads through these areas. Owen Johnson photographer, 
Houston Post, December 4, 1961, Houston Post Collection, RGD0006, 284, HMRC. 
By the late 1960s an accrual of negative consequences led many of those residents who 
lived in areas directly affected by the presence of highways to vocalize their discontent 
and to place transportation issues at the center of a broader push for civil rights.  
A number of factors combined to shape the possibility of African American 
resistance to the interstates. Chief among them was the fact that the political and 
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economic limitations they faced made any fight of that sort an uphill battle.44 During the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, black Houstonians still could not count on influencing the 
Houston City Council or Harris County officials. The roads ran through neighborhoods 
that were overwhelmingly black and with residents, on average, who had significantly 
lower income levels than residents in the predominantly white areas of the city. In 1960, 
the Third Ward was 98.7 percent black and only 2.8 percent of households matched the 
$8000 ($62,000 in 2013) annual income held by 87 percent of Memorial Bend residents. 
The Fifth Ward was 98.4 percent black and only 2.4 percent of its households matched or 
surpassed that income level.45 In addition, most residents were renters with little legal 
power to contest eminent domain takings.46 Limited economic means and a politically 
marginalized population gave elected officials little reason to cater to the concerns of 
residents in these areas. In addition, the Houston NAACP chapter, historically one of the 
city’s most powerful civil rights entities, experienced a lull in membership in the early 
1960s that reduced the likelihood of citywide organization against the roadways. Further, 
the civil rights momentum that did exist in the early 1960s centered mainly on voting 
rights, integration, and labor rights, not large-scale infrastructure issues. Finally, the 
disruptive nature of the highway projects made organizing against them very difficult. 
The projects planning and construction occurred quickly and when highways bisected 
                                                
44 Even the wealthiest and most influential of Houston’s African American and ethnic Mexican 
populations possessed significantly less political power than whites of their equivalent class or social 
position for most of the twentieth century. For a discussion of some exceptions to this pattern and examples 
of ethnic Mexican and African American Houstonians who possessed significant social influence in the city 
as a whole, especially Felix Tijerina and Hobart Taylor see, Thomas H. Kreneck, Mexican American 
Odyssey: Felix Tijerina, Entrepreneur & Civic Leader, 1905-1965 (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2001), 108-114; Pruitt, The Other Great Migration, 246-248.  
45 Income and racial statistics taken from Social Explorer records for Houston Census Tract 37 and 18 in 
1960, www.socialexplorer.com, last accessed October 24, 2013. 
46 In 1960, 90 percent of Third Ward homes in Houston Census Tract 34 were rented. 75 percent of Fifth 
Ward homes in Houston Census Tract 18 were as well. Social Explorer, 1960, Houston Census Tract 18 
and 34, www.socialexplorer.com, last accessed October 24, 2013. 
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neighborhoods they dispersed residents throughout the city, breaking community 
networks that might have helped organize resistance.47 
 Understanding the state of black civil rights groups in Houston at the moment of 
highway construction is also important to understanding why resistance to the roadways 
did not become a priority until the mid-to-late 1960s. The Houston branch of the NAACP 
reached its apex in the early 1950s, after having built one of the nation’s largest chapters 
on the basis of its leadership in several important legal cases, such as Smith v. Allwright, 
in which the Supreme Court outlawed the all-white primary election in 1944, and Sweatt 
v. Painter, in which the Supreme Court compelled the integration of the University of 
Texas at Austin Law School, in 1950.48 The NAACP and other groups helped raise the 
number of black voters in Texas after the decision. In the early 1950s, when chapters in 
other southern cities were declining in the face of violence, the Houston branch remained 
strong under the leadership of Lulu B. White.49 At its postwar peak in the early 1950s, the 
Houston branch listed 10,000 members and in 1957 the rolls still held the names of over 
3,000 members.50 These totals represented a much higher number than those in other 
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50 Pitre, In Struggle Against Jim Crow, 107, 120-128; “A Fading Symbol,” Forward Times, January 12, 
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southern states and cities.51 After White died in 1957, internal squabbles, a state 
injunction against the group, perceived political inaction, and competition from other 
civil rights groups lowered the group’s membership. By 1962 just 600 members 
remained.52 The decline of the NAACP branch did not mean an end to black political 
activism in the city as new groups such as the Progressive Youth Association, which led 
Houston’s student sit-in movement in March 1960, emerged in its stead.53 The growth of 
these groups signaled a generational shift in black activism, as younger African 
Americans moved away from the legal strategies of the NAACP and towards direct 
action and protest. While such new groups demonstrated that energy for activism 
remained in the city, the weakening of the NAACP, one of the few citywide civil rights 
organizations, did significantly lower the chance that cooperative resistance from the 
Third and Fifth Ward could be organized to stop the interstates.54  
The first interstate section that threatened downtown black communities was the 
Pierce Elevated, a six-lane elevated freeway through downtown and part of the Third 
Ward, for which officials inaugurated a regimen of protective buying and condemnation 
in 1957.55 Plans called for the project to claim half a block of property along a mile-and-
a-quarter stretch of Pierce Avenue and cost a total of $8 million, the equivalent of more 
than $65 million in 2013. Ninety percent of that total came from the federal government 
                                                
51 For example, in 1951 the entire state of Mississippi had a total of 1303 members down from 3540 in 
1948. Likewise the Memphis branch had only 731 members in 1952. Mississippi figures from Sullivan, Lift 
Every Voice, 400. Memphis figures from Green, Battling the Plantation Mentality, 190. 
52 Letter from Current to Boone, November 20, 1962; Ramona Houston, “The NAACP State Conference 
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Great Migration, 141-185, 286-287. 
55 “Big Highways Program In Harris Gets Go Ahead,” July 17, 1957, Houston Post, H-Freeways-1950 VF, 
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through the Interstate Act. A.C. Kyser, the engineer manager for Houston freeway 
projects, believed that the route would prevent a traffic crisis downtown.56 Just as 
opinions on the Outer Belt depended upon one’s connection to the space through which it 
ran, Houstonians who lived and worked along the proposed route of the Pierce Elevated 
possessed divergent thoughts on the project. 
 For many white Houstonians, the building of the Pierce Elevated offered the 
opportunity to remove the eyesore of dilapidated housing and undesirable businesses in 
the northwest corner of the Third Ward. A 1958 article in the Houston Post urged the city 
to take advantage of the redevelopment opportunities created by highway building. The 
article, like many before it, embraced the new roads. It contended that Houstonians 
should celebrate the city’s march “into the prairie about it,” through its growing network 
of highways. Elements of the system, “the multi-million dollar expanses of the Gulf 
Freeway, Eastex Freeway, or Hardy Street Bridge,” were modern marvels of engineering 
that reflected Houston’s growing significance and the great capabilities of its citizens. 
Yet, as drivers cruised along these new routes they were confronted by “the relentless 
spread of slums,” just beyond the business district.57  
 The idea of using highways as a spur for redevelopment and to remove 
undesirable populations or structures from the downtown area was not unique to 
Houston. In many American cities, the construction of roadways occurred simultaneously 
with other urban renewal projects such as public housing. Despite being depicted as 
positive, these contemporaneous strategies most often resulted in the creation of “second 
ghettos,” as African Americans and other impoverished residents were displaced into 
                                                
56 “Plan for New Gulf Freeway Feeder Offered,” October 20, 1956, Houston Chronicle, H-Freeways-Gulf 
Freeway VF, HMRC. 
57 “Core: City’s Heart Needs Treatment.” From “Houston, 1958” Supplement to Houston Post, January 16, 
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increasingly segregated and under-supported pockets of the city. In Houston, little 
support for public housing and the rejection of federal funds for urban renewal led to an 
uneven process of displacement and resettling, but areas of concentrated poverty were 
created nonetheless. The construction of highways contributed to this by displacing 
residents, many of who resettled into already dense parts of the Third and Fifth Wards 
and overtaxed their services and resources. The highways also blocked off those 
neighborhoods with new boundaries, physically defining the de facto second ghettos.58   
 As the route of the Pierce Elevated ran away from the Third Ward toward the 
heart of downtown Houston the highway threatened more than homes of African 
Americans and the small businesses they patronized. Closer to the center of the city the 
road necessitated the claiming of properties owned by several prominent white 
businessmen and corporations. The leaders of these companies were among the first to 
question the merits of the road. The politics involved with their dissent once again 
magnified the differences between elite and non-elite citizen complaints and reconfirmed 
the difficulty of changing road plans. While none of the corporate leaders who protested 
were from the topmost echelons of the Houston elite, their economic and political power 
was certainly not trivial. In the late 1950s, Oscar Weyrich, the president of Houston Bank 
and Trust Company, waged a campaign to stop the construction of the elevated section of 
the road because it threatened his bank’s expansion plans. Joined by other landowners on 
the western edge of the route, Weyrich sued the state and city for illegal takings. In 1957, 
it appeared that the landowners might win as the City Council contemplated removing the 
                                                
58 For further discussion of the conscious use of roadways by city and state officials as a form of urban 
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building lines and rerouting the road. But, as they had with the Memorial Bend decision, 
officials ultimately decided that removing established plans because of an upset minority 
would set a poor precedent. Instead, they compromised with the majority of the 
landowning businessmen and agreed to pay higher prices for key plots of land.59  
Weyrich continued to resist the plan, laying out the consequences he believed 
would occur in a 1959 letter to Texas Highway Department Engineer A.C. Kyser. 
Weyrich argued that the road meant “the abandonment of plans for office buildings, 
stores and similar improvements,” along Pierce that would have produced tax revenue for 
the city. Further, he predicted that the displacement caused by the road would not be 
limited to properties within the right-of-way, but instead that its influence would ripple 
outward. The road would act as “a Chinese Wall to normal development” and would 
cause blight for several blocks both north and south of the freeway. Weyrich criticized 
the highway department for lack of transparency and asked why no public meetings had 
been held to determine the routing or form the road would take.60  
Kyser responded directly to Weyrich with several justifications for the route. 
Kyser argued that growing downtown congestion necessitated a limited-access, interstate-
standard roadway. The Texas Highway Department estimated that the new road would 
increase traffic capacity to 75,000 vehicles a day. Kyser also pointed out that the section 
was essential to the success of the entire highway system as it represented the only link 
between the roads that, at that point, ended on either side of downtown. As far as the 
blight concerns, Kyser assured Weyrich that the Pierce Elevated would not cause the 
same problems elevated roadways in other cities had because it was an “open-type 
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60 Letter from Oscar Weyrich to AC Kyser, October 20, 1959, Weyrich Letters, Box 2002/101-72, Texas 
Highway Department Historical Records (THDHR), TSA. 
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construction with modern, pleasing, architectural lines.” Far from hurting the community, 
the road would promote commerce by removing freeway traffic from local streets and 
creating a pleasing visual form. In the end, Kyser thanked Weyrich for his input, but 
asserted that the road plan remained the same.61  
 
 
Figure 2.5 and 2.6: Pierce Elevated 
Two views of the Pierce Elevated under construction through downtown Houston. The left photo shows the 
end of the Pierce just after opening, but before the interchange with US 59 was constructed. Note the 
cleared lots on the right side of the picture in the northern Third Ward. On the right side is a view of the 
road through downtown. Texas Department of Transportation, Communications Division, Media 
Production, Photo Library. Left Photo by F.W. Brown, August 30, 1967. Right Photo by Jack Lewis, 
December 3, 1964. 
Unlike the patience they showed with Weyrich’s complaints, when officials began 
work on the interstate projects near downtown and in the Third and Fifth Wards they 
showed little concern for potential political fallout and moved quickly to purchase and 
build the roads.62 As interstate plans took shape and right-of-way clearance began for I-
45, the physical consequences of construction—displacements and the reshaping of the 
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neighborhood—became apparent in the Third Ward. Texas Highway Department 
photographs and Sanborn Fire Insurance maps capture the stark physical changes made 
by I-45 as it cut through the ward. The Texas Highway Department photographs show the 
clearing that occurred downtown and in the northern Third Ward. (Figures 2.5 and 2.6) 
The Sanborn maps likewise demonstrate this transition. The 1951 maps of the Third 
Ward showed dozens of homes and businesses on the 1900 block between Pierce and 
Calhoun Avenues. On the 1970 maps they no longer exist. In their place is a set of lines 
that represents I-45.63 These maps provide a bird’s eye view of how the neighborhood 
changed after the interstate. The road subsumed an entire block and turned Pierce and 
Calhoun Avenues into feeder and frontage roads. The highway also eliminated two cross 
streets in the Third Ward. With the building of the road entire parts of the Third Ward 
disappeared and the absences forced residents to redefine their daily lives and 
movements.64 (Figures 2.7 and 2.8) 
As Weyrich predicted, the consequences of construction were not limited to the 
immediate vicinity of the road. Instead, the effects of the highway rippled outward. The 
changes to Dowling Street reflect this process. In 1960, seventy-four black-owned and 
black-patronized businesses operated between the 1800 block and the 2300 block of 
Dowling Street.65 The businesses on this stretch demonstrated the centrality of Dowling’s 
involvement in the economy of the Third Ward and wider Houston: fourteen beauty 
salons and barber shops, eleven restaurants and cafés, five gas stations, three pharmacies, 
one movie theater, two African American insurance companies, seven dentist or  
 
                                                
63 Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps, 1951 and 1970 maps see Vol. 4, section 471, Vol. 9, Section 900. 
Available on Microfilm at the DBCAH. 
64 Jacobs, Death and Life. Jacobs explores the importance of smaller side streets and cross streets to 
neighborhood cohesion and health.  






Figure 2.7 and 2.8: Third Ward Sanborn Maps 
These are the same Sanborn Fire Insurance Company maps from 1951 and 1970. These images depict the 
route of the I-45 through the Third Ward across Dowling Street. 1951 map accessed through the University 
of Texas’s UMI Sanborn Map Database, http://sanborn.umi.com/ last accessed November 7, 2013. 1970 
map scanned from microfilm collection of HMRC. 
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physicians offices, the headquarters of the Houston chapter of the NAACP and the 
headquarters of the student-led Progressive Youth Association.66 Not only did these 
businesses provide black patrons with a welcoming place to shop in segregated Houston, 
they employed a number of local residents and kept the wealth of the Third Ward within 
the community.67 By 1964, when I-45 cut Dowling in half between the 1800 and 2000 
blocks, the number of businesses along that same stretch of road dwindled to forty-nine. 
By 1970, the number had dropped once more, falling to only forty-two businesses.68 The 
road’s construction corresponded to a marked change in the character of the Dowling 
Street business district and exacerbated a decline in the economic power of the Third 
Ward.  
The roadway hit the residential sections of the Third Ward particularly hard as 
well. The ward was about twice as dense as other parts of the city in 1960, ensuring that 
any roads that ran through it would cause disruption to a larger number of people than it 
would have elsewhere. Prior to the eminent domain takings for Interstate 45 and State 
Highway 288 the neighborhood held nearly 17,000 dwellings. By 1966, the community 
had only 15,000 dwellings. The twin road projects resulted in the removal of over 2,000 
homes and put pressure on housing stock in other parts of the ward as they became even 
more densely populated.69 The physical toll the roadways took on both businesses and 
homes does not capture the attached psychological impact they caused for ward residents. 
Just as the road physically reshaped the neighborhood, it also shifted residents’ cognitive 
ideas of the neighborhood, creating an unrecognizable Third Ward.   
                                                
66 Ibid. 
67 For more on the significance of Dowling and its businesses see Pruitt, The Other Great Migration. 
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Ernie Attwell, a long-time Third Ward resident and city planner, recalled the 
physical and mental costs of the highways. When an oral history interviewer asked about 
the interstate’s impact, Attwell responded with a question of his own. “What was on the 
land” in the Third Ward before the roads ran over it? Not waiting for an answer from his 
interviewer, he continued, “human beings, houses, businesses were on the land.” The 
roads “about killed” the Fifth and Third Wards because displacement and its aftereffects, 
which Attwell estimated to have driven as many as 30,000 people away, drained the 
customer base of businesses. “If you own the hair style place, you have no people coming 
to your hair style place, right, you moved 30,000 people. You have nobody coming to 
your grocery store.” Attwell also remembered the ripple effects of the road’s presence. 
As the road was built and people moved away a “knock down, and abandoning of many 
houses and many buildings” outside of the right-of-way occurred, changing the 
neighborhood from vibrant, livable space into a shell of its former self.70 
Residents and outside observers also found fault with the raised form of the Pierce 
Elevated. Critics singled out the spaces created underneath the road as problematic. To 
many, the looming structure widened the divide between sections of the neighborhood 
and created dark, seemingly useless spaces below the road. Prominent architect Patrick 
Horsburgh disliked the aesthetic effects elevated roadways had on cities and 
neighborhoods. Writing about the Pierce Elevated, Horsburgh argued that the road’s 
demarcation of central business district boundaries aided long-term planning. But, it also 
created “cavernous spaces beneath the highways” that were “psychologically 
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intolerable.” The “sheer un-neighborliness” and “drafty dankness” of the road was 
“detrimental to housing and to other domestic land uses.”71 
Horsburgh’s critique highlighted the physical changes the road created in the 
neighborhood. Rather than productive city blocks lined by businesses and private homes, 
the Third Ward now possessed an elevated freeway with blocks of underutilized space 
beneath it. The city attempted to retrofit the empty space almost immediately. In 1968, 
within a year of the road’s opening, the Houston Planning Department and the Houston 
Municipal Art Commission released a report entitled “Beautification Study: Freeways.” It 
suggested that the areas underneath the road be developed into a mix of “playgrounds, 
plazas, and parking” and included a number of illustrations depicting children playing 
basketball and office workers enjoying a break beneath six lanes of traffic. The northern 
Third Ward’s residential character made it the perfect location “for children’s 
playgrounds…basketball courts, game floors, and various forms of play equipment.” 
(Figure 2.9) The report, however, ignored the fact that to access these play areas children 
would need to cross high-speed frontage roads.72 While the highway department showed 
a willingness to work with localities on such improvements, aside from a few trails along 
the bayous north of downtown, the effort fell flat. By the mid-1970s nearly all the areas 
underneath Houston’s elevated highways held parking lots.73  
 
                                                
71 Patrick Horsbrugh, “Blight, A Foretold Affliction,” Texas Architect, May 1966, Box 29, Folder 3, GFC, 
SCLUH, 7-8; Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles, new ed. (London ; New 
York: Verso, 2006), makes similar arguments about the built environment in Los Angeles. 
72 Houston Municipal Art Commission; City of Houston Department of Planning, “Beautification Study: 
Freeways,” 1968, Box 5, CHPD, RG A 004, HMRC.  
73 State Highway Commission Minutes, August 5, 1971, Minute Order #65169, Box 1998/69-06 (May 




Figure 2.9: Under Pierce Elevated 
Artist’s rendition of recreational possibilities below the Pierce Elevated along the Third Ward. Houston 
Municipal Art Commission City of Houston Department of Planning, “Beautification Study: Freeways,” 
1968, Box 5, City of Houston Planning Department Collection, RG A 004, HMRC. 
Newspaper accounts of the opening of the Pierce Elevated in August of 1967 
avoided any mention of the controversial and disruptive nature of the project. The 
Houston Chronicle applauded the opening of the road and anticipated a significant easing 
of congestion downtown as through-drivers could now avoid the “tortuous 23 blocks of 
street level traffic” they faced prior to the highway.74 Echoing the earlier Houston Post 
article that touted the roads and sought a modern downtown to match them, columnists 
celebrated the fact that drivers no longer saw slums and battered buildings as they drove 
the Pierce Elevated. Instead the road lifted drivers up and provided a 
“scenic…magnificent view of the business district…almost like going up in a cable 
car.”75 Such celebratory accounts of the Pierce Elevated made it easier for the 
                                                
74 “Gulf Freeway Through Town Expected by September 1,” Houston Post, June 25, 1967, H-Freeways 
Gulf Freeway VF, HMRC. 
75 “A New, Beautiful Freeway Link,” Houston Chronicle, August 22, 1967, H-Freeways-1950s VF, 
HMRC.   
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Houstonians who drove above the Third Ward to ignore the consequences the road they 
drove upon had brought to the communities that rested in its shadows.   
 At the same time that Third Warders were dealing with the construction of I-45 
and the Pierce Elevated, residents of the Fifth Ward and the neighborhood just to the east, 
Denver Harbor, confronted the construction of Interstate 10 through their communities. 
Unlike I-45, I-10 ran below grade through the Fifth Ward. Highway planners viewed 
depressed routes as less disruptive to surrounding neighborhoods, yet, in the Fifth Ward, 
this configuration added additional concerns about pedestrian safety to continued 
complaints about abuse of eminent domain and a lack of citizen input. The interstate took 
a huge swath of homes and businesses from the neighborhoods alongside the route. 
Along Stonewall Street, just one example of an area that absorbed numerous costs, the 
road claimed three full blocks and thirty-four homes. The physical change is obvious in 
the Sanborn Map of the area and was repeated throughout the Fifth Ward.76 (Figures 2.10 
and 2.11) 
   
                                                
76 Polk’s Houston (Harris County) City Directory (Houston, TX: Polk, 1960), Polk’s Houston (Harris 
County) City Directory (Houston, TX: Polk, 1970), DBCAH. The directories show the change to the streets 






Figures 2.10 and 2.11: Fifth Ward Sanborn Maps 
1950 and 1970 Sanborn Fire Insurances Company Maps for the Fifth Ward showing the cut across of I-10. 
Stonewall Street is featured here. 1950 map accessed through the University of Texas’s UMI Sanborn Map 
Database, http://sanborn.umi.com/ last accessed November 7, 2013. 1970 map scanned from microfilm 
collection of Sanborn maps at the HMRC. 
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Ramona Toliver, whose story opened the chapter, purchased a house on Tremper Street 
in the Fifth Ward in the late 1950s. When she moved in, her immediate neighborhood 
was home to many black professionals. The majority of the schoolteachers and the 
principal of Wheatley High School, which sat a few blocks to the south, lived nearby. 
Toliver recalled that other middle-class black residents settled in her part of the ward to 
take advantage of the updated infrastructure, especially the sewer system, which the city 
connected to school. Despite access to some amenities, like other predominantly black 
neighborhoods across Houston, Toliver’s area of the Fifth Ward lacked paved streets, 
adequate street lighting, and had poor drainage. Some avenues, such as the one that 
paralleled her home to the south, were not even organized city streets, but rather informal 
lanes created by residents. Despite the challenges presented by the area’s uneven mix of 
informal, underdeveloped, and developed infrastructure, Toliver remembered the area as 
a welcoming and desirable place to live.77  
 This version of the ward, however, would not survive the construction of I-10. 
Toliver’s surprise the morning she confronted the state highway employee in her yard 
indicated how unaware many black residents were of the pending construction of the 
interstate. According to Toliver, neither she nor her neighbors were notified of the road 
prior to the appearance of the Texas Highway Department. Toliver prevented the loss of 
her property only by vociferously resisting plans and benefitting from the fact that 
officials had erred with their first survey. The highway department wanted to build the 
road as fast as possible and to avoid conflicts with residents that might bog down of the 
process or lead to organization against the road. When they resurveyed Toliver’s 
                                                
77 Ramona Toliver, interview by author, April 20, 2012. Several histories of Houston describe the 
infrastructural challenges many Houston communities faced. See Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 210-264. 
David G. McComb, Houston, the Bayou City (Austin: University of Texas, 1969), 209; Martin Melosi, 
“Houston’s Public Sinks: Sanitary Services from Local Concerns to Regional Challenges,” in Melosi and 
Pratt, Energy Metropolis, 109-147. 
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property, the highway department concluded that the frontage route needed only to run 
along the edge of her property not through her garage and moved their staves. Other 
African American residents whose homes were within the route of the interstate or 
frontage were not able to stop the state from taking their property. Some on Tremper saw 
their entire homes taken; others lost their backyards. The informal road below Toliver’s 
home became the main route for the freeway.78 
 To Toliver and other residents, the building of the interstate accelerated a 
transition within the ward. By the end of the 1960s, shifts in population, land-use, and 
housing quality gave the Fifth Ward a very different demographic and physical landscape 
than it possessed in the previous decade. Once the Texas Highway Department 
established building lines, homeowners within them were prevented from improving their 
homes in order to keep property values low ahead of state purchase. This contributed to 
the physical deterioration of many structures.79 Coupled with a decline in housing stock, 
in the early 1960s better off African Americans began to leave the ward as the repeal of 
segregation made formerly all-white areas of the city, such as MacGregor, available to 
blacks. Many of those displaced by the interstate joined these residents in the exodus 
from the community. Ms. E. Smith, an absentee owner of several Fifth Ward properties, 
recalled that even with relocation support, most of her renters resettled outside of the 
Fifth Ward due to the high prices and intense competition for housing within in the ward 
caused by the displaced scrambling to find shelter.80 The departure of these residents 
                                                
78 Ramona Toliver, interview by author, April 20, 2012. 
79 Algenita Scott Davis, interview by J.R. Wilson, July 19, 2006, interview #00624, transcript, Box 10, 
Houston History Project Collection (HHP), SCLUH. 
80 The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 was the first to mention relocation assistance for displaced 
residents and businesses. This was essential for renters, who before the act did not receive any 
compensation if the dwelling they rented were claimed. See the text for the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1962 at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-76/pdf/STATUTE-76-Pg1145.pdf, last accessed 
October 24, 2013. 
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drastically reshaped the demographics of the ward. In addition, the flight of consumers 
and their spending power—and a lack of exits off the freeway—combined to threaten the 
ward’s once vibrant business community along Lyons Avenue.81  
The construction of the interstate also redefined the way residents moved through 
the neighborhood. Prior to the interstate, walking represented a major form of travel in 
the Fifth Ward. Ramona Toliver recalled that throughout the 1950s her side yard operated 
as a thoroughfare for students walking to Wheatley High School. Algenita Scott Davis 
and Beneva Williams, who were children during the construction of the interstate, 
likewise recalled the prevalence of walking in the ward and discussed the disruptions the 
road caused. Williams, who was also the plaintiff for one of Houston’s first integration 
lawsuits, remembered the Fifth Ward of the early 1950s as “open and free” with calm 
neighborhood streets.82 She herself walked the length of the neighborhood each morning 
to get to junior high school at E.O. Smith, on the west side of the ward. The interstate, 
Williams said, changed all that. It “busted up” the community, making travel from one 
end to the other more difficult.83 The construction of the interstate cut the Fifth Ward in 
half, separating residents from community institutions on the opposite of the road. 
Algenita Davis recalled that unlike the wealthy areas along US 59 that were served by 
ample overpasses, the Fifth Ward “didn’t get any cute little bridges…we just got a 
complete wipeout.”84 (Figure 2.12). Because it took several years for adequate pedestrian 
bridges to be added, walking became more difficult and residents took to automobiles 
                                                
81 Ramona Toliver, interview by author, April 20, 2012. On lack of freeway exits Algenita Scott Davis, 
interview by J.R. Wilson, July 19, 2006. 
82 Beneva Williams, interview by J.R. Wilson, July 13, 2003, interview #00628, transcript, Box 10, HHP, 
SCLUH. On Williams and the desegregation case see McComb, Houston, 231; Kellar, Make Haste Slowly, 
89-103.  
83 Beneva Williams, interview by J.R. Wilson, July 13, 2003.  
84 Algenita Davis, interview by J.R. Wilson, July 19, 2006. 
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even for routine neighborhood trips, changing their interactions with the community and 
city.85   
 
 
Figure 2.12: I-10 and the Fifth Ward  
View of I-10 through the Fifth Ward looking west. Location unspecified, it appears to be the intersection of 
Schweikhardt Street and I-10, putting Toliver’s home on Tremper Street on the left side near the crane. 
Note the wide swath taken from the neighborhood and the paucity of crossings. One pedestrian bridge and 
one overpass are pictured here. Texas Department of Transportation, Communications Division, Media 
Production, Photo Library, December 3, 1964, Photographer unknown. 
The shortage of safe crossings over the interstate did more than force residents 
into cars and split the neighborhood, it also contributed to several pedestrian deaths.86 
                                                
85 Both Toliver and Smith discussed the changes to their personal mobility patterns and the increase in car 
trips after the construction of the road. Ramona Toliver, interview by author, April 20, 2012 and E. Smith, 
interview by author, April 18, 2012, Houston, Texas, audio recording. On the experiential significance of 
changing mobility modes from walking to driving, especially to interstates, see David Nye, “Redefining the 
American Sublime, From Open Road to Interstate,” in Mari Hvattum, Brita Brenna, Beate Elvebakk, and 
Janike Kampevold Larsend, eds. Routes, Roads, and Landscapes (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2011), 99-112. 
86 The dangers presented by the location of transportation structure in or around lower-class 
neighborhoods has been a problem for African Americans for decades. For a recent example see Mark 
Fiege, The Republic of Nature: An Environmental History of United States (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2012): 318-357. 
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After a number of accidents, including several that resulted in the deaths of local 
children, residents vocally advocated for the city to construct pedestrian bridges over the 
interstate, one of the first instances of collective action aimed at altering the highways.87 
As Davis suggested, for years only a handful of north-south thoroughfares crossed over 
the depressed freeway in the Fifth Ward or Denver Harbor. This lack of overpasses led to 
a rise in pedestrian-related accidents as local residents attempted to cross the interstate by 
foot. After years of pressing officials to build walkways over the road, residents of 
Denver Harbor finally assembled along the frontage roads of the interstate in April of 
1970 to cut the ribbon on the first pedestrian bridge.88  
The building of I-10 completely boxed in the Fifth Ward with transportation 
infrastructure. The absence of pedestrian and street overpasses added to an already 
established collection of structures that cut the ward off from the rest of the city. 
Significant rail yards had been a part of the neighborhood for decades and marked its 
northern boundary. The building of I-10 and US 59 created new southern and western 
borders for the ward and bisected the neighborhood. (Figure 2.13) The interchange for 
these two roads destroyed 36 square blocks of the Fifth Ward near downtown.89 
Residents on the north side of I-10 recalled feeling more cut off than ever from the rest of 
the city.90 In Denver Harbor, congestion from commercial trucks serving the ship  
                                                
87 Houston City Council Minutes, April 12, 1966, HMRC; Margaret Scanlan, “Boy Fatality of East 
Freeway,” Denver Harbor News, May 12, 1970, Box 1, Folder 2, Margaret Scanlan Collection (MSC), 
MSS 266, HMRC.  
88 Margaret Scanlan, “Denver-Harbor CC Opens Crosswalk,” Denver Harbor News, April 28, 1970, Box 
1, Folder 2, MSC, HMRC. 
89 TxDOT Can 230/SRN006411, February 19, 1964, I-10/1-45-57, Texas Department of Transportation 
Aerial Photo Library, Austin, Texas.  
90 Reflections upon the Fifth Ward’s physical boundaries come from an informal conversation by the 




Figure 2.13: Aerial photograph of the Fifth Ward. 
This 1964 Photo shows the ward boundaries created by transportation structures. The cleared area on the 
left is the construction of I-10. The Intersection is of I-10 and U.S. 59, which runs left to right in the middle 
of the picture. Train tracks cut across the north of the community. TxDOT Can 230/SRN006411, February 
19, 1964, I-10/1-45-57, Texas Department of Transportation Aerial Photo Library, Austin, Texas.  
channel, the body of water itself, the presence of I-10 to the north, and rail tracks to east 
boxed in that community and limited movement. To top it off, neither community would 
be served by meaningful public transportation until well into the 1970s.91 
CONCLUSION: CITIZEN RESPONSE TO HIGHWAYS 
Citizens’ questioning of Houston’s non-stop highway building in the wards and 
Memorial Bend represented a shift in their ideas about the politics of mobility and 
encouraged more organized, longer-lasting actions. During the mid-1960s, when the 
physical problems faced by black and ethnic Mexican neighborhoods piled up and the 
consequences of interstate construction magnified the importance of controlling 
                                                
91 Denver Harbor descriptions from City of Houston Department of Planning, “Denver Harbor/Port 
Houston Data Book,” Box 2, CHPD, RG A 004, HMRC, 11.  
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community-level development, African American and ethnic Mexican activists, whose 
role in this fight will be explored in Chapter Three, pivoted their civil rights actions 
toward confronting the adverse effects of infrastructure construction and addressing 
service shortcomings in their neighborhoods.92 White Houstonians throughout the HMA 
also continued to encounter infrastructure projects in their neighborhoods during the mid-
to-late 1960s and attempted to broker outcomes that served their interests. 
Changes in how African American Houstonians framed highways before and after 
their construction demonstrated the switch of transportation issues from the political 
backburner to the fore of civil rights campaigns. In the early 1960s, black leaders used 
highways as a rhetorical tool, labeling them harbingers of progress that could be used to 
illustrate broader civil rights goals. A 1960 article in the black-owned Forward Times 
described the struggle for racial equality as a “muddy road” and called on black 
Houstonians to “start draining off the water of poverty, filling in the low spots of 
dissoluteness and bringing the bulldozer of unity to scrape off the mud of ignorance.” 
Every resident needed to “pitch in and help with the paving.”93 The article depicted roads, 
both physically and metaphorically, as crucial to the overall advancement of the city’s 
black population, as a path toward modernity. Just five years later, after the construction 
of I-10 through the Fifth Ward and I-45 through the Third, Algenita Davis, Beneva 
Williams, and Ernie Attwell expressed just the opposite sentiments with each lamenting 
                                                
92 On the physical conditions facing black and ethnic Mexican communities see de León, Ethnicity in the 
Sunbelt; Bullard, Invisible Houston; Robert Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental 
Quality 3rd Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008); Robert D. Bullard, “Dumping on Houston’s 
Black Neighborhoods,” in Melosi and Pratt, eds., Energy Metropolis, 207-223; On shifts towards 
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93 “About Muddy Roads and Men,” Forward Times, April 16, 1960. DBCAH, 21. 
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the destruction the roads brought. They framed highways not as progress, but as a 
regression. The gap between these two depictions showed that the consequences of 
highway construction galvanized African Americans to forward a full-throated demand 
for improved infrastructure and participation in civic decision-making. By attempting to 
improve the physical conditions of their communities, these Houstonians began a new 
phase of civil rights struggle, one that would persist well into the 1980s.94  
 In 1967, black Houstonians protested in front of the Holmes Road Dump, which 
was one of many examples of polluting, dangerous land-uses in black neighborhoods. 
This protest marked the beginning of more than two decades of fights against the 
placement of such structures in black neighborhoods.95 The chambers of the Houston 
City Council became another venue that black Houstonians used to air grievances about 
the physical issues they confronted, including the location of trash dumps, the poor state 
of neighborhood roads, a lack of adequate drainage, and the low levels of investment in 
black neighborhoods.96 Residents used their votes and voices not only to express their 
dislike of currents projects, but also to lobby for more resources to rebuild, rather than 
tear down or redevelop, their neighborhoods. 
Black Houstonians were not the only ones who continued to encounter problems 
with road infrastructure through the mid-to-late 1960s. Residents in the predominantly 
white and wealthy near-downtown subdivision of Indian Trail fought against the routing 
of a major thoroughfare, Chimney Rock Road, through their community from 1963 until 
1967. While the road’s impact on the neighborhood would be a far cry from those caused 
                                                
94 This push can be seen as the beginning of the environmental justice movement and a shift toward 
focusing on the physical inequalities that African American and ethnic Mexican urban dwellers faced. See 
Bullard, Dumping in Dixie. 
95 Bullard, “Dumping on Houston’s Black Neighborhoods,” 219-221; Elizabeth Blum, “The Gunfighters 
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and Pratt eds., Energy Metropolis, 224-240. 
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by the Outer Loop or the interstates, residents’ active resistance demonstrated the 
growing resolve of citizens to not be forced into accepting official infrastructure 
decisions.  
Chimney Rock Road was a north-south boulevard planned to run the entirety of 
the city. By 1963 it had been constructed nearly to its northern terminus, lacking only a 
mile of road and a bridge over Buffalo Bayou. City planners did not anticipate any 
problems when they moved to construct the bridge and connect the road with Interstate 
10. The details for the area were part of the city’s earliest comprehensive plans and had 
been in the City of Houston Major Thoroughfare and Street Plan since the 1950s.97 
Planners saw the bridge as particularly important to metropolitan traffic flow, because, 
aside from the Inner Loop’s bridge over the bayou, no local streets crossed the water 
between Shepherd Road in downtown Houston and Voss Road to the west, a distance of 
almost 5.5 miles.98 Despite officials’ assertions that the road was essential, a group of 
residents from Indian Trail solicited the support of the Houston City Council to stop the 
extension. 
Articulating many of the same arguments as Memorial Bend residents, Indian 
Trail homeowners argued that the road would lower their property values and turn their 
neighborhood into a strip mall. Because the residents possessed significant economic and 
political resources, city council members listened to their demands and requested that the 
city attorney draw up an ordinance removing the extension of Chimney Rock from 
plans.99 The planning commission scrambled to respond to what they believed was as an 
                                                
97 See Chamber of Commerce, Master Freeway Plan, March 1954, Box 6, Folder 10, Oscar Holcombe 
Collection, MSS 20, HMRC; Houston Chamber of Commerce, “1975 Freeways and 1925 Thoroughfares,” 
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VRC, MSS 143, HMRC.  
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unprecedented and unwise action. Ralph Ellifrit cautioned that the council’s choice set a 
dangerous precedent. Caving to the Chimney Rock residents, Ellifrit believed, made the 
entire “major thoroughfare system…vulnerable” to citizen resistance. Further, it 
threatened the city’s ability to engage in “long-range planning” because fears “of 
continuing defeats” at the hands of residents might limit the options available to 
officials.100 With the Memorial Bend dispute fresh in his mind, Ellifrit worried that 
altering the major street plan because of complaints from a small group of residents 
would foster hundreds of other such complaints and hamstring movement throughout the 
city.  
 After the council passed the removal ordinance, the planning commission 
announced that it would not remove the extension from its thoroughfare plan. This 
disagreement led to a legal battle over which entity could impel the actions of the other, 
and which had the ultimate say in directing Houston’s growth.101 When Louie Welch 
took over as mayor in 1964, he announced that his administration would back the 
planning commission and construction plans went forward. When, in 1965, the City 
Council considered a motion to buy the remaining parcels of right-of-way, residents 
made a final push to resist the project. Welch and the commission held firm. Just as 
Memorial Bend residents were told that the Outer Belt was needed for the greater good, 
residents in the vicinity of Chimney Rock were informed that that the bridge was 
essential to easing citywide traffic problems and opening Northwest Houston to 
economic development.102 In the end the Chimney Rock Road fight served as both 
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another example of the limits of citizen influence over planning changes and as a signal 
of the continuing commitment of Houstonians to resist projects they viewed as damaging.  
The debates around the road projects discussed above marked attacks on the top-
down, official-driven highway planning and construction program that held sway in 
Houston during the late 1950s and early 1960s. They also signaled the emergence of a 
system in which citizens became progressively more involved with decisions about the 
city’s transportation network. This change, however, did not represent the end of unequal 
decision-making in Houston. Wealthy developers such as Roy Hofheinz still possessed a 
great deal of sway; white suburbanites succeeded in getting their complaints aired with 
local officials more easily than their black neighbors. Yet, by the end of the decade it was 
clear that Houstonians from across the city were no longer willing to absorb the 
consequences of construction without at least some say in its foundational decisions.  
 Taken together, protests by African American and ethnic Mexican citizens about 
service problems and Indian Trail residents’ fight against Chimney Rock Road 
represented fundamental challenges to the city’s development status quo. Each of these 
fights was a reaction to the destruction wrought by earlier road projects and built upon 
the nascent resistance of Houstonians to such disruption. Between 1945 and 1960, city 
officials dealt with the HMA’s rapid expansion by building the systems they needed and 
expecting residents to accept them. When the required structures reached the size of 
interstates and major highways, though, citizens could no longer ignore the impact. Like 
Ralph Ellifrit, many officials worried that the pushback would derail long-range growth 
plans and threaten Houston’s connection to its growing suburban fringe.103 Citizen action 
raised the stakes on such concerns over the coming years. A nearly decade-long fight 
against a proposed state highway in which ethnic Mexican Houstonians played a central 
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role represented just such a conflict. Houstonians’ encounters with the construction and 
consequences of transportation structures in the 1960s led many to form new notions of 
the politics of mobility and sparked the involvement of a broader population of non-elite 




 “Only You Can Prevent Another Freeway”1: 
 The Harrisburg Freeway and the Struggle to Shape a Neighborhood 
In the mid-1960s Richard Holgin was sitting on the front porch of his family’s 
Avenue L home in Magnolia Park when his teenage nephew ran up to share some 
disturbing news. A rumor was floating around the community that the Texas Highway 
Department planned to “build a freeway through” Magnolia Park. In fact, according to 
his nephew, the road would run “right over [Holgin’s] house” on its way through 
Houston’s East End neighborhoods toward downtown. Looking out at the streets of the 
tight-knit, predominantly ethnic Mexican community in which he grew up, Holgin feared 
that such a project would tear it apart. Shortly after speaking with his nephew, Holgin 
confirmed the veracity of the rumor: since the early 1960s officials from the city and the 
Houston office of the highway department had been steadily working on plans to run a 
highway through the East End.2 Aware of the destruction brought to other central city 
neighborhoods by the ongoing construction of Interstate 10 and State Highway 59, 
Holgin, one of a small minority of ethnic Mexican East Enders with a college education, 
led several of his neighbors in a struggle to halt the project.3 
 Over the subsequent decade, the contest around the Harrisburg Freeway proposal 
saw a mainly working-class, predominantly ethnic Mexican group of protestors resist the 
                                                
1 Maggie Landron, “Freeway Kills—City Thinks” Papel Chicano, April 11, 1970, Houston Metropolitan 
Research Center (HMRC), 7. 
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3 According to the 1960 US Census only 1.6 percent of East End residents had a college degree. Social 




plans of authorities from both local and state governments.4 In addition to the panoply of 
protest tactics they employed to delay the road planning process, opponents of the 
roadway also benefitted from shifts in federal highway policy and regulation, a national 
upsurge in resistance against urban highways, and a timely state-level budget crunch. The 
coalescence of these factors resulted in the blocking of the road’s construction and its 
eventual removal from the Texas State Highway plan. While ostensibly about the 
roadway, the conflict came to represent a larger struggle that pitted two visions for the 
future of east Houston against one another. As officials tried to shape the community into 
a form they believed would best facilitate central city and suburban growth, resident 
opponents articulated alternative visions to maintain the integrity of their neighborhoods 
and stop discriminatory decision-making.5 The struggle increasingly fomented questions 
about civil rights, political power, and the meaning of place. 
Added to Houston’s Major Thoroughfare and Highway Plan in 1963 and to the 
State Highway Plan in 1969, the route for the proposed Harrisburg freeway connected 
with State Highway 225 on the east side of Loop 610 and ran to downtown Houston, 
cutting through the predominantly ethnic Mexican, working-class neighborhoods of 
Harrisburg, Magnolia Park and the Second Ward along the way.6 As planning for the 
route progressed in the late 1960s, the process threatened to repeat the same pattern of 
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heavy central city displacements as earlier road projects like the Pierce Elevated and 
Interstate 10 in the Fifth Ward. Just as with these projects, city and state officials hoped 
the new route would alleviate traffic problems on the city’s highways and improve the 
mobility of Houston’s growing suburban population. Aware of, but not overly 
sympathetic to, the disruption caused of displacing hundreds of Houstonians, officials 
argued that such uprootings were inevitable in the burgeoning city. Officials explained to 
frustrated residents that unlike projects started at a time when Houston was so “spread out 
that” planners had “been able to find holes” through which to run roads, by the 1960s the 
city’s rapidly filling urban landscape meant that “there [were] just no holes” for new 
roadways, so they needed to be created.7 Officials told East End residents whose homes 
lay within the potential rights-of-way that such plans needed to be implemented for the 
greater good of the city.   
While, overall, residents of the East End generally approved of the freeway, many 
ethnic Mexican residents of Magnolia Park and Harrisburg did not accept that their 
homes would be cleared in the name of progress. Those who saw the road in a positive 
light believed it would shorten their daily commutes into downtown Houston and make 
travel to other parts of the city easier. The push made by the group of residents against 
the highway represented a very different vision of the politics of mobility and definitively 
altered the fate of the project.8 Road opponents in the East End argued that the highway 
                                                
7 “Houston Most Auto-Dominated City Next to LA,” Houston Chronicle, February 22, 1972.  
8 Burke, et. al., “Evaluation of Residents’ Attitudes and Expectations,” 9-20. The study found that overall 
70 percent of East End residents surveyed approved of the highway plan with 15 percent opposed and 15 
percent expressing no opinion. Controlling for Anglo residents the approval rating rose to 78 percent, but 
among ethnic Mexicans it dropped to 66 percent. This difference demonstrates a higher level of skepticism 
among the East End’s ethnic Mexican population toward the project. The study also concludes that the 




Figure 3.1: Harrisburg Freeway Proposal 
The proposed route of the Harrisburg Freeway extension, the bold black line above, ran from the 
intersection of SH 225 and Interstate 610 to downtown crossing through Harrisburg, Magnolia Park, and 
the Second Ward. Texas Highway Department, “Draft Environmental Impact Statement for State Highway 
225,” FHWA-TEX_EIS-730977-D, 21.  
was another abusive infrastructure project that benefitted the wealthier parts of the 
metropolitan area, while foisting the consequences of construction onto African 
American and ethnic Mexican communities. By voicing dissent to what they saw as 
discriminatory planning methods, ethnic Mexican East Enders challenged the lack of 
citizen input involved in civic decision-making. This opposition made it clear that a 
uniform definition of “good” mobility did not exist in Houston. Indeed, their campaign 
against the road illustrated that various groups possessed divergent, often contradictory, 
understandings of the concept and its role in daily life. During the Harrisburg fight, ethnic 
Mexican Houstonians forced their visions for the future of their neighborhoods and for 
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the city into public view and in the process changed the nature of Houston’s 
infrastructure development. 
The actions taken by ethnic Mexican highway opponents overlapped with and 
built upon other ongoing civil rights struggles in which Houstonians of color advocated 
for greater control over and access to economic, political, and mobility rights. By the 
1970s, ethnic Mexicans in the East End, like African Americans in the city’s Third and 
Fifth Wards, had been engaged in campaigns for civil rights for several decades. In the 
ethnic Mexican East End, those campaigns centered mainly on education, employment, 
and voting rights.9 In the late 1960s and early 1970s a conflict over school integration 
erupted in the city’s ethnic Mexican neighborhoods. For decades Houstonians of Mexican 
origin were considered white and during school desegregation efforts Houston leaders 
used this categorization to place black and ethnic Mexican children in the same schools 
and claim that such actions represented black-white integration. Ethnic Mexican 
Houstonians responded by rejecting whiteness, instead insisting that they belonged to 
separate racial category and that the school district needed to fully integrate black, brown, 
                                                
9 Raymond Mohl and Mark Rose have argued that many of the national upsurges in highway revolts can be 
linked with other civil rights victories, see Raymond Mohl and Mark Rose, Interstate: Highway Politics 
and Policy Since 1939, 3rd ed., (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 113-134. Likewise, 
Joseph DiMento and Cliff Ellis argue that the negative impact urban highways had on lives in American 
cities pushed both planning professionals and citizens to react against new road plans by the 1960s. See 
Joseph DiMento and Cliff Ellis, Changing Lanes: Visions and Histories of Urban Freeways (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, 2012). For a sample of works dealing with ethnic Mexican civil rights fights in Houston, 
see Guadalupe San Miguel, Brown, Not White: School Integration and the Chicano Movement in Houston 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001); Arnoldo de León, Ethnicity in the Sunbelt: A 
History of Mexican Americans in Houston (Houston, Tex.: University of Houston Press, 1989); Brian 
Behnken, Fighting Their Own Battles: Mexican Americans, African Americans, and the Struggle for Civil 
Rights in Texas (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Thomas H. Kreneck, Mexican 
American Odyssey: Felix Tijerina, Entrepreneur & Civic Leader, 1905-1965 (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2001); William Henry Kellar, Make Haste Slowly: Moderates, Conservatives, and School 
Desegregation in Houston (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999); Cynthia Orozco, No 
Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed: The Rise of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2009).  
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and white children in city schools.10 Many of the actors involved in the Harrisburg 
Freeway fight participated in these other civil rights campaigns. These overlapping 
battles helped to radicalize a large proportion of the city’s ethnic Mexican population and 
empowered them to voice their shared frustrations about education, police brutality, poor 
city services, and discrimination. 
While the act of moving through the city may seem secondary to the essential 
political and social rights pursued by more recognized civil rights campaigns, those 
Houstonians who pushed against the Harrisburg plan came to believe that unhindered and 
equal access to systems of mobility represented an important piece of the larger push for 
civil rights. Ethnic Mexican protestors—who urged the city to consider alternative 
transportation structures, sought the just distribution of the physical costs of 
transportation systems, and who demanded a local voice in planning efforts—made the 
Harrisburg fight into an important iteration of the local civil rights struggle. As a result of 
the city’s multifaceted civil rights actions and changing federal laws, by the mid-1970s, 
Houston’s ethnic Mexican and African American citizens constituted a much more 
significant electoral bloc than they did a decade earlier.  
Beyond fighting over the roadway, officials and residents also sparred for the 
power to define and control the parts of the city through which the road would run. Each 
side attempted to characterize the landscapes of the East End in ways that best suited 
their desired ends. Two reports—a required environmental impact statement (EIS) 
produced by state and city officials for the road project and a Model Cities publication 
issued by the Houston’s Neighborhood Improvement Program about neighborhood 
                                                
10 San Miguel, Brown, Not White, argues that the fight in Houston around the topic of school integration 
helped radicalize a vast majority of the city’s ethnic Mexican population. This fight began almost 
simultaneously with the build up to the Harrisburg Freeway conflict. See also Behnken, Fighting Their 
Own Battles, 154-194.  
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renovation—captured the very different perspectives the Texas Highway Department and 
residents of the East End held of the community. Each of the reports reflected changes to 
federal participation in the governance of major public works projects and cities. 
Required EIS for all federally-funded projects was a product of the National 
Environmental Policy Act passed in 1969. Model Cities was a federal program initiated 
during the War on Poverty to get funds to poverty-stricken neighborhoods. The EIS 
depicted the East End, particularly Magnolia Park and Harrisburg, as rundown and 
outdated. It claimed that the roadway could encourage urban renewal in the East End. 
Residents fought to maintain the residential nature of their neighborhoods. In the Model 
Cities report and in their public comments about the road, they argued that their 
communities were viable and productive parts of the city. They feared that the road’s 
construction would render their streets unrecognizable, disrupt their patterns of living, 
disconnect them from the city at large, and accelerate the environmental breakdown of 
their already stressed landscape.11 Like suburban Houstonians nervous about the impact 
of Interstate 610 on their homes and lives, ethnic Mexican activists articulated their 
concerns about the road through arguments that focused on issues of mobility, place, and 
the environment.12  Those opposed to the freeway voiced these concerns at community 
meetings, to their elected officials, and among their neighbors. Their actions made it clear 
that never again would mobility decisions emerge solely from a room of officials pouring 
over maps in search of “holes” through which to run roads.  
                                                
11 Burke et. al., “Evaluation of Residents’ Attitudes,” 43. 
12 This chapter’s discussion of place-making and resident/official conceptions of landscapes relies greatly 
on the idea of framing historical work through an “ethic of place,” which allows for a given landscape or 
space to be understood as a collection of definitions and viewpoints from a variety of actors, as well as 
taking into account the physical, natural landscape itself. This idea comes from Matthew Klingle, Emerald 
City: An Environmental History of Seattle (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007).  
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SITUATING THE DEBATE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF EAST HOUSTON COMMUNITIES 
Real estate developers came to east Houston in the early 1900s and conceived of 
the area as a potential suburban haven in the shadow of downtown. However, due to its 
position on the edge of the Houston Ship Channel east Houston had transformed by the 
1920s into one of the leading industrial areas in the city. Shipping companies, cotton 
compresses, and manufacturing centers clustered along the ship channel seeking easy 
access to the Gulf of Mexico. At the same time, residential communities such as 
Magnolia Park and the Second Ward grew up alongside this industry, housing the 
laborers who flocked to the area in search of jobs or because of connections with already 
settled families and friends.13 Magnolia Park became one of Houston’s earliest ethnic 
Mexican barrios. By the end of World War II, as the area’s industries transitioned to the 
petrochemical and heavy manufacturing interests that would drive Houston’s postwar 
expansion, the residential communities continued to grow apace.  
By the beginning of the Harrisburg Freeway debate in the mid-1960s, east 
Houston communities featured factories, warehouses, and train tracks interspersed with 
homes, schools, and churches. The factories projected a decidedly industrial landscape 
dominated by commercial infrastructure and facilities, relegating the residential and 
natural elements of the area to the background. By the 1970s, industrial land use in a 
corridor that encompassed both Magnolia Park and Harrisburg stood at twenty-one 
percent, more than five percent higher than the city average. The communities’ 
commercial usage stood at sixteen percent.14 Beyond the physical presence of the 
factories and shops, the industrial landscape—its processes, infrastructure requirements, 
and detritus—also left unseen marks upon the area in the form of pollution and toxicity. It 
                                                
13 de León, Ethnicity in the Sunbelt, 3-42. 
14 City of Houston Department of Planning, “Magnolia Park/Harrisburg-Manchester Data Book, 1976,” 
City of Houston Department of Planning Records (CHPD), RG A 004, Box 2, HMRC, 22. 
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was this legacy, as much as the buildings themselves, with which residents contended on 
a daily basis. 
The area’s industry served as the foundation for the social and economic activity 
of the area. In east Houston communities, almost a third of adult residents worked at 
either one of the numerous factories on 76th street or along the docks.15 Just as industrial 
byproducts seeped into the landscape, so too did the patterns of industrial life engrain 
themselves into every facet of life. Residents timed their daily commutes around slow 
moving freight trains; they avoided impromptu garbage dumps outside of factories; they 
awoke to the whistles of oil barges and container ships. Unlike Houstonians whose homes 
sat in the shadows of the growing downtown, east Houston residents experienced the 
extreme nature of Houston’s economic growth first hand. While they benefitted from the 
many opportunities created by the city’s burgeoning economy, they also absorbed—
physically and cognitively—the consequences that came with living in an industrial 
neighborhood.16 For residents whose homes rested among and behind the walls of 
factories and warehouses, the surrounding landscape shaped the way they lived their lives 
and affected how they interpreted their places within the city.  
People, not just landscapes, defined these communities. At the time of the 
freeway fight ethnic Mexicans dominated the demographics of both the Second Ward and 
Magnolia Park, while Harrisburg and Manchester saw a closer split between ethnic 
Mexican and white Houstonians. Other East End neighborhoods such as Lawndale, 
                                                
15 USDOT; FHWA; THD, “Draft Environmental Impact Statement,” 7; See also Richard Holgin, interview 
by author, February 20, 2012; Frank Partida, interview by author, March 5, 2012, Houston, Texas, audio 
recording.  
16 Joseph A. Pratt, “A Mixed Blessing: Energy, Economic Growth, and Houston’s Environment,” in 
Martin Melosi and Joseph A. Pratt, eds., Energy Metropolis: An Environmental History of Houston and the 
Gulf Region (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 21-51; Hugh S. Gorman, “The Houston 
Ship Channel and the Changing Landscape of Industrial Pollution,” in Melosi and Pratt, eds., Energy 
Metropolis, 52-68. Both Pratt and Gorman discuss the costs and benefits of living along the Ship Channel. 
Proximity brought access to jobs, but also created grave environmental risks.  
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Eastwoods, and Pecan Park were predominantly white.17 Chinese and African American 
Houstonians had a small but meaningful presence in the neighborhoods, particularly 
Magnolia Park. Chinese immigrants operated several grocery stores there and African 
American laborers and their families clustered near the union hall of the all-black 
International Longshoremen’s Association Local 872.18 Neither group participated 
vocally in the Harrisburg Freeway fight. East Houston communities were especially 
dense as well. In 1970 the citywide average was 14.4 people per acre. In the east Houston 
corridor from Magnolia Park to Harrisburg the population density stood at 23.4 people 
per acre.19 Such density guaranteed that any major infrastructure projects in the area 
would displace a large number of residents.  
 East Houston—an industrial-residential world, populated by working-class 
Houstonians from a variety of backgrounds—became the site for the fight over the 
Harrisburg Freeway. East End residents—who alternately tolerated, benefitted from, and 
complained about their landscape—approached the highway project with a mix of 
opinions ranging from acceptance, to resignation, to indignation.20 No matter how they 
viewed the road itself, what became clear was that each resident possessed a 
preconceived notion of their neighborhood and its landscape. Further, each held his or her 
                                                
17 Burke et. al. “Evaluations of Residents’ Attitudes,” 7; See also the census tract level data for these 
neighborhoods that demonstrates the predominant ethnic makeup of the East End as a mix of white and 
ethnic Mexican residents in both 1960 and 1970, with the percentage of ethnic Mexican residents rising in 
most census tracts between the decades. Houston Census Tract Level data accessed through Social 
Explorer, www.socialexplorer.com, last accessed November 30, 2012. 
18 Frank Partida, interview by author, March 5, 2012. Also an informal interview with Gordon Quan of 
Houston, whose parents and uncles operated grocery stores in Magnolia Park and lived in the community. 
For more information about ILA Local 872 see Rebecca Montes, “Working for American Rights: Black, 
White, and Mexican American Dockworkers in Texas During the Great Depression,” (PhD Dissertation, 
University of Texas at Austin, 2005.)  
19 City of Houston Dept. of Planning “Magnolia Park/Harrisburg-Manchester Data Book,” 22. 
20 Burke et. al. “Evaluations of Residents’ Attitudes”; and Dock Burke, Jesse Buffington, and Hugo 
Meuth, “Attitudes, Opinions, and Expectations of Businessmen in a Planned Freeway Corridor,” (College 
Station:  Texas Transportation Institute (TTI), 1972), TTI Report 148-2. 
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own idea about what the road might mean to movements through the city and the 
community. From this diverse array of opinions, a solid knot of ethnic Mexican 
residents—linked by a mutual fear of the road and a distrust of the city’s power 
brokers—emerged to resist the highway’s construction.  
EARLIER COMMUNITY CONFLICTS  
The area’s industry-centric makeup provides a clue to many residents opposition 
to the Harrisburg Freeway. Well before the fight against the highway, East Enders had 
taken stands against toxic pollutants, poor city services, and dangerous transportation 
crossings, showing a desire not only to remove hazards from their communities, but also 
to define the shape of their neighborhoods. While East Enders divided over the proposed 
highway, in earlier fights residents presented a united front against mutual problems. 
Experiences with industrial and infrastructural issues, as well as an awareness of the 
destructive nature of Interstate 10 through the Fifth Ward, contributed to some residents’ 
choices to resist the freeway. Further, earlier struggles to shape the neighborhood and 
curtail damaging practices prepared those residents who opposed the freeway for the 
struggle against it.21  
One major conflict that had arisen from the industrial-residential nature of the 
East End centered on the near constant movement of train and truck traffic around Ship 
Channel industrial complexes. In 1960, white and ethnic Mexican residents from the 
Harrisburg area complained to the Houston City Council about a traffic problem caused 
                                                
21 On lack of public services and environmental hazards facing the ship channel neighborhoods see de 
León, Ethnicity in the Sunbelt; Robert D. Bullard, Invisible Houston: The Black Experience in Boom and 
Bust (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 60-75; Robert Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: 
Race, Class, and Environmental Quality 3rd Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008); Bullard, 
“Dumping on Houston’s Black Neighborhoods,” in Martin Melosi and Joseph A. Pratt, eds., Energy 
Metropolis, 207-223; David McComb, Houston: The Bayou City (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), 
209; Joe Feagin, Free Enterprise City: Houston in Political and Economic Perspective (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 210-264; Melosi, “Houston’s Public Sinks: Sanitary Services from 
Local Concerns to Regional Challenges,” in Melosi and Pratt, eds., Energy Metropolis, 109-147.  
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by a long line of idling semis in the community. Vehicles came and went at all hours of 
the day—disrupting sleep, straining infrastructure, and filling the communities with 
dangerous traffic. In an attempt to exert some control over their neighborhood, residents 
asked the City Council to pass regulations that prevented trucks from clogging their 
streets at all hours of the day.22 They also issued complaints about high train volume, 
which likewise disrupted easy movement in the communities, and fourteen at-grade train 
crossings that snarled traffic during the peak hours.23 The complaints against truck and 
train traffic centered not just on the disruptions caused by the presence of the two 
systems, but also on the limitations they imposed onto the daily movements of East End 
residents. Influenced by these earlier experiences, many residents worried that the 
construction of the road would worsen, not improve, traffic in their community.  
On top of facing logistical costs of living within an industrial landscape, East End 
residents also had to contend with some of the worst provision of public services in the 
entire city. Due to Houston’s territorial and demographic growth in the postwar period, 
the city struggled to provide basic services. The shortfalls in service fell onto the newest 
of suburbs and the oldest, poorest central city neighborhoods. So, while wealthier central 
city neighborhoods had better maintained roadways and received the bulk of drainage 
work, well into the 1960s working-class, predominantly minority communities struggled 
with unpaved or poorly maintained roads, faced dire problems during times of floods, and 
saw their communities fall into disrepair.24 Facing these issues head on, ethnic Mexican 
                                                
22 Houston City Council Minutes, September 14, 1960, HMRC. 
23 Texas Highway Commission Public Hearing Docket, March 6, 1969, Box 2002/101-35, Folder “Harris 
County, Re: Highway Matters in the Houston Area,” TSA, 44. 
24 Problems with service delivery have been discussed in a number of places including Joe Feagin, Free 
Enterprise City, 210-288; Martin Melosi, Effluent America: Cities, Industry, Energy, and the Environment 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 158-188; Kyle Shelton, “Houston (Un)Limited: Path-
Dependent Annexation and Highway Practices in an American Metropolis,” Transfers: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal for Mobility History 4, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 97–115. 
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East Enders attended Houston City Council meetings and implored council members to 
help them rid their community of trash, rats, and vacant homes so they could “pursue 
decent and healthy lives.” Pointing to a disparity in services between wealthy and 
impoverished neighborhoods, these residents lamented the fact that they were “last on the 
totem pole” for services and argued that as taxpayers they deserved adequate and equal 
service. They were “not asking them [council] to do something for us that they are not 
doing for the whole city.”25  
Residents feared that the new road would add to already significant levels of 
water and air pollution in the community. By 1970, the Ship Channel—which east 
Houston residents lived along, worked near, and, at one time, swam and fished in—was 
one of the most polluted waterways in the nation.26 Opponents of the road also worried 
that the highway would compound the already dangerous air pollution levels experienced 
in the densely packed industrial neighborhoods. Emissions from industrial vehicles and 
factories left east Houston communities covered in a haze of “fumes, odors, dirt, and 
smut” and residents were concerned that a highway would intensify these problems.27 
Providing concrete justification for these misgivings, in 1970 residents of Harrisburg 
noticed a massive die-off of birds in their community. Residents immediately blamed air 
pollution as the cause of the bird-kill. After city officials failed to take action, numerous 
residents, led by a contingent of children ranging from age five to thirteen, marched to 
                                                
25 “Harrisburg Citizens Invite Welch to Live Amidst Trash, Rats.” Houston Chronicle, February 1, 1970, 
H-City Council-1970s Vertical File (VF), HMRC. For a breakdown of the poor quality of service provision 
to minority and lower-income communities see, City of Houston Dept. of Planning, “Magnolia 
Park/Harrisburg-Manchester Data Book.” 
26 “US Aide Tours Area: Channel Pollution Rated in 10 Worst,” Houston Post, January 19, 1970, Box 29, 
Folder 9, George Fuermann Collection (GFC), Special Collections Library University of Houston 
(SCLUH); Frank Partida, interview by author, March 5, 2012; Gorman, “The Houston Ship Channel and 
the Changing Landscape of Industrial Pollution,” in Melosi and Pratt eds., Energy Metropolis, 52-68. 
27 City of Houston Department of Planning, “Houston’s Neighborhood Improvement Planning Program: 
Magnolia Park,” Box 1, Folder 9, CHPD, RG A 004, HMRC, 30-31.  
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the gates of one of the worst polluting companies, blocked a number of trucks from 
entering the facility, and demanded the company decrease the amount of pollution it 
created.28  
The above examples capture a small sample of the struggles that east Houston 
residents waged against environmental and infrastructural problems in their communities 
prior to the fight against the freeway. At the most basic level each of these fights 
originated in residents’ desires to maintain or improve the character of their communities 
and the health of their families. When plans for the Harrisburg Freeway were announced, 
many residents viewed the proposal through a lens colored by these previous experiences 
and did not like what they saw. Confronting the environmental problems facing their 
communities allowed east Houston residents to articulate their own approach to creating a 
healthy and productive neighborhood. Their public activism provided them with entrée 
into larger conversation about the city and its future. With highway construction looming, 
residents who saw the road as yet another threat to their communities responded, as they 
had numerous times before, by organizing against the project and asserting themselves 
into metropolitan politics.  
THE FREEWAY PLAN  
Texas Highway Department officials possessed a different picture of the 
Harrisburg Freeway than the residents who opposed it. In the initial planning stages, 
officials believed that the roadway would meet the two primary goals the agency hoped 
to achieve with each of its new highway projects: the creation and support of suburban 
mobility and the stimulation of citywide economic growth. Specifically, officials 
envisioned that the freeway would ease traffic problems between downtown Houston and 
                                                
28 Maggie Landron, “Children March in Manchester,” Papel Chicano, April 1, 1970, HMRC, 3. 
 
133
the quickly growing southeastern suburbs. In addition, they believed that the roadway 
would encourage the continued industrial and commercial development of the city’s ship 
channel. Prior to the blossoming of local opposition against the road, officials and city 
boosters promoted the suburban mobility and economic growth as arguments for the 
proposed freeway.29  
 Kindled by wartime production demands, the industrial suburbs of Pasadena and 
La Porte had experienced massive economic and population growth beginning in the 
early 1940s. This expansion continued after the war and officials in Houston and its 
satellite towns moved to control it by linking industrial areas with the larger city. In the 
early 1950s the major east-west link between Houston and its eastern suburbs was the 
locally dubbed La Porte-Houston highway (later State Highway 225), a small road ill-
suited to the high volumes of traffic officials believed continued growth would soon 
bring.30 In order to provide better road access to the Ship Channel, Houston officials 
called for the construction of a spur road to connect the Gulf Freeway and the La Porte-
Houston highway. At a meeting of the Texas Highway Commission in July of 1950, 
leaders from the Houston Chamber of Commerce, joined by elected officials from 
Houston and Harris County, went further by lobbying for the expansion of southeastern 
Harris County’s roadways.31 The desired spur was constructed, but quickly thereafter it 
                                                
29 The economic growth argument forwarded by Houston officials for infrastructure projects was similar to 
those used by politicians and officials in other growing American cities at the time, particularly in the 
Sunbelt, to justify mobility and general infrastructure projects. For examples from Phoenix see Philip 
VanderMeer, Desert Visions and the Making of Phoenix, 1860-2009 (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 2010). For Los Angeles see Jonathon Richmond, Transport of Delight: The Mythical 
Conception of Rail Transit in Los Angeles (Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 2005). For Atlanta see 
Miriam Konrad, Transporting Atlanta: The Mode of Mobility Under Construction (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 2009). 
30 For a more detailed description of Highway 225’s history and construction see Erik Slotboom, Houston 
Freeways: A Historical and Visual Journey, (Cincinatti, OH: C.J. Krehbiel, 2003), 194.  
31 Public Hearing Docket, Texas Transportation Commission, July 1, 1950, Box 2002/101-72, Folder 
“Harris County, 7/1/50, Continued Development of Highways in Houston,” TSA; “3,000,000 Addition to 
Freeway Announced,” Houston December 1950, 58, HMRC. 
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became clear that a more permanent and higher-capacity road would be required. In 
1953, at the urging of local officials, the Texas Highway Commission designated 
Highway 225 as an official state highway. The original iteration of the road stretched 
from the outskirts of east Houston to Highway 146 in east Harris County.32 Markedly 
absent from this designation, however, was a connection between downtown Houston 
and the end of the road.  
 As construction of Highway 225 between Houston’s Loop 610 and its eastern 
suburbs began in the 1960s, a simultaneous push for the extension of the road into the 
heart of Houston picked up speed. In 1961, a report titled Preliminary Freeway Phase 
first suggested the running of a freeway from the western terminus of 225 into the heart 
of downtown.33 As a part of the larger Houston Metropolitan Transportation and Transit 
Study, the report highlighted several yet-to-be-designated projects that the city required 
in order to grow, including the Harrisburg Freeway extension.34 Officials hoped that a 
downtown-225 link could relieve the growing traffic problems of the Gulf Freeway by 
shunting the LaPorte/Pasadena commuters off of the Gulf Freeway and onto 225.35 
Because of the hefty financial commitments and priority given to the interstate system, 
the Texas Highway Department did not immediately adopt the Harrisburg extension. 
Despite this inaction, local officials, confident that in due time the route would be added 
to the state plan, continued clearing the way by conducting feasibility studies and 
planning possible routes.  
                                                
32 Slotboom, Houston Freeways, 194; Texas Highway Commission Minute Order 34178, September 23, 
1953, TSA.  
33 Houston Metropolitan Transportation and Transit Study, “Preliminary Freeway Phase,” August, 1961, 
Texas Department of Transportation, Houston Branch, Planning Library Records.  
34 City of Houston Planning Commission, “A Study of Thoroughfare Development in Southeast Area of 
Metropolitan Houston and Harris County,” 1963, CHPD, RG A 004, Box 1, Folder 13, HMRC, 1. 
35 “Would Ease Traffic,” Houston Chronicle, July 1961. 
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 Almost immediately upon making plans for the Harrisburg extension public, city 
and state officials started receiving inquiries about the road from Houstonians anxious 
either for the construction to begin or wary of its costs. As we saw in the opening 
anecdote, as Houstonians like Richard Holgin heard about road plans many contacted 
both the highway department and the city of Houston to learn the details. As early as 
1963, so many inquiries came into highway department offices that they asked the 
Houston City Planning Department to stop forwarding questions about the road until it 
was officially a state highway project. In an interoffice memo the city planning 
department told employees to ensure inquiring parties, that far from having set its plans 
in stone, Houston had only just begun a “number of alignment studies.” To those nervous 
about their homes, the city would offer assurances that the freeway’s construction was “at 
least eight to ten years in the future.” In the same memo, however, officials noted that a 
general alignment had already been selected running just north of Harrisburg Avenue 
through the Second Ward and Magnolia Park before cutting down through Harrisburg 
and joining up with the under construction State Highway 225.36 
The fact that the local officials continued to make plans for the highway despite a 
lack of commitment from the highway department demonstrates the momentum of road 
projects during the 1950s and 1960s. It also hints at the task facing opponents who hoped 
to stop them. Road planning often began ten years before any construction took place. As 
officials committed resources and planning toward the project, its completion became 
more and more likely. Even if they conducted public hearings or sought feedback from 
the public, these activities rarely resulted in changes to the entrenched plans. This 
practice made the alteration or rollback of projects difficult if not impossible. The city 
                                                
36 City of Houston Department of Planning Interoffice Memo, April 5, 1963, La Porte Freeway Extension 
File (LPFE), CHPD, Erik Slotboom Research Collection (ESRC). 
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and county began the planning steps early in hopes of having the required infrastructure 
in place when the Highway Commission finally moved on the route. This approach 
precluded the incorporation of citizen feedback and resulted in a muddled public picture 
of the project and its timeline. The relative lack of transparency stoked the anxiety of 
residents like Holgin, who heard rumors of potential plans, but lacked access to any 
concrete details.  
The City of Houston was one of the main actors in preparing the foundation for 
the extension prior to the announcement of any official plans. In addition to settling on a 
preliminary location for the route, the City Council instructed numerous departments to 
take the initial steps required to prepare for construction. In 1963, director of city 
planning Ralph Ellifrit asked the real estate department to investigate the required right-
of-way purchases along the proposed route and to begin those purchases.37 In 1964, the 
City Council established building lines, which restricted property owners from building 
new structures or making significant improvements to existing structures, in hopes of 
keeping right-of-way costs down.38 To residents and business owners in the area, this 
move signaled the concrete possibility that the road would be coming through their 
neighborhood, compounding fears that homes and neighborhood were at risk.  
 As officials laid the groundwork for the extension into downtown, they continued 
to lobby the State Highway Commission to designate the extension a state highway route. 
The Houston Chamber of Commerce worked closely with city and county officials in 
their efforts to the gain designation, which would bring significant state assistance to the 
project. At a Chamber meeting attended by A.C. Keyser, the head engineer of the Texas 
Highway Department’s Houston Urban Project, Chamber, city, and county leaders 
                                                
37 Letter from Ralph Ellifrit to Earl Martin, August 28, 1963, LPFE, CHPD, ESRC. 
38 Houston City Council Minutes, October 13, 1964, HMRC, 23.  
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pitched the importance of beginning the route as soon as possible. The director of the 
Houston Traffic and Transportation Department, Eugene Maier, pointed out that the 
southeastern parts of the city and county were “seriously deficient in freeway facilities,” a 
problem that would result in “major congestion unless immediate plans are developed for 
the construction of additional freeways.” Chamber members from Humble Oil and 
Foley’s Department Store supported the extension plan in hopes that it would lower 
shipping costs and offer commercial access to the burgeoning markets of the eastern 
suburbs.39 
The highway department clearly supported the plan for extending Highway 225 
into the city, but remained hesitant to add to its program of work until more funds could 
be secured and once again delayed designation.40 In yet another appearance before the 
commission in 1969, local officials used the amount of work and resources local entities 
had put into preparing the ground for the road as a justification for state aid. Harris 
County Judge Bill Elliot pointed out that the city, county, and Harris County Navigation 
District had already spent “some $7 million for construction of connecting roads” and the 
elimination of at-grade railroad crossings. Officials forecasted that the right-of-way costs 
for the extension would be approximately $16 million and warned that if the commission 
did not act quickly the cost would skyrocket due to speculation along the routes.41 The 
commitment of city and county officials to the extension project paid off when the Texas 
Highway Commission made the 225 extension a part of state highway system in April of 
                                                
39 Minutes of the Highway Committee of the Houston Chamber of Commerce, October 2, 1963, Box 20, 
Folder 18, Foley’s Department Store Collection 03/2007-004, SCLUH, 2. 
40 Letter from DeWitt C. Greer, State Highway Engineer, to Bob Casey, US Representative, July 29, 1965, 
Box 2002/101-72, Folder “Harris County Re: State Highway 225,” TSA. Greer asserts the THD’s 
commitment to Highway 225, but points to an earlier commitment of resources to NASA-area roads as a 
priority. 
41 Texas Highway Commission Public Hearing Docket, March 6, 1969, Box 2002/101-35, Folder “Harris 
County, Re: Highway Matters in the Houston Area,” TSA, 44. 
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1969.42 The state highway department projected the cost of the highway at approximately 
$40 million for right-of-way and construction. Not measured in this cost, however, were 
the changes residents believed such a road would bring to their lives.43  
PUSHING BACK THE INEVITABLE: THE FIRST PHASE OF FREEWAY OPPOSITION 
When the State Highway Commission brought the Harrisburg Freeway extension 
into the State Highway Plan, opposition to the roadway began in earnest. Led by ethnic 
Mexican residents of Magnolia Park and Harrisburg, these critiques attacked the road 
from several angles—condemning the lack of input secured from residents, arguing that 
any roadway would drastically damage the environment and character of their 
neighborhood, and asserting that the roadway was not the best form of transportation for 
the neighborhood or the city. While in the early stages it seemed the anti-freeway group 
faced a doomed battle against a long-planned project, during the debate members 
received boosts from changes in federal policy that helped residents slow the road 
building process considerably.  
In response to both the national environmental movement and a growing number 
of protests against urban highway projects, the federal government altered many of the 
oversight requirements on major public works projects between 1962 and 1970. Most 
crucial for the purposes of the Harrisburg Freeway fight, in 1969 Congress passed the 
National Environmental Policy Act. Likewise important was the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) institution of rules that required local agencies to present more 
opportunities for citizen feedback through public meetings. Finally, because of ongoing 
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resistance to controversial sections of the Interstate Highway System, the federal 
government decided to back away from contentious road projects.44  
The National Environmental Policy Act required that the agencies responsible for 
projects receiving federal funding produce an environmental impact statement for 
approval by federal administrators. The statement, based on studies of the project area, 
estimated the negative consequences a project would have on the environment, economy, 
and residents of its covered area. The law gave the Environmental Protection Agency, 
which began operation in 1970, the power to reject or require changes to submitted plans 
that were deemed to have an overly negative outcome for project areas. The new FHWA 
standards established a much more democratic public hearing process specifically for 
roadway projects that received federal monies. Finally, the lack of US Department of 
Transportation and FHWA support for divisive highway projects made it difficult for 
state and local officials to push road projects through opposition.45 The Harrisburg 
Freeway was the first major roadway in Houston to face this new federal scrutiny. Unlike 
earlier projects where public meetings served as little more than a formal rubber stamp, 
the elongated feedback processes slowed the momentum for highway projects and 
provided citizens with an additional outlet for critique.46 East Houston residents who 
                                                
44 Altshuler and Luberhoff, Mega-Projects, 251-254. 
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Harrisburg fight. See also, Jeremy Korr, “Physical and Social Construction of the Capital Beltway,” in 
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140
opposed the highway used these new requirements to voice disapproval of the road to 
officials who earlier ignored them.  
Significantly, not all residents of east Houston saw the roadway as a negative, but 
regardless of their stance toward the road itself, throughout the debate nearly all residents 
supported changes that allowed for more democratic decision-making. Many, including 
the business-oriented neighborhood group the East End Progress Association, argued that 
a road would help develop east Houston. In addition, many white residents who lived in 
neighborhoods that would not be bisected by the highway supported the construction.47 In 
the early stages of the debate city and state officials who wanted to maintain control of 
development responded to this challenge by alternately trying to circumvent, appease, 
encourage, or ignore the concerns and thoughts of residents. From 1970 to 1974, the peak 
of the Harrisburg debate, both residents who opposed the road and local officials who 
backed it attempted to gain the upper hand.  
 In a series of articles published in the early months of 1970, Harrisburg resident 
and ethnic Mexican community journalist Maggie Landron laid out her case, and that of 
many of her fellow East Enders, against the Harrisburg Freeway. At a time when debates 
about mass transit were gaining steam across the nation, she accused local and state 
officials of tunnel vision when it came to building highways instead of mass transit.48 
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Landron argued that while officials touted the newest highway plans as the “end to all our 
traffic problems,” they ignored the fact that new “freeways are out-of-date before they are 
finished.” Landron asserted that “no freeway has solved the traffic problems of Houston,” 
and that the “proposed Harrisburg Freeway will be no exception.” Pivoting from here, 
Landron articulated an alternative vision of mobility, one that she believed expressed the 
desire of most of east Houston ethnic Mexican residents. Instead of trying to force east 
Houston into a suburban model of mobility, Landron advocated for an investment in mass 
transit. Roads, she pointed out, could not serve a community where at least half the 
residents were either “without cars completely; have ancient, undependable cars that 
would gladly be gotten rid of; or are too elderly to drive.” Labeling highway plans short-
sighted, she argued that a mass transit system would be “transportation for residents 
within the city for fifty and seventy-five years from now, not just tomorrow.” Cognizant 
of the challenge of breaking Houston’s highway monopoly, Landron called on residents 
to demand the implementation of mass transit and to articulate their own ideas of the 
politics of mobility. “It is up to you to make the city use their head,” she said. With this 
call to action, Landron vocalized the intention of an active constituency of central city 
residents to enter into the planning process of the city.49 
 Landron’s articles, published in the Harrisburg community newspaper Papel 
Chicano, served as the public voice to freeway opposition in east Houston’s ethnic 
Mexican neighborhoods. Broadly, Landron and Papel Chicano, reflected the youth-led 
Chicano movement that was central to several civil rights campaigns in Houston during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Similar to the African American Progressive Youth 
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Association, Chicano-identified groups such as the Mexican American Youth Association 
represented a mainly younger subset of ethnic Mexican Houstonians unsatisfied with the 
actions of mainline ethnic Mexican organizations such as the League of United Latin 
American Citizens. These activists led the push for ethnic Mexicans to be identified as a 
racial group separate from whites and to celebrate that heritage. They also employed 
much more confrontational strategies of protest including the organization of Huelga 
(Spanish for strike) schools during protests against the Houston Independent School 
District’s desegregation practices. The fact that Landron and Papel Chicano covered and 
participated in the Harrisburg freeway showed that worries about the shape of the 
community and access to political power were concerns that many generations of ethnic 
Mexicans shared.50  
 While other activists like Richard Holgin and John Reyes brought the struggle to 
the halls of the city and state government, Landron articulated the motivations of their 
opposition. Harkening back to the industrial and pollution problems east Houston had 
faced for decades, she asserted that ethnic Mexican residents were “fed up choking on 
our own exhaust fumes; fed up looking at cement ribbons crisscrossing our cities; fed up 
with homes and people being destroyed to build more and more freeways; and fed up 
with others determining what is good for us.”51 Landron’s words acted as a rallying cry 
for many in east Houston. Her articles in Papel Chicano spurred residents to action and 
redoubled efforts to drum up support from those not yet engaged. Activists strove to learn 
from their community’s damaging experiences with infrastructure projects and pollution. 
They also advocated their own ideas about the neighborhoods and of the city’s mobility.  
                                                
50 A number of studies consider the role of Chicano activists in Houston, see de León, Ethnicity in the 
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 In March 1970, ethnic Mexican activists first broached their resistance to the 
highway by attending a public meeting, one required by the new FHWA meeting 
guidelines. At the meeting, highway department engineer A.C. Kyser revealed three 
potential corridors—A, B, and C—for the Harrisburg extension, each of which ran 
through a different part of east Houston and threatened the homes and businesses of 
residents (Figure 3.2). Kyser said that the department believed Corridor A, which would 
run between Canal Street and Harrisburg, represented the best potential route. The 
official count recorded that this path would require the destruction of 1,125 homes. The 
highway department concluded that this loss represented a lesser cost than the other two 
proposed corridors because it would not threaten any businesses along the ship channel. 
Corridor C would displace 330 homes and 70 businesses, whereas Corridor B would 
remove 775 homes and 110 businesses. While Kyser noted that Corridor A was the odds 
on favorite, he refused to name any specific route information, instead offering 
assurances that resident removal remained at least “three or four years” away.  According 
to newspaper accounts, 500 people attended the meeting, most concerned that their 
homes would be taken by the highway.52   
Opposition activists possessed a very different memory of this meeting. Holgin 
recalled the overarching message as an assertion that “this thing was going to go through 
whether you [residents] like it or not. It’s already set.” In his eyes, the department’s 
stance toward residents at the meeting was “you just got to get out of the way, we’re 
going to do this.”53 Holgin and others disliked what they saw as a done-deal-attitude by 
asserting that, in the opinion of many residents, “no freeway was desirable.”54 
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Figure 3.2: Harrisburg Freeway Alternatives  
Three proposed corridors for the Harrisburg Freeway extension presented by the THD at the March 1970 
meeting. “Residents on Right-of-Way Safe for 3-4 years,” Houston Post, March 10, 1970.   
Holgin believed that the dismissive attitude of officials at the first meeting helped to 
galvanize opposition. At future public forums, opponents offered much stiffer resistance 
to the assertions of the highway officials. According to Holgin, officials facing tough 
audience inquiries at these meetings avoided providing answers by concluding their 
discussions in a rushed manner and departing without taking questions.55  
In May 1970, to raise further awareness of the highway department plans and to 
encourage greater resistance, Holgin organized a meeting at the Ripley House, a 
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community center in the Second Ward.56 At the meeting Holgin and Al Davey, a 
consulting planner who agreed to work with the residents on their fight against the road, 
presented a slide show of community homes and businesses that would be destroyed by 
the proposed highway if the Corridor A plan was constructed. They also proposed the 
idea of routing the highway along the Ship Channel rather than through the neighborhood 
itself (Figure 3.3).  Holgin recalled that the slide show was particularly effective. It 
“really woke them [residents] up.” It alerted them to the reality that “all this stuff [was] 
going to be gone. All these homes and businesses are going to be gone.” Holgin recalled 
that opposition leaders channeled the momentum of this meeting into greater organization 
against the highway. He encouraged attendees to come to future meetings, write to 
officials, and ask questions of the Texas Highway Department.57  
If this meeting functioned to coalesce opposition to the highway, it also elicited a 
strong response from highway department officials and other city leaders who hoped to 
head off such resistance before it could stymie the highway plans. In a letter to Holgin 
written the day after the Ripley House meeting, A.C. Kyser chastised opposition leaders 
for what he saw as the deliberate misleading of attendees. Kyser conveyed exasperation 
over the fact that the “meeting obviously resulted in leaving many of the people with the 
impression that the bayou location was a feasible alternate and the option was whether 
the freeway is to be built in Corridor A or along Buffalo Bayou.” He asked Holgin to 
“submit the Davey scheme to a competent, qualified engineer for review,” and to limit 
future discussion to “pertinent matters rather than unworkable schemes proposed by 
                                                
56 For more information about Ripley House and its transition to serving the East End’s ethnic Mexican 
population, Felix Fraga, interview by author, February 13, 2012, Houston, Texas, audio recording. 





Figure 3.3: Locally Preferred Alternative 
The preferred Harrisburg Freeway options presented by Richard Holgin and Al Davey at the May 1970 
community meeting. Routes 2,3, and 4 correspond to corridors A,B, and C, from the THD map. Route 1 is 
the Ship Channel route promoted most heavily by Holgin and other anti-road activists for its avoidance of 
residential areas. Mark Madera, et. al., The Barrios: Mexican-Americans in Houston (Houston, Texas: 
Magnolia Business Center, a Model Cities Agency, January 1971), 41. 
self appointed experts.” Kyser dismissed the idea that most residents opposed the freeway 
by asserting that “interested citizens and the government of Houston and Harris County” 
solicited the freeway in the first place. He contended that the department did its utmost to 
“build the best facility possible with the least amount of disruption of the neighborhood.” 
While he acknowledged that the highway department stood ready to “listen to 
constructive suggestions,” he chided Holgin and other highway opponents for taking a 
limited view of the project and its benefit. Arguing that while “it was not surprising that 
some…would oppose the project,” the state needed to account for “the desires and 
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interests of the rest of the people of the sector and the entire community,” not just those 
who opposed the plans.58 
Despite the hopes of A.C. Kyser and other city officials for the smooth 
construction of the highway, neighborhood opposition could not be easily dismissed. 
Responding to residents’ complaints about the lack of citizen input and potential 
disruptions, the state highway department delayed the initial phase of the project and in 
July 1970 commissioned the Harrisburg Freeway Study Team to reexamine the routing of 
the roadway.59 In creating this group, the state highway department clearly intended to 
assuage the concerns of residents by articulating the “rational objectives and detailed 
alternatives” of the project and by promising to consider “the social, economic, and 
physical implications” of the road’s presence in the neighborhoods.60 Despite the goal of 
establishing a working relationship with the communities through which the road would 
run, the study team did not include a single community member outside of highway 
department project engineer Dexter Jones, who was born in Harrisburg; nor did it have a 
single local political representative.61 Instead, the team consisted of twelve white men, 
ten of whom worked for the highway department and two, a sociologist and an 
economist, who worked for Texas A&M—a school intimately connected to the 
department.62 Aiming to get command of the various actors and demands involved in the 
freeway debate, the team began their work in the summer of 1970.  
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At one of the first official meetings of the Harrisburg Freeway Study Team, 
chairman Phil Wilson told highway and Houston officials that the major goal of the team 
was to prevent the road planning process from becoming a full blown “controversy.” The 
team hoped that they were entering into the process early enough to combat the “bad 
feelings” that often arose as these debates dragged on. They thought that such problems 
could be avoided if they could “meet with everyone involved,” shore up supporters, and 
find “offsets to the objections of the people.”63 While the team knew that numerous 
groups and many residents of east Houston supported the roadway, they also recognized 
the reality that new federal regulations made it so that “one person can stop a freeway” by 
raising questions through the EIS process and public hearings. In the first months of its 
existence, the team believed that the freeway would ultimately succeed because, with the 
exception of Holgin’s anti-freeway group, “all of the civic groups and virtually all of the 
private citizens who have contacted the team have expressed a pressing need for a 
freeway.” Despite this strong support, the study team intended to educate residents about 
the freeway plans in order to dispel the “rumors” that swirled around the freeway plans 
after the meetings in March and May of 1970.64  
In hopes of promoting the official image of the roadway, the Harrisburg Freeway 
Study Team began by distributing an informational packet and offering quarterly 
progress reports on the freeway. The information pamphlet made the case for the freeway 
through the same celebratory, growth-driven language used to sell earlier highway 
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projects. Published in both English and Spanish, the pamphlet told residents that building 
the Harrisburg Freeway would put the community on “the road to better living.” It would 
replace the accidents, noise, and exhaust fumes that came from crowded surface streets 
with better access to jobs, education, and a higher quality of life. Showing their 
determination to get the input of citizens, the pamphlet asked residents to share 
information with the team about “where you live, where you work, where you shop, 
where your children go to school, what church you attend, what parks you have or need” 
so that it could find the best location for the road.65 The study team and its community 
survey directly resulted from the opposition of ethnic Mexican East Enders.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Harrisburg Freeway Study Team Newsletter 
A clip from a Harrisburg Freeway Study Team newsletter attempting to sell the Harrisburg Freeway 
extension as a positive development for the neighborhoods through which it would run. Note the use of 
both Spanish and English. Harrisburg Freeway Study Team, “Handout Pamphlet,” December 1970, City of 
Houston Department of Planning Records, La Porte Freeway Extension File, Erik Slotboom Research 
Collection. 
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150
Opposition to the roadway resulted in the delay of the project and in a study that 
promised to include greater citizen feedback. This must be considered a victory for anti-
freeway advocates given the nature of decision-making in the city up until this point. 
(Figure 3.4) 
“HIGHWAYS ARE NO LONGER GODS”: CONTINUED FREEWAY OPPOSITION 
Building upon their earlier efforts, the Texas Highway Department and the 
Harrisburg Freeway Study Team wasted no time in attempting to move forward. In a 
move intended to assuage the demands of residents both for and against the route, 
government officials shifted their pitch for the project away from the “greater good,” 
suburb-oriented strain of the previous months and replaced it with a language that put the 
affected residents and their concerns at its core. At a February 1971 meeting attended by 
at least 600 people, the Harrisburg Freeway Study Team informed residents that the route 
for the freeway would be chosen by the end of the year.66 A few weeks later Dexter Jones 
attended another information session at the Magnolia Community Center in the heart of 
Magnolia Park. Here, he faced a number of community activists who opposed the 
highway. These residents reasserted their demand that the state build no road, no matter 
the type, through their community. The residents told Jones that they feared “a wide 
ribbon of concrete will ruin their neighborhoods and scatter residents” across the city, 
destroying their community. Apparently tone-deaf to these concerns, Jones replied: “the 
freeway is necessary and it will be built. We don’t know how, where, or when, but it will 
be built.” Jones continued, saying that the highway department would consider the Ship 
Channel route, but he gave no promises. To Holgin, Jones’s assertion that the department 
                                                




was considering the Ship Channel struck a false note and seemed simply to be the 
department’s way of trying to “pacify people.”67 
These two meetings signaled that the debate around the Harrisburg Freeway 
extension was far from over. Undeterred and unwilling to abandon ten years of planning 
and expense, officials took new steps to try to secure the project’s start. In January 1973, 
the Harrisburg Freeway Study Team announced its conclusion that Corridor A, the route 
through the heart of Harrisburg and Magnolia Park, represented the best route for the 
roadway.68 The highway department accepted the study team’s conclusion and having 
held the required public meetings, settled the route. Initial construction was still years 
away and many residents continued to vocally object to the highway. After the route was 
decided upon, the terrain of the debate shifted once again, centering this time on the 
definition of the communities through which the road would run.  
In the early 1970s, the Texas Highway Department released the draft 
environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Harrisburg extension and the Neighborhood 
Improvement Program of the Houston Department of Planning released their plan for 
Magnolia Park. The reports placed the character of East End neighborhoods at the centers 
and pushed a debate about the future of the area to the fore of the freeway debate. In their 
depictions of Magnolia Park, the Second Ward, and Harrisburg, the reports provided 
evidence for readers looking either for justification to build or reasons to repudiate the 
freeway and each were fraught with political agendas of their own. On one hand, both 
reports highlighted the institutionalized problems and underserved populations of the East 
End, seemingly corroborating residents’ complaints that their neighborhoods struggled 
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due to underinvestment from the city and problems caused by the concentration of 
industry. On the other, they substantiated some of the claims of road proponents that the 
freeway would not greatly change residents lives and painted most of the East End as 
dilapidated and struggling. To freeway advocates, the problems highlighted in the reports 
legitimated the proposed destruction of a section of these neighborhoods in order to make 
way for the freeway. To opponents, the reports misrepresented their communities. 
Residents asserted that far from neglected, their neighborhoods were vital and functional. 
While acknowledging that the East End had problems, residents argued that finding 
solutions to those problems simply required an increase in resources, not wholesale 
destruction. This clash over how to perceive and improve the East End would dominate 
the remainder of the debate around the Harrisburg Freeway extension. The two reports 
held the spotlight with both sides exerting a great deal of effort to bend the reports to 
meet their ends.   
Supported by Model Cities funding, Houston’s Neighborhood Improvement 
Program aimed at bettering the lives of the poorest residents of the city by upgrading 
their homes and neighborhoods. The program began in the early 1970s, directed by the 
Houston Department of Planning. As with the Harrisburg Freeway Study Team, in order 
to create plans of work, the department conducted neighborhood surveys to solicit 
residents’ opinions about the problems they faced. The Magnolia Park survey reported 
issues with poor drainage, too few streetlights, and a lack of park space. The pending 
highway loomed over the Magnolia Park plan of work and became one of the major 
issues the program attempted to address. Highway officials wrote the EIS in order to 
satisfy the requirements of the National Environmental Protection Act. The document 
detailed all of the plans for the Harrisburg Freeway and demonstrated how officials 
viewed the communities around the proposed road. Both reports highlighted the 
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arguments that activists and officials used in their attempts to influence the outcome of 
the debate and shed light onto the ways that the potential highway influenced the shape 
and meaning of the communities through which it would run.  
In their delineation of the boundaries of east Houston, both the Neighborhood 
Improvement Program’s plan of work and the EIS demonstrated how the proposed 
freeway might alter the definition of the neighborhoods. The Neighborhood Improvement 
Program defined Magnolia Park using one natural boundary, Brays Bayou, two man-
made, the Ship Channel and the Houston Belt & Terminal railroad tracks, and one 
imagined, the proposed Harrisburg Freeway.69 The EIS acknowledged all the same 
boundaries and asserted that because of these pre-existing borders the roadway’s route 
would not cause “any division or disruption of established communities.” 70 Even as ink, 
then, the route that highway officials drew on official maps restructured the communities 
and landscapes through which it ran.  
The two reports captured the contradictory understandings road proponents and 
opponents held of east Houston. When highway and development proponents looked at 
east Houston communities they saw, just as they did with the Third and Fifth Wards, 
ample chunks of land covered by decrepit or abandoned structures.71 When east Houston 
residents looked, they saw their homes. Maggie Landron once again articulated the 
viewpoint of many ethnic Mexican residents when she claimed in a Papel Chicano article 
that while the “second ward barrios may not mean much to the Anglos of East End or to 
Mayor Welch…they are home to those Chicanos living there.”72 These clashing 
                                                
69 City of Houston Depart. of Planning, “Houston’s Neighborhood Improvement Planning Program: 
Magnolia Park Working Plan,” 2. 
70 FHWA; USDOT; THD, “Draft Environmental Impact Statement for State Highway 225,” 11. 
71 Ibid., 10. 
72 Maggie Landron, “Harrisburg Freeway Will Destroy Barrio,” Papel Chicano, February 20, 1970, 
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conceptions of the same landscape and of the potential changes the freeway could bring 
show how the debate surrounding it quickly became about the future shape of east 
Houston.  
Given that its mission was to find ways to improve the neighborhood it studied, 
the Neighborhood Improvement Program’s findings corroborated the community’s 
perceptions of their neighborhoods and diverged from the picture of the East End 
projected by the highway department’s rhetoric. The report stated that 72 percent of 
homes in Magnolia Park were either in excellent condition or needed only minor repairs. 
Of the remaining 28 percent, only 27 percent required some form of major repair, and 
just 1 percent were listed as completely unsound.73 Given that Magnolia Park, as a stable 
ethnic Mexican, working-class community, was representative of the neighborhoods that 
surrounded it, it can be assumed that similar conditions existed in those communities.  
Despite the study’s conclusion that Magnolia Park and its surrounding 
communities were far from decrepit, highway officials continued to argue that the road 
was needed to revitalize a downtrodden neighborhood. In the EIS, officials asserted that 
the route they chose would “enable the parks, playgrounds, historic sites, churches and 
other community facilities to be utilized more fully.”74 To residents whose homes stood 
alongside the proposed route, who worked in one of the soon to be razed businesses, or 
worshipped at one of the two churches in the highway’s path, the neighborhood was 
already used “fully.”75 Once again led by Richard Holgin, these residents would make 
another push against the freeway plans, gaining a substantial assist from federal 
regulators and a stagnating state and national economy along the way.  
                                                
73 City of Houston Dept. of Planning “Houston’s Neighborhood Improvement Planning Program: 
Magnolia Park Working Plan,” 5.  
74 FHWA; USDOT; THD, “Draft Environmental Impact Statement for State Highway 225,” 8. 
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While the Neighborhood Improvement Program’s conclusions were encouraging 
for highway proponents, the federal oversight involved with the EIS made the document 
the most significant remaining opportunity to slow the freeway’s construction. Aware 
that the requirements of the National Environmental Protections Act made it harder to get 
projects approved, Richard Holgin moved to make the regulations work in their favor. 
Holgin knew that the EIS would face federal scrutiny and planned to jump on any errors 
federal regulators highlighted. Holgin linked the Harrisburg fight to freeway revolts 
taking place across the country. Pointing to the contemporary North Expressway fight in 
San Antonio and those in Boston, Miami, Baltimore and San Francisco, Holgin 
announced at a public meeting that the national mood toward highways had shifted and 
that citizen resistance efforts across the nation meant that “highways are no longer 
gods.”76 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s rejection of the Harrisburg Freeway EIS 
in September 1973, gave anti-freeway activists their best chance to stop the road.77 
Holgin, in a speech before the City Council in October 1973, pointed out that between the 
release of the routing information and the EIS the displacement projections had increased 
considerably. The original estimate of 900 homes had increased to 1,244 in the EIS, with 
a final displacement of 4,000 residents.78 Holgin also lambasted a comment that William 
Ward, a state highway engineer, made after the announcement of the inadequate ruling. 
In response to the ruling, Ward commented that the Texas Highway Department was not 
“too sure how displacing people would have an impact on the environment. We [the 
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highway department] tend to think along the lines of air, noise and water having an 
environmental impact.” In his testimony Holgin said residents of east Houston disagreed 
with Ward and the Texas Highway Department, they believed that “uprooting and 
displacing 4,000 persons will have an adverse effect on our community—as a total living 
organ.”79 Holgin’s words illustrated that residents connected the highway fight with the 
very essence of their neighborhoods. His words showed that the fight against the highway 
was not just a conflict over whose view of the road would win out, but further, who 
possessed the right to interpret the value of the homes and lives residents had built in East 
Houston. Holgin’s words also spoke to the fact that Americans held competing ideas 
about the environment in the 1970s. What was once a solely scientific term was quickly 
encompassing political import as Americans applied it to questions about their immediate 
surroundings word and no longer just represented a scientific concept.  
 Continuing to rely on the idea that the differences between white and ethnic 
Mexican communities in the East End meant that the highway could run through the 
community without causing major disruption, city and state officials continued to support 
the Harrisburg project. The Harrisburg Freeway Study Team asserted that they would 
work closely with the EPA to address the shortcomings with the EIS.80 The City Council 
continued to follow the advice of the planning department, which echoed the EIS in 
asserting that the route of the highway split two drastically divergent neighborhoods of 
different racial, ethnic, and socio-economic populations. The planning department 
explained that the natural split between the communities on the north and south sides of 
the proposed freeway route meant that the “logical location of a freeway” was right 
                                                
79 Richard Holgin City Council testimony, October 9, 1973.  
80  “Harrisburg Freeway Study Team Progress Report” March 1974, LPFE, CHPD, ESRC.  
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between them.81 The continued support of the freeway from highway and city 
authorities—despite the opposition of ethnic Mexican citizens in the Second Ward, 
Magnolia Park, and Harrisburg, in addition to the rejection of the EIS—showed that even 
when residents articulated their ideas about the politics of mobility openly and 
repeatedly, they remained subordinate to the planning priorities of officials into the early 
1970s. 
 Six months after the rejection of the EIS, Richard Holgin appeared once again in 
front of City Council to protest highway plans. He noted that freeway plans continued 
apace and once more asked City Council to stop them. Mayor Fred Hofheinz and other 
councilmen, perhaps to deflate or at least redirect Holgin’s complaints, told him that the 
state highway department, not the City Council, was the venue through which he needed 
to voice his complaints. They told Holgin that any role the Council played in routing 
occurred much earlier in the process and that any future problems would be handled by 
the state.82 In a memo he sent to City Council the day after Holgin’s final appearance 
there, Roscoe Jones, the director of the Houston Planning Department, recounted the 
history of the development of Highway 225 and his department’s ongoing support for the 
project. Jones, echoing state highway officials, pointed out that in all such projects “some 
objections…will be voiced,” but that such resistance should not discount the 
“considerable public funds and planning efforts” that had already gone into the project or 
displace the needs of the city as a whole.83 Holgin received a copy of this letter and 
responded to Mayor Hofheinz. A frustrated Holgin wrote: “it is clear to us that you, as 
well as your departments, are in favor of building this freeway through our community.” 
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82 Houston City Council Minutes, May 21, 1974, Houston City Secretary’s Office.  
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In his sign off he told Hofheinz that he would no longer look to the city for support now 
that he knew “what to expect from the Hofheinz Freeway Administration.”84 
“THE LINE IS STILL THERE”85: THE END OF THE HARRISBURG FIGHT?  
At the end of 1974 it appeared that the Harrisburg Freeway would be built, 
despite years of protest from the ethnic Mexican residents of east Houston. The route still 
enjoyed the support of the Texas Highway Department, the Houston City Council, and 
the majority of white citizens in east Houston. The first stages of construction at the west 
end of Highway 225 resulted in the building of a cloverleaf to connect 225 with the 
extension and the clearing of several acres of land on the right-of-way through the East 
End. However, by 1976, larger economic forces entered into the decision-making 
process, which ultimately served as the tipping point for the abandonment of the route. 
Because of a stagnating state and national economy in the mid-1970s, the amount of 
federal and state funds available for road construction fell dramatically short of the 
demand and need for new roads. When the Texas State Highway Commission decided to 
mothball several projects in 1976 in order to focus on those of the highest priority, the 
Harrisburg Freeway was among those placed on the backburner.86 
 Despite the indefinite delay caused by the funding crisis, the Harrisburg Freeway 
did not disappear. In the late 1970s, Texas State Representative Ben Reyes, who 
represented much of east Houston, wrote to the state highway officials because of 
continued questions from constituents about the status of the road. Reyes and his aides 
expressed doubts to highway engineer William Ward about the wisdom of continuing 
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with the highway plan. By Reyes’s count, the number of houses that would be removed 
along the route of the highway was 2200, almost a thousand more than the EIS 
estimated.87 Reyes worried that removing that number of homes would magnify 
overcrowding issues and raise rents on Houstonians from the lowest socio-economic 
echelon. Reyes and his staff argued that when one took the “cost of replacement housing, 
the cost of right of way, the city’s investment in capital facilities and the pressure on the 
housing market” into consideration, the project was unviable. Reyes asked the city 
planning commission and the highway department to remove the road from the Major 
Thoroughfare and Freeway plan.88 Reyes may have employed a very different rhetoric 
than Holgin, but the gist remained: East Enders did not want the road.  
 The financial crunch of the mid-1970s, and the continued questioning of the 
project by elected officials like Reyes, was the death knell for the Harrisburg Freeway. 
While state highway and city planners turned their attention toward other routes and 
needs, the project did not to completely disappear. Richard Holgin remembers 
occasionally checking up on its position through local representatives. In one such check-
in in the early 1980s, Lauro Cruz, a three-term state representative, reported back to 
Holgin that “the line” remained on State Highway Department maps. Holgin also 
continued to seek definitive answers about the road from highway officials, asking why it 
had not been “done away with?” The only answer he remembers receiving in response 
was “well, it’s on hold.”89 In fact, as late as 1989, regional planning maps listed the 
Harrisburg Freeway, and its provisional Corridor A route as a site of potential future 
construction. It was not until 1992 that the route was finally excised from all local, 
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regional, and state highway plans.90 Even its erasure from plans has not meant that 
community members have forgotten the threat of its construction. Holgin, who left 
Houston around 2000, recalled returning to visit with friends and former neighbors in the 
East End. As they caught up, Holgin recalled that “always, behind their mind, they used 
to ask ‘when are we having that freeway?’…they did not want that freeway to come 
through there.”91 
 Ultimately, the combination of the opposition from Holgin and his neighbors, 
federal regulations, and the financial crises of roadway funding did in the Harrisburg 
Freeway. But regulation and financing issues represented ongoing problems of large 
construction projects. The unique variable in this equation, then, was the opposition from 
east Houston ethnic Mexican communities.92 Without their prolonged opposition, the 
road most likely would have been started well before the funding crises came to pass. By 
asserting their desire to control the image and definition of their neighborhoods, anti-
freeway activists pushed against the established power structure of Houston and Texas. In 
the end, their view won out. While a victory of this type seemed unlikely when the fight 
began in the late 1960s, as the debate progressed into the 1970s, the previously 
marginalized residents of east Houston began to flex more political muscle than ever 
before, demanding that their ideas of the politics of mobility be taken into account. 
Houstonians displayed this new political power on the ground in the projects that 
came to their neighborhoods and in city-wide politics. As residents, community groups, 
and ethnic Mexican elected officials gained a larger say in the shaping and planning of 
their communities, they also called for a wider role in directing the growth of the city. 
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Here, Houston’s transportation choices rose to the fore. As citizens from across the city 
and its environs clamored for better, faster, smoother transportation into and out of the 
city, residents of central Houston, ignored through most of the postwar period, built upon 
the Harrisburg Freeway opposition and made their voices and votes heard with more 
authority than ever before in the early 1970s. It is to those voices, and the mobility 








“Frankenstein” or Savior?  
Houston’s 1973 Transit Debate 
On October 7, 1973, Houstonians awoke to find their fast-growing city at a 
political standstill. The day before, HMA voters rejected a referendum that would have 
established the city’s first publically run regional transit authority, the Houston Area 
Rapid Transit Authority (HARTA). Intended to address problems of metropolitan 
congestion and alleviate concerns about the environmental impact of automobiles, the 
proposal and Houstonians’ perspectives on the plan, wove metropolitan politics and 
transportation decision-making together with unexpected results. During the lead up to 
the referendum, city officials, elite white Houstonians, and the Chamber of Commerce all 
promoted the Authority and most white residents of the city itself supported HARTA’s 
creation. In past decisions such a collection of backers nearly guaranteed a proposal’s 
passage. 
In the HARTA campaign, however, a unique coalition of African Americans, 
ethnic Mexicans, and white, mostly working-class suburbanites, opposed the plan and 
helped bring about its defeat. While these Houstonians disapproved of the HARTA 
proposal for a variety of reasons, by coming together as a bloc this group challenged 
several historical assumptions about the suburb-city relationship and that between white 
and non-white metropolitan residents during the 1970s.  
The ties between the members of this coalition were tenuous. The coalition was 
never formalized, nor did the Houstonians within it vote alongside each other in political 
debates beyond transportation. Further, the groups involved were not monolithic or 
naturally disposed to an alliance with the others. Working-class white suburbanites 
offered different opinions on transit then their wealthier neighbors in other suburban 
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municipalities. African American and ethnic Mexicans, despite a recent history of 
cooperation during statewide campaigns for labor rights in the 1960s, did not have an 
innate connection. These groups came from different parts of the city and HMA, had 
different political agendas, and brought different experiences to their involvement with 
the HARTA debate.1  
Despite these differences, the HARTA proposal, and transportation issues in 
general, offered this surprising constituency a space in which they could claim a concrete 
say over the direction of the HMA’s development. Earlier chapters have documented the 
ways Houstonians used protests about highway planning and construction to challenge 
the decision-making power of elected officials and developers and to push for more 
democratic planning practices. Houstonians saw that call for greater power realized in the 
HARTA debate as, for the first time, they were presented with a choice to approve or 
reject a transportation plan through a direct referendum. The decisions residents made 
with their vote demonstrated more than an opinion about a mode of transportation. They 
also signaled a continued demand for citizen input in HMA governance.  
One would assume that Houston’s working-class blacks and ethnic Mexicans 
would have supported HARTA, especially considering that many relied on transit for 
their daily mobility. However, these Houstonians defied such expectations by rejecting 
mass transit. Crucially, individuals from both groups voted this way not because they 
disliked the idea of transit or because they wanted more highways to be built. Instead, 
they voted against HARTA because they felt that the proposal still reflected an official-
driven planning process that discriminated against them. Based on their experiences with 
the building of highways, many worried that at best the system would not serve their 
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needs and at worst it would once again damage their communities. They exercised the 
political power they had gained through earlier fights and rejected a proposal that did not 
match their expectations.  
Working-class white suburbanites, on the other hand, by voting against HARTA 
played their expected role within historical narratives of 1970s suburb-city antagonism. 
Blue-collar suburbs overwhelmingly voted against the plan and were joined by some 
wealthier white-collar suburbs concerned that the plan would not serve their areas. The 
only suburbs to show support for HARTA lay to the north of Houston in areas that would 
be served by the proposed transit lines. Residents who opposed the system worried that if 
they approved a countywide authority they would be stuck footing the tax bill. In 
addition, suburbanites from across the HMA resented the fact that under the HARTA 
plan the city of Houston would have complete control of the Authority. Suburban elected 
officials already disliked the power Houston officials exerted through the city’s 
expansive annexation rights and they did not want to create another system that Houston 
could use as a cudgel in metropolitan debates. White residents in the working-class 
municipalities southeast of downtown, such as Pasadena and La Porte, shared with black 
and ethnic Mexican Houstonians a worry that the system would not serve their needs. 
Finally, many of the Houstonians who voted against HARTA disliked the eminent 
domain powers given to the agency and their lack of oversight on the appointed board, 
both concerns that meshed well with Houstonians demands for greater citizen input.  
The HARTA vote occurred at a time of immense political, developmental, and 
economic transition in Houston and the wider Sunbelt. While on its face the debate 
revolved around transportation, it also reflected fundamental questions about community 
participation and the balance of political power in the city. During the early 1970s 
African American, ethnic Mexican, and white Houstonians all pushed for greater 
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influence over local decisions. These changes were especially turbulent in Southern cities 
still grappling with the aftereffects of the Civil Rights Movement. African American and 
ethnic Mexican Houstonians gained traction at the state-level in 1972 when the Texas 
Legislature transitioned to single-member districts, a change that, in combination with the 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, created several African American and ethnic 
Mexican state house districts and one U.S. Congressional District in Houston.2 Due to 
this shift, the 1973 HARTA vote marked one of the first times that African American and 
ethnic Mexican voters in Houston could bring direct political pressure onto local 
decisions through their elected state representatives. The city’s minority communities 
helped elect five state representatives to the Texas Legislature in the fall of 1972—
Mickey Leland, Anthony Hall, Senfronia Thompson, Craig Washington, and Ben Reyes. 
When, with less than a month to go before the HARTA election, the five legislators came 
out against the Authority, it seriously crippled the referendum’s chances. The playing out 
of the HARTA debate illustrates an important example of how black, ethnic Mexican, 
and white Americans negotiated political decisions amidst the rapidly changing political 
atmosphere of 1970s Sunbelt cities.  
The HARTA debate also gave Houstonians an opportunity to embrace, even if on 
a limited scale, a non-road centric transportation practice for the first time since 1940. In 
the early 1970s, cities across the Sunbelt including Houston, Atlanta, Dallas, and Los 
Angeles all considered implementing mass transit systems. The decade was key 
developmentally for these cities. Having absorbed the population growth of the postwar 
period by expanding outward from historical downtowns along highways, elected 
officials in these cities now confronted problems with the roads that ranged from air and 
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noise pollution to growing citizen resistance to new projects. The most crippling issues, 
though, were traffic congestion and an inability to provide adequate mobility to suburban 
residents. To address these problems cities either tried to build their way out of 
congestion with more and larger highways, or embraced mass transit in the hope that it 
might promote new development patterns and ease traffic. These debates, and the choices 
made between mass transit and highways, have often been framed as contests between 
suburbs and cities. Houston’s HARTA example shows, though, that these decisions often 
went beyond these binaries.  
The early 1970s were also a pivotal economic moment for Sunbelt cities and the 
nation as a whole. In late 1973, just days after the HARTA vote, the Oil Crisis began, 
compounding an already stagnating national economy and contributing to the start of a 
nearly decade-long recession. Compared to midwestern and northeastern cities hit hard 
by deindustrialization and the recession, Sunbelt cities faired relatively well during the 
decade, bestowed with the moniker of Sunbelt as a foil to the struggling midwestern 
Rustbelt.3 Sunbelt cities saw an increase of migrants during the 1970s, as many 
Americans moved south and west in search of work. Houston provides a particularly 
crucial example because of the city’s centrality to the national and international 
petroleum industry. High oil prices allowed Houston to ride through the national 
recession on a wave of growth, with the oil industry and secondary suppliers providing a 
wealth of job opportunities throughout the HMA.4  
Finally, the HARTA debate raised two issues about taxation. The blue-collar and 
white-collar suburbanites who resisted HARTA found part of their motivation in their 
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disdain for the idea of financially supporting a system that only served the city. This type 
of tax resistance represented an early iteration of the national tax revolt that would reach 
its apex among America’s white-dominated suburbs with the passage of Proposition 13 in 
California in 1978. In this vote, suburban, predominantly white municipalities removed 
their tax revenues from central cities like Oakland that were increasingly run by black or 
ethnic Mexican politicians.5 It is likely that the resistance of some suburban Houstonians 
stemmed from a hesitance to subsidize non-white mobility, but Houston’s control over 
the Authority and tax revenue represented an even larger problem for most suburbanites. 
African American and ethnic Mexican Houstonians also attacked the proposed emission 
tax of HARTA. They argued that the tax, like many other Texas taxes, was regressive and 
placed a greater burden on the income of the poor than it did the rich. Each of these 
disputes would be central to the larger HARTA debate. 
The politics of the HMA, the mobility needs of its residents, and the realities of 
the city’s growth contributed to the surprising outcome of the 1973 vote. Like the 
Harrisburg Freeway fight, the HARTA vote was a linchpin moment in the city’s 
development history. If the Harrisburg conflict marked an apex of Houstonians steady 
attempts to gain influence over city decisions, the HARTA vote represented the first 
moment that power was applied. Before the vote, the city’s leaders confidently laid out 
the routes of the HMA’s future in any direction they saw fit. After, many voices clamored 
to shape the area’s way forward.  
CONSIDERING TRANSIT: CROWDED HIGHWAYS AND THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 
During the two decades after World War II, Houston planning and elected 
officials worked to build the physical infrastructure for a city that “grew up with the 
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automobile.”6 As earlier chapters illustrated, officials wove the car and the structures it 
required into the fabric of the city’s development. What is more, they believed that 
personal cars and road systems would dictate the physical shape of the city into the 
future. Well into the 1960s, entities such as the Houston Chamber of Commerce, which 
considered itself one of the “prime movers for a mobile city,” continued to promote the 
personal automobile and the roads that carried it above all else.7 The Chamber applauded 
the city’s highway development and viewed its expansion as critical to keeping Houston 
from “strangling on its own vehicular traffic.” The organization remained skeptical of 
public transit, doubting that any system could solve Houston’s transportation problems if 
even an “intensive road program” would be  “hard-pressed to keep pace” with the growth 
of the city.8 The Chamber and many other groups who supported highway construction 
expressed confidence that once the freeway system was completed “that freeways and 
buses should satisfy Houston’s mass transit needs until 1980.”9  
Much of this optimism dissipated by the late 1960s, however, as Houston’s 
growth strained the limits of the city’s existing infrastructure system. This stress was 
especially visible on the city’s first generation highways.  Between 1950 and 1969, 
vehicle registrations in Harris County more than tripled from 306,870 to 1,035,346 and 
showed no signs of slowing down.10 Recognizing that “an adequate and efficient 
transportation system [was] vitally important to the economy and welfare of the Houston 
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Metropolitan Area” and no longer confident that roadways would provide the answer, 
city and regional leaders began to search for solutions.11 As the city faced worsening 
congestion levels in the late 1960s, despite opening more miles of highway during the 
decade than any that preceded it, consideration of non-road based mass transit systems 
picked up speed.12  
Despite the increasingly dire situation on the area’s roadways, though, many  
Houstonians, especially suburban commuters, steadfastly advocated for the expansion of 
roads and resisted the idea of mass transit. These citizens often viewed highways as the 
pinnacle of the free-market, non-regulatory attitude so closely linked with Houston’s 
identity and that of Texas itself. The suggestion that individuals should give up their 
vehicles to ride transit or have their movements determined by the routes of a fixed 
system seemed to be un-Houstonian and even undemocratic. As U.C. Waigand, a resident 
of Brazoria County south of Houston, told Thomas Tyson, head of the city’s Public 
Service Department, Houstonians would choose private automobiles over transit even if 
the city offered “diamond-studded, fur-upholstered coaches running on gold and silver 
rails,” because they “ have no desire to travel in herds.”13 
While many leaders echoed the sentiments, if not the rhetoric, of residents like 
Waigand in their support of the city’s auto-centric transportation system, those tasked 
with preserving the city’s efficient growth and movement recognized the severity of the 
                                                
11 City of Houston Department of Planning, “Metropolitan Area Transportation Study: Houston, Origin-
Destination Survey, 1960,” Box 1, Folder 12, City of Houston Department of Planning Collection (CHDP), 
RG A 004, HMRC, 3 
12 In 1960 only 42 miles of the nearly 300-mile designated freeway system had been constructed. By 1969, 
the completed mileage had grown to 152 miles. See Houston Harris County Transportation Study 
Newsletter, January 1969, Box 40, Folder 3, City of Houston Public Service Department Collection 
(CHPSD), RG A 20, HMRC; “Swinging, Surging, Soaring, the Shining Sixties,” Houston, December 1969, 
HMRC, 20. 




limitations on the highway system. Even as they celebrated the personal autonomy 
provided by the car, leaders increasingly worried that “personal living patterns and 
changed economic standards and choice of mode of travel could lead to oversupply of 
transportation facilities of one type and critical deficiencies in other areas.”14 Officials 
called for alternative systems that could connect diffuse parts of the city and alleviate the 
crippling immobility that daily occurred on the highways. This action created a flurry of 
debate around the HMA about what form of transit represented the best path forward. As 
worries about an overreliance on roads and general immobility accrued, confidence in 
freeways waned. For many, mass transit systems that not long before had been 
considered unrealistic or un-Houstonian, reemerged as “the most promising and likely 
solution to the most critical corridor deficiencies and to problems of access and 
circulation in downtown Houston.”15 
As city leaders began to discuss transit options they made it clear that any such 
system would accompany, not replace the city’s road network. Officials recognized the 
integral place that roads and their users held—and would continue to hold—in the 
functioning of the city’s transportation system and economy. They did not want their 
championing of transit to alienate politically powerful road proponents such as suburban 
developers. In attempts to avoid creating conflict, officials couched the discussion of 
transit within a rhetoric of balanced investment toward a system of roads and mass transit 
that would create an “urban environment” that “the region as a whole [was] willing to 
                                                
14 City of Houston Public Service Department, “Road And Transit Study,” July 1969, Box 38, Folder 9, 
CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC, 55. 
15 City of Houston Public Service Department, “Road And Transit Study,” July 1969, Box 38, Folder 9, 
CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC, 53; Several scholars have written of the value officials of major cities placed on 
mass transit as a way to address the issues plaguing central cities. See David W. Jones, Mass Motorization 
+ Mass Transit: An American History and Policy Analysis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); 
Robert M. Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
2001); Alison Isenberg, Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It (Chicago, 
Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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support.”16 Leaders acknowledged that creating this type of system required “a rare level 
of foresightedness and cooperation” among “both public and private segments of the 
regional community.”17 Such cooperation, however, did not materialize in Houston. 
The careful actions of city officials to prevent the discussion of transit from 
dividing Houstonians between those who thought it offered a viable solution to the city’s 
mobility issues and those who believed that only continued road construction could solve 
its problems. Within this debate, though, transit advocates succeeded in framing their 
cause as a key component of a multi-pronged assault on the city’s mobility problems. The 
foothold gained by this tack allowed local and state officials to lay the institutional and 
financial foundations that would be necessary to plan and implement a mass 
transportation system in Houston.  
Some of the earliest ideas for Houston’s non-road mass transit, perhaps inspired 
by the city’s proximity to NASA, proffered mobility systems that resembled space-age 
wonders such as hovering trains, self-driven cars, or even “flying buses.”18 City leaders 
entertained, or at least tolerated, the fanciful possibilities some citizens thought up, but as 
they set to work they approached transit options more realistically. Most plans revolved 
around building an improved bus system or limited rail system to alleviate traffic 
problems.19 In order to build such a system, officials began to advocate for enabling 
                                                
16 City of Houston Public Service Department, “Road And Transit Study,” July 1969, Box 38, Folder 9, 
CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC, 56. 
17 City of Houston Public Service Department, “Road And Transit Study,” July 1969, Box 38, Folder 9, 
CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC, 56. 
18 There are dozens of such plans contained within the records of the City of Houston Public Service 
Department Collection, HMRC, RG A 20 see particularly Box 44, 45, 46, and 47, which contain plans 
ranging from Monorails to “flying buses.” These plans came from both individuals and prominent 
companies like Westinghouse and Goodyear. For “flying buses” see Houston Public Service Department 
Box 47, Folder 1, HMRC. 
19 See for example, Letter form Thomas Tyson to Louie Welch, December 19, 1969, where Tyson 




legislation at the state level that would allow large cities to create public mass transit 
authorities.20 At the same time that they lobbied the state, the Houston City Council 
discussed creating an intermodal downtown transit center that would allow for bus, 
automobile, and mass transit to intersect in the central business district, and make an easy 
connection to the city’s suburban airport.21  
In 1969, responding to the rising concern of urban leaders, the State of Texas 
created the Texas Metropolitan Transportation Commission to manage and plan state 
investment in public transportation. The commission aimed to “encourage, foster, and 
assist the development of public mass transportation, both intercity and intracity, in the 
state and to encourage the establishment of rapid transit.”22 Despite this clear mission 
statement, state leaders, sensitive to the power of the highway lobby and cognizant of the 
level of investment in the state’s roads, tempered the idea that mass transit support would 
ever equal or surpass that of highways. Reflecting upon the commission, Speaker of the 
Texas House Gus Mutscher reminded Texans that “it took a series of political decisions 
to create the committee” and assured his constituents that their government recognized 
that Texas had “one of the finest road systems in the world” and that no state mass transit 
legislation would prevent the government from keeping it that way.23  
 Despite politicians’ promises that roads would continue to garner significant 
investment, road proponents in Houston and across Texas resisted the discussion of mass 
transit funding and study that was gaining steam. Eugene Maier, the longtime Director of 
City Planning for Houston and a staunch supporter of continued road building, attacked 
                                                
20 Houston City Council Minutes, February 1, 1961, HMRC, 2. 
21 Houston City Council Minutes, November 19, 1969, HMRC,132; Houston City Council Minutes, April 
29, 1970, HMRC. 
22 Texas Mass Transportation Commission Documents, Box 40, Folder 2, CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC.  
23 Speech by Gus Mutscher to Texas Transportation Congress, July 17, 1970, Box 54, Folder 6, CHPSD, 
RG A 20, HMRC. 
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advocates of mass transit for what he viewed as a lack of respect toward the effort put 
into building America’s roadways. In a speech to the Houston Chamber of Commerce in 
1971, Maier lamented the fact that “as completion of man’s greatest engineering 
achievement—the Interstate Highway System—draws near, we [planners and engineers] 
find no general recognition or applause for a job well done.” Instead, Maier and other 
road advocates faced criticism from “ecologists, environmentalists, conservationists, and 
a growing number of average citizens.” The systems these critics advocated, Maier 
contended, walked a thin line “between possible success and certain failure.”24 Other road 
advocates in Texas, particularly the Texas Good Roads Association—a consortium of 
road contractors, engineering, and construction firms—directed their opposition toward 
the shift of tax money toward mass transit. The association used a visit to Washington to 
“wine and dine members of the Texas Congressional delegation and the Texas Highway 
Commission” in hope of blunting efforts “to tap the highway trust fund for mass transit 
and to encourage a continued emphasis on road construction.”25 
Mayor Louie Welch countered this opposition with a speech about transit funding 
given in the early 1970s in which he dealt head on with the dire reality of Houston’s 
traffic situation. Houstonians were surrounded by “one of the finest freeway systems in 
the nation,” he declared, but the city’s snarled traffic conditions made it this system into a 
parking lot. To Welch it was becoming increasingly clear that not even the construction 
of “freeways stacked upon freeways” would solve this problem.26 Instead, he called for 
                                                
24 The quotes in this paragraph are from a speech by Eugene Maier, “Total Urban Mobility,” delivered to 
the Houston Chamber of Commerce, September 1, 1971, text for the speech in Box 54, Folder 1, CHPSD, 
RG A 20, HMRC. 
25 “Texans in Capital to oppose mass transit fund plan,” Houston Post, March 19, 1972, Box 55, Folder 7, 
CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC. 
26 Speech by Louie Welch, “Transit Financing: The Cities’ Role,” Box 53, Folder 7, CHPSD, RG A 20, 
HMRC, no date, 1. I base the date estimation on signs visible in the document itself, such as the naming of 
Rapid Transit lines General Manager Stanley Gates as well as the fact that Welch is addressing the topic of 
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Houstonians to demand greater support for mass transit from their representatives at 
every level of government. He concluded by returning to a balanced rhetoric of roads and 
transit, though, arguing that in order to reach a comprehensive solution to the city’s 
mobility problems “mass transit must work hand in hand with a viable freeway system.”27  
During his speech, Welch broached a subject that many road advocates in Texas 
considered sacrosanct, the federal Highway Trust Fund. With his mention of the fund, 
Welch tapped into an ongoing campaign of transit advocates to open the federal gas tax, 
which supported the Highway Trust Fund, to both road and transit projects to give local 
governments the power to decide where to invest their allotment of the money. Welch 
maintained that it was a waste that “the money must be spent for freeways, or not at all,” 
especially given the reality that “the need for new freeway and improved freeways 
varie[d] from city to city.”28 Rather than relying on a one-size-fits-all approach, he 
advocated for a more open-ended approach to the use of funds that would allow money to 
be spent on transit. 
 With this call Welch and Houston joined the national debate about the future of 
mass transit and freeway construction in the United States. In the early 1970s, the Nixon 
administration’s Department of Transportation, led by Secretary John Volpe, responding 
partially to the demands of large cities, called for using part of the Highway Trust Fund 
to pay for transit projects and made more money available for rail-based mass transit 
systems.29 The rationale behind the Administration’s support of such a move stemmed 
                                                                                                                                            
using the federal Highway Trust Fund to pay for mass transit systems, a debate that was waged in the early 
1970s at a national level. 
27 Speech by Louie Welch, “Transit Financing: The Cities’ Role,” Box 53, Folder 7, CHPSD, RG A 20, 
HMRC, no date, 1.  
28 Ibid. 1. 
29 Alan A. Altshuler and David Luberhoff, Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public 
Investment (Washington, D.C.: Cambridge, Mass: Brookings Institution Press; Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, 2003).  
 
176
from a shift in national attitudes about the construction of freeways and the use of mass 
transit that began in the mid-1950s and escalated to its apex in the late 1960s and early 
1970s in the form of freeway revolts across the nation.30 Some mass transit advocates 
doubted that the Nixon Administration truly supported alternatives to road construction, 
especially since the administration placed restraints on the gas tax monies flowing to 
mass transit.31 Regardless of the level of commitment behind the actions of Volpe and 
Nixon, even their nominal support of mass transit demonstrated that the subject held an 
important place in American consciousness and politics. Visible everywhere from the 
halls of Congress and to local newspapers that contemplated the fading of “America’s 
love affair with freeways,” mass transit debates held a central place in policy 
conversations of the time, and dominated politics in Houston for much of the 1970s.32 
 Officials in Houston viewed mass transit primarily as a salve for the city’s 
problems of congestion and immobility, but they also hoped that a cutting-edge system 
would help the city keep up with its rivals. Houston leaders commonly discussed the 
decisions made by other growing cities like Dallas and Atlanta. These communities, like 
Houston, expanded rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s and competed with one another to 
draw workers, businesses, and investment from across the nation. Houston officials 
worked to outpace their rivals and establish their city as the most desirable and fastest 
                                                
30 Some American cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco began to advocate for the formation of 
transit authorities in the 1950s. Houston and other cities like Atlanta and Washington D.C. did not engage 
in serious consideration of such systems until the mid-1960s. For discussion of the transit milieu’s 
expansion in the postwar period, especially the role of federal involvement see Sy Adler, “The Evolution of 
Federal Transit Policy,” in Martin Melosi, ed., Urban Public Policy: Historical Modes and Methods 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993). See also the Highway Action Committee 
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and the Difficult Path to Sustainable National Investment (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 
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31 “Gift Horse?” Forbes, April 15, 1972, 27-28. 
32 Mark Morrison, “American love affair with freeways fades,” Houston Post, April 9, 1973, Box 48, 
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growing in the nation. Atlanta and San Francisco garnered much of Houston’s attention  
given the successful implementation of the Bay Area Rapid Transit and Metropolitan 
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority systems in the cities. Prominent Houston real estate 
developer Gerald Hines wrote to Houston City Councilman Frank Mancuso to lament 
that whereas Houston had yet to take action on transit, “Atlanta is a forward thinking, 
forward moving city that is far ahead of Houston in implementing mass transit.” Hines 
urged the councilman to recognize that in the future “the survival of the city is only going 
to be related primarily to the strength of its total transportation system.”33 
The balanced road-transit rhetoric of Mayor Welch and the suggestions of a “total 
transportation system” in Gerald Hines’s letter suggested that mass transit advocates 
recognized that roadways, and their transit-skeptical proponents, would remain central to 
Houston’s transportation planning. While proponents attempted to convince hesitant road 
supporters of transit’s merits, though, they also took a series of concrete steps at the state 
and local level to open the way for the 1973 HARTA vote. While transit supporters 
successfully created a pathway toward the city’s first public mass transit system, the fight 
that ensued prior to the HARTA vote demonstrated the intensity of disagreements about 
transit and roads at the local, state, and federal levels. 
CLEARING THE WAY FOR HARTA: THE PITCH FOR TRANSIT IN HOUSTON 
Despite resistance from road backers like Maier and the Texas Good Roads 
Association, federal and state money became increasingly available for transit studies and 
system construction. Combined with the state’s growing involvement through the Texas 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the expansion of federal involvement in mass 
                                                




transit made more funds available than ever to local governments.34 On the heels of the 
locally funded “Road and Transit Study,” the city applied to the Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration in 1970 for a technical study grant to create a mass transit 
plan for the region. They received a grant for $516,000 in October 1970 and 
commissioned Alan M. Voorhees & Associates to begin work on a regional transit plan 
in May 1971. Ultimately, the Voorhees study cost $774,000 and its findings were 
released in a series of publications between 1971 and 1973.35  
 With the Voorhees study underway, Houston elected officials and their 
predominantly white supporters began a campaign to convince residents that the Houston 
metropolitan area needed a local transit authority and a system that offered alternatives to 
the personal automobile. To sell the idea of an authority, city leaders established the 
Transit Action Program (TAP) in 1971. Mayor Welch appointed thirteen prominent 
Houstonians to the TAP’s steering committee and tasked the group with creating a 
system “desirable enough that we, ourselves, use it. We want a system that will be for 
everybody, not just a system to stop the other guy from gumming up the freeway for us.” 
36 The TAP and its Citizen’s Advisory Committee (CAC), which began to operate in 
early 1972, would bring citizen input into the planning process. Welch believed the 
                                                
34 See Adler, “The Evolution of Federal Transit Policy.” Adler argues that federal involvement increased 
because of greater advocacy for transit solutions by central business district actors throughout the country. I 
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policy and resources well outside of the central city. Voorhees study cost in “Transit Advisers to Meet,” 
Houston Post, September 14, 1971, Box 10, Folder 4, CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC. 
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diversity of the CAC, which consisted of one hundred Houstonians from across “the 
city’s business, industrial, professional and socio-economic segments,” would help 
spread the transit program to a wide range of Houstonians.37 The TAP and CAC put out a 
monthly newsletter called Newsbriefs and city officials pitched transit at hundreds of 
information sessions throughout the city. Thomas Tyson and his primary assistant, 
William Laughlin, attended over ninety community meetings between January of 1972 
and the August 1973 when the HARTA board was created and its members became the 
public face of the campaign.38  
 TAP presentations to the City Council offered transit proponents an opportunity 
to build the case for HARTA. In an April 1972 meeting, Robert Keith, the head planner 
for the Voorhees Plan, employed Welch’s balanced investment rhetoric when he 
discussed the still in-progress plan. Explaining the study, Keith celebrated Houston’s 
“excellent highway system,” which provided an advantageous starting point for the 
development of a larger system. But, he argued, even the state’s effective highway 
department could not “build highways as fast as people are moving into Houston.” Keith 
asserted that in 1972 the effectiveness of city’s highways was “the best it [Houston] will 
ever have.” The Voorhees plan, he said, was intended to address the fact that Houston’s 
access to mobility in the future would, at best, stay even or decline. Time and time again 
Keith and other transit planners made the argument that augmenting highway capacity 
with transit held the most promise. As Keith moved into a discussion of the planned rapid 
rail system, he kept roads close to the center of the discussion. Though in his eyes mass 
transit was “the key element in an overall new comprehensive public transportation 
service,” Keith assured the Council, and through them Houstonians, that transit 
                                                
37 “Transit Advisers to Meet” Houston Post; See also, Louie Welch’s letter to Houstonians invited to 
become members of the CAC, February 11, 1972, Box 48, Folder 1, CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC.  
38 “Presentations—Re: Transit Program by Thomas Tyson” Box 58, Folder 8, CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC.  
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proponents did not consider that “the construction of the Rapid Transit Program” meant 
“that the highway efforts should be diminished.”39 Keith and other transit proponents 
hoped that depicting the transit plan as a complement to, not a competitor of, the 
roadways would ease its acceptance. 
 In addition to selling the transit plan, the TAP also worked to predict and deflect 
the criticisms levied at the transit plans. To divert questions about citizen input, officials 
lauded the TAP and the CAC as attempts to “get as much citizen involvement as 
possible” with the ultimate goal of creating a system “that would be responsive to the 
needs of the people.” Keith lauded Houstonians for their willingness to “make themselves 
available” and remain “positive minded about working on program like this one.” He felt 
that the plan, when announced, would benefit greatly from “the right kind of response 
and criticism” they had received from residents across the region. Transit supporters 
knew that some Houstonians doubted the system would serve them and their interests. By 
using language of inclusion, transit planners and officials tried to head off criticisms of 
HARTA and spin the roiling debate as a productive part of planning process.40 
Non-government groups that supported transit also helped to sell the system. 
Beginning in 1971, groups like the Houston Chapter of the League of Women Voters 
began to publicly advocate for mass transit.41 In a March 1971 press release, the League 
argued that despite the mobility highways afforded the city, the problems they caused 
outweighed their benefits. They listed a number of reasons the city needed to shift away 
from highways, arguing that the system the city possessed was “congested; it perpetuates 
pollution; not everyone can use it; it is becoming unsafe; it is costly; it is not always a 
                                                
39 All Keith quotes from Houston City Council Minutes, April 24, 1972, 495-499. 
40 Keith quotes from Houston City Council Minutes, April 24, 1972, 495-499. 
41 Other prominent civic groups that called for mass transit included the Texas Society of Professional 




thing of beauty—and with our present system of development by land speculation, the 
freeway perpetuates itself.” Despite this dim outlook, the League pointed out that 
Houstonians were lucky because the city still had a choice to make about its future 
transportation networks. The choice was simple: Houstonians could “either continue to 
accommodate our automobiles by expansion of the present freeway systems,” and 
compound the issues this system created, or the city could “balance our system with rapid 
transit.”42 
In September 1971, just as city planning director Eugene Maier levied his 
criticisms at transit advocates, the League of Women Voters announced that in 
conjunction with the Southwestern Center for Urban Research at Rice University, it 
would conduct a survey of citizen’s attitudes toward transit. The League hoped that the 
survey would confirm citizenry’s support of a transit system. Released in November 
1972, the survey showed that 52 percent of Houstonians said they would use mass transit 
as their main means of transportation if it were available. In addition, it showed that 54 
percent of respondents believed they would vote for a publicly owned and maintained 
system.43 The summary of the survey concluded that Houstonians recognized that 
“freeways…and relatively limited bus system” could not address the city’s specific 
needs. Instead, the results justified a shift to “a comprehensive, multi-modal transit 
system” that could adequately address the city’s growth.44  
Buoyed by the results of the survey, the support of civic groups like the League of 
Women Voters, and the progress of transit planners, the city of Houston continued to 
                                                
42 Houston League of Women Voters, “Focus: Mass Transit,” March 1971, Box 44, Folder 6, CHPSD, RG 
A 20, HMRC. 
43 For survey numbers see Southwestern Center for Urban Research (SCUR), “Houston Mass 
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prepare the ground for an authority vote by considering the purchase of the private bus 
line.45 As a sign of officials’ confidence that a public authority would be created, in the 
months before the Voorhees study was released, the city seemed poised to purchase the 
private system despite its high cost. Officials intended for this move to ease the transition 
to public operation of the transit system and to prove to skeptical Houstonians that a 
public entity could manage Houston’s transit network. Thomas Tyson believed that if the 
city could provide better bus service prior to the HARTA vote that it could prove to be “a 
crucial step in winning public support for a more extensive rapid transit system of 
elevated trains and subways…Faster and better bus service would be the first visible sign 
of improved mass transportation.”46 The Voorhees plan was released before the city took 
action on the purchase. In the turmoil around the 1973 election, the city delayed all 
discussion of purchasing the bus line. 
In October 1972, an environmental advocacy group, the Citizens’ Environmental 
Coalition, hosted an “inquiry” into the mass transit situation. The group was Houston’s 
leading environmental organization and a primary driver behind many environmental 
reforms in Houston during the 1970s such as the protection of bayous and cutting air 
pollution.47 The event offered both transit proponents and opponents a public platform 
from which to broadcast their perspectives on the transit plan. A number of supporters 
testified to the merits of the program and its plan. Charles Trost, the Director of Planning 
for the Houston-Galveston Area Council, the region’s Metropolitan Planning 
Organization, supported the system because in his experience “what you can afford is 
                                                
45 Discussions of purchasing the bus lines appear in the Houston City Council Minutes throughout the 
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46 “City Appears Ready to Buy the Bus Line” Houston Chronicle, November 26, 1972, Box 10, Folder 4, 
CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC.  
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what gets done and we cannot afford to widen our freeways, widen our major 
thoroughfares, or live with accumulative vehicles producing air pollution.” In his eyes, 
the only option was to build the rapid transit system.48  
Even some earlier opponents of mass transit, like the Texas Good Roads 
Association, expressed guarded support for the plan. Through the testimony of Gene 
Robbins, the group’s Executive Secretary, the association said it could approve the plan if 
transit construction was accompanied by continued “highway and street construction” 
and if funding for transit came “from sources other than the Highway Trust Fund.”49 Even 
with these qualifications, the fact that the association begrudgingly accepted the 
Voorhees plan demonstrated the seeming inevitability of its passage at this stage. The 
only voice of dissent, or, perhaps more accurately, of doubt, came from Dr. George 
Strong, Assistant Director of the Rice University’s Southwest Center for Urban Research. 
Strong raised questions about the practicalities of the plan, specifically asking about the 
cost of the proposal, access to the system by the poorer residents of the city, and the 
makeup of the Authority itself. While Keith assured Strong and the other listeners that the 
plan would adequately address each of these concerns, Strong’s comments would echo 
through the later debate and influence the outcome of the election. 
 While, as we have seen, many road builders and developers proved to be among 
the opponents of mass transit, two prominent entities joined forces in hope of capitalizing 
on Houston’s turn toward transit. In late 1970, Gerald Hines Interests and Brown & Root 
Inc. announced a joint-venture to create BRH Mobility Systems, a company that would 
“provide a combination of capabilities and experiences in transit system development, 
                                                
48 Testimony of Charles Trost, “Mass Transit: An Inquiry on the Recommendation of The Alan M. 
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design, implementation and operation, construction, and real estate planning and 
development.”50 The fact that two prominent, pro-development Houston companies—up 
to the 1970s, Brown and Root Inc. was one of the largest road building firms in the state 
of Texas and Gerald Hines was among the largest real estate developers in the city—
combined to form a transit company, signified the tacit approval of the pending transit 
plan by some of Houston’s business leaders who hoped the system would mean a boom 
in development.51 BRH even went so far as to create bulletins to sell the unapproved 
system that extolled “the ways a proper assessment of transit can help liberate urban and 
medical centers, new towns, universities and airports from traditional barriers.”52 
 Despite opposition from some quarters, the support for transit at the local, state, 
and national level seemed to preordain the successful creation of HARTA. On March 2, 
1973, Voorhees & Associates released their much-anticipated final report. Two weeks 
after the plan came out, the Houston City Council adopted it as their official transit plan 
and called for the formation of a provisional HARTA board. One week after that, the 
Houston-Galveston Area Council did as well.53 Days later, in what State Representative 
Kay Bailey called a “surprise” the Houston Chamber of Commerce announced its support 
for the HARTA enabling legislation then under consideration, despite the grumblings of 
some of its developer and road building members.54 For most of Houston’s history, when 
such a wide collection of the city’s political and business establishment backed a 
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program, it was implemented. In May 1973, shepherded by Houston-area representatives 
Hawkins Menafee and Kay Bailey, the Texas State Legislature passed Senate Bill 642, 
which allowed major cities to form public transit authorities after approval by their 
citizens.55  
THE PLAN AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Briefly exploring the details of HARTA and the primary complaints of its 
opponents will help to explain the debate that emerged in the months prior to the October 
1973 vote. Four questions quickly came to the fore of the HARTA debate. First, what 
type of system—rail, buses, or expanded highways—would the Authority and the 
Voorhees plan focus on and what areas would they serve? Second, who would be in 
charge of the Authority and how would the voices of both Houston and its surrounding 
municipalities balance? Third, how would the city pay for HARTA and its network? 
Fourth, what governing power would the HARTA board possess and what checks would 
exist for those powers?  
HARTA intended to implement the two-stage Voorhees plan, which captured the 
balanced investment language and commitment to both roads and transit that leaders 
touted during initial discussions. In the first stage, forty miles of new system 
infrastructure would be created. This mileage consisted of both fixed guideway transit as 
well as express and priority bus routes on existing highways. The plan provided for two 
primary fixed guideways and two shorter guideway spurs for the use of some form of rail 
transit—most likely a heavy rail system similar to the subway trains used in New York 
and the El cars used in Chicago. The paths of two primary guideways hugged close to 
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existing highway networks along State Highway 59 to the southwest of downtown and 
Interstate 10 running west from downtown. These two segments stretched from the Inner 
Loop into downtown. The two guideway spurs shot off the Highway 59 route. One route 
linked the University of Houston, Texas Southern University, and the Third Ward area to 
downtown. This route also contained a planned extension to Hobby Airport. The other 
spur moved north of downtown toward the Inner Loop and served as the first leg of an 
eventual route toward the Intercontinental Airport. The major travel corridors neglected 
by guideway plans would receive busways—planned as elevated, separate lanes similar 
to today’s existing HOV lanes. These busways would be created on both the northern and 
southern sections of Interstate 45, as well as on State Highway 288. The first stage came 
with a $795 million price tag. The second stage extensions, which would add another 41 
miles of rapid transit system, cost an additional $655 million. Together, the plan called 
for a total of $1.45 billion in spending.56 
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Figure 4.1: HARTA Plan 
The proposed rapid transit plan of the Voorhees Company shows the first and second stages of rapid transit, 
fixed guideway construction, as well as potential expansions of that system and of freeway busways. The 
plan was contentious for many Houstonians because of a perceived lack of service to minority and working 
class suburban areas. Transit Action Program, “Long Range Program,” 1973, Folder 6, Box 49, City of 
Houston Public Service Department Collection, RG A 20, HMRC. 
The Voorhees report argued that creating a balanced system of road and transit 
would benefit the users of both by producing citywide cost savings. According to the 
final report, unlike a purely auto-dependent system—where “Houston-Harris County 
residents will be spending 50 billion dollars or more” on comprehensive costs of road and 
vehicle maintenance, new road construction, gas costs, and congestion costs between 
1973 and 1990—a mass transit system could be built and maintained for roughly $2 
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billion over the same period.57 At the same time transit would create “large direct and 
indirect benefits to the community” by easing congestion on the roadways and creating a 
more balanced system.58 The report also pointed out that the mixed development of 
busways and fixed guideways would avoid future congestion issues that would occur if 
only busways were implemented—a predication that came true in the congestion 
problems of the 1980s.59   
Opponents and skeptics of the plan quickly pointed out the limited nature of the 
plan’s route—with the major opposition coming from African Americans, ethnic 
Mexicans, and working-class white residents from surrounding municipalities in the 
HMA. Each of these populations doubted that the routes planned for their areas would be 
built in a timely fashion, if at all. Basing their reactions on the details of the plan, these 
critics argued that city officials were more concerned with buttressing the economic 
strength of the central business district and improving the mobility of wealthier white 
residents in the city and northern suburbs than adequately serving all parts of the city. 
Communities of color outside of the Third Ward saw that no part of the system would 
immediately serve them, and suburbanites to the southeast saw a plan with no concrete 
timeline for the service to reach their communities. In addition to the proposed routes, the 
economic rationale articulated by most city officials for the transit system and the 
widespread support for a system by downtown businesses and interest groups like the 
Chamber of Commerce led many Houstonians to question the true intentions of the 
system. Was it, as officials attempted to pitch it, a system for all of Houston? Or, rather, 
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did it represent a system intended to benefit the few who lived along the route and those 
businesses that would benefit at the cost of many?  
The anatomy of the Authority also engendered a great deal of discussion and 
debate. The makeup of the board proved particularly controversial for many in the 
metropolitan region. The proposed Authority covered not just Houston, but the entire 
HMA. Because of the wide territory, the board would include “representation from all 
local governments,” with membership based “either on population, annual costs of transit 
to each represented government or the amount of transit service rendered.”60 
Metropolitan and state officials decided the board would consist of nine members—five 
appointed by the Houston City Council, two appointed by the mayors of the surrounding 
municipalities within the HARTA territory, and two appointed by Harris County 
Commissioners. The appointing entities convened the provisional HARTA board on 
August 23, 1973.61 Officials tasked the board with selling the Authority and its plan. 
Appointed with just over a month to go before the election, the nine board members took 
over the public relations push from city officials like Thomas Tyson, and attempted to 
navigate the debate surrounding the vote.62 
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Moving beyond the concrete details of the plan and the board, the next question 
that arose centered on finances. While they ultimately settled on a vehicle emissions tax 
as the primary financing mode, before doing so officials studied the payment methods 
used by other cities and transit authorities. A variety of funding mechanisms supported 
such entities across the nation: Baltimore employed a gasoline tax, Atlanta a sales tax, 
San Francisco a property tax.63 Given Texas’ long history of rejecting progressive taxes 
and relying on regressive funding structures such as sales and property taxes, Houston 
officials worried that the electorate would object to taxation. They also recognized, 
however, that the system required significant local financing in order to ensure matching 
funds from federal coffers. The enabling legislation laid out the emissions tax and made it 
clear that the Authority would have no other taxing authority outside of it. Officials sold 
the emissions tax as a user fee. Those who drove on, and clogged, the roads, they argued, 
should pay for the system that would bring them respite. The proposed tax rate varied 
based on the size and displacement of one’s engine—the larger the engine, the higher the 
rate—ranging from $4 to $15 a year for most drivers.64 In his public pitch to Houstonians 
one month prior to the vote, Louie Welch reminded people that the “local tax dollar will 
be matched by up to four federal dollars” and that all the taxes paid “should be more than 
refunded through time saved due to reduced congestion and in gas saved from avoiding 
longer and longer waits in traffic.”65 Despite these assurances, as the HARTA debate 
heated up, this tax received a great deal of criticism. 
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The final point many observers questioned concerned the governing powers given 
to the HARTA board.  The state enabling legislation allowed any transit authority in the 
state to levy the vehicle emissions tax, gave authorities the power of eminent domain, and 
declared that “ the use of property for other public purposes by the State of Texas, its 
municipal corporations and political subdivisions, and by public utilities and public 
service corporations, are subordinate and inferior to the higher use of such property for 
rapid transit purposes in metropolitan areas.”66 While, as we shall see, the emissions tax 
raised the eyebrows of many Houstonians, the rights of eminent domain and the 
subordination of all other public entities to the land usage needs of the transit authority 
became a primary reason for many Houstonian’s opposition to HARTA.  
These four questions framed the area’s debate over mass transit. Between May 
and October 1973, both advocates and opponents waged a public relations battle to sway 
the tide in their favor. The Authority and its plan, which seemed destined to pass at its 
conception, encountered stiffer than expected opposition. The resultant fight changed the 
functioning of the city’s politics and cemented the region’s reliance on roadways in the 
years to come. 
THE DEBATE  
 SB 642 established voter approval of HARTA as the last hurdle in establishing a 
public transit system for Houston. With the proposal out in the open, leaders and citizens 
could focus on the merits and drawbacks of a definitive entity and plan, not simply debate 
the amorphous idea of mass transit itself. Reflecting on the importance of the moment, 
and advocating for HARTA, the Houston Post called for “a countywide educational 
campaign” to “inform the voters on what needs to be done, on why it must be done, on 
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how it will be financed and on the benefits to be gained.” The Post article continued, 
noting that in order to ensure success, leaders needed to “undertake a thorough, 
comprehensive, neighborhood-by-neighborhood” approach to bring the details of 
HARTA to “public hearings…schools, civic clubs, and community centers.”67 While 
transit advocates expected an easy sell given the pro-transit momentum of the previous 
years, they nonetheless began a strong push for the system. City officials, members of the 
TAP steering committee, and the HARTA board led the charge for approval. Transit 
advocates would not be alone at the community institutions at which they spoke, 
however. Nor would their opinions be the only ones heeded by voters. As the days crept 
toward the October election, more and more opponents emerged to challenge the 
HARTA backers. 
 Houston’s African American and ethnic Mexican citizens, working-class white 
suburbanites, and road proponents each articulated different elements of the four major 
questions as their primary concerns. While none of these populations were monolithic in 
their resistance to the Authority, those against HARTA outnumbered those in support. 
The opposition developed slowly between May and September, but in the final weeks of 
the campaign, opponents to the Authority cropped up from all parts of the HMA. Faced 
with unexpected opposition, transit backers backpedalled and focused their energy on 
creating the transit authority, even if it that meant sacrificing parts of the Voorhees plan. 
Transit advocates pivoted away from the Voorhees plan in order to deflect criticism, but 
this resulted in the loss of a concrete plan. As the vote approached, the abandonment of 
the Voorhees recommendations and the subsequent lack of a definite plan created one of 
the biggest stumbling blocks toward a HARTA victory.  
                                                
67 “Moving Mass Transit,” Houston Post, May 17, 1973, Box 61, Folder 7, CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC. 
 
193
 The African American and ethnic Mexican Houstonians who opposed HARTA—
and the elected officials that represented them—voiced two major complaints. First, they 
argued that the planning effort ignored the needs and concerns of the communities. Based 
on their experiences with the city’s highways, many doubted promises that transit service 
would reach their neighborhoods and felt that HARTA offered a system that served only 
the interests of wealthier whites in the city and its northern suburbs. Second, many 
considered the emissions tax problematic and regressive. Importantly, the opposition 
from the city’s communities of color focused on the details of the HARTA plan, not the 
idea of mass transit in general. Indeed, both before and after the vote, African American 
and ethnic Mexican leaders recognized the importance of mass transit and advocated for 
an appropriate system. As far back as 1969, Quentin Mease, the director of the YMCA in 
the predominantly black Third Ward, wrote to City Councilman Frank Mann encouraging 
the city to address “the plight of the urban poor” by installing “a comprehensive mass 
transit system,” that could provide “all the necessary mobility to ensure equal 
employment.”68 While the city’s communities of color came to reject HARTA because of 
worries about inequity, the words of Houstonians like Mease as well as later support for 
mass transit showed that African American and ethnic Mexican Houstonians generally 
supported the idea of transit, just not the details HARTA proposal.69  
 Concern that service would be confined to Houston alone and worries about 
Houston’s ability to dictate HMA decisions drove much of the resistance from working-
class and middle-class suburbanites who disapproved of transit. Only in close-in northern 
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suburbs did suburbanites feel the system might serve them. While suburban opponents 
echoed concerns about lack of service and the emissions tax, most questioned the 
representation on the board and the powers that it possessed. Like suburbanites, road 
proponents maintained a constant stream of criticism that revolved around the belief that 
only expanded roadways would allow the region to maintain adequate mobility.   
 One of the earliest signs of trouble for HARTA emerged when the League of 
Women Voters withdrew its endorsement from the 1972 transit opinion survey it helped 
conduct, citing a lack of proportional input to its results by Houstonians of color. In a 
May 30, 1973, letter to the president of Southwest Center for Urban Research, League 
president Laura Keever announced that the organization needed “to disassociate the 
League from the survey” because of the “underrepresentation of blacks and Mexican-
Americans in the survey sample.”70 In a letter to Mayor Welch written the same day, 
Keever outlined the survey’s problems. In 1973, whites made up 61 percent of Houston’s 
population, African Americans totaled 26 percent, and ethnic Mexicans made up roughly 
12 percent. The survey, however, took 80 percent of its responses from white 
Houstonians, 12 percent from African Americans, and 7 percent from ethnic Mexicans 
Americans.71 The League’s withdrawal stemmed less from a concern about the input of 
minority Houstonians and more from apprehension that such an obvious problem could 
weaken the city’s overall push toward transit. Keever and the League worried that the 
flawed survey afforded communities of color evidence for their “contention that current 
mass transit plans are designed primarily to serve white, middle-class citizens” and 
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thought that abandoning the results might undermine this criticism before it damaged the 
prospects of the vote.72 
 While the concerns raised by the League foreshadowed protests that would 
emerge closer to the election, the early summer of 1973 saw few disruptions to the steady 
drumbeat of transit proponent’s arguments. In the June issue of Houston, the Chamber of 
Commerce’s in-house publication, Chamber president Bernard Sakowitz gave his and the 
Chamber’s reasons for supporting HARTA. In his editorial, Sakowitz lauded the fact that 
HARTA gave officials a chance to plan for the HMA’s growth. He argued that acting on 
HARTA in 1973, before traffic became intolerable, could ensure that the city has “the 
answer available…when the real crunch comes.” He called on Houstonians to give their 
support to the Authority.73 By late June, minor route complaints and questions about the 
emissions tax represented the bulk of negative comments about HARTA. Transit 
advocates felt that the path to victory would be smooth.74 
 The League of Women Voters, despite backing away from the opinion survey, 
maintained their push for a successful transit vote. Led by HARTA board member Mary 
Rollins and Laura Keever, the organization continued to sell the concept of transit to 
Houstonians. In an appearance before the Houston City Council, Keever pointed out that 
Houstonians, whether “housewives whose days are spent chauffeuring children because 
bike riding is unsafe; workers who must be paid higher wages in order to buy and 
maintain the car to get to work,” or “shoppers who cannot find a parking place,” one 
constant united them: all wanted easier ways of getting where they needed to be. Keever 
framed HARTA as an entity that could “save the city from choking on pollution, 
                                                
72 Keever to Conant, May 30, 1973. 
73 Bernard Sakowitz, “Rapid Transit System depends on you,” Houston, June 1973, HMRC.  
74 “No Big opposition surfacing for area rapid transit plan,” Houston Post, June 25, 1973, Box 61, Folder 
7, CHPSD, RG A 20, HMRC.  
 
196
strangling in vehicle tie-ups,” and also “guarantee to each citizen the basic right of 
mobility.”75 Keever’s words supported the major points of transit supporters about 
congestion and the environment, while also acknowledging the need to listen to the 
concerns of lower-class, transit-dependent, and minority Houstonians. 
 The same day that Keever addressed the Houston City Council, the first real signs 
of opposition surfaced in some surrounding suburban communities and Houston’s 
African American population. In Pasadena, Houston’s largest working-class suburb that 
sat to the southeast of the city along the ship channel, the City Council voted to oppose 
HARTA because they saw “nothing that [would] serve Pasadena or serve the ship 
channel areas,” and therefore could not justify “levying a tax on Pasadena people…until 
such time as it [the HARTA plan] has been adjusted to render service to this area.” In 
addition, the community’s leaders found it unfathomable that the HARTA board, 
dominated as it was by Houstonians, would set the boundaries of the area to be taxed. In 
their eyes such authority seemed almost unconstitutional.76 Addressing the same council 
meeting as Keever, Pluria Marshall, an black civil rights leader, said that he and other 
African Americans could not support HARTA because without a definitive plan they did 
not “’know what you’re asking them to vote for’” and they feared that the system would 
“would turn out to be a high-class system for affluent suburbanites that would further 
isolate inner city areas.”77 
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 These trickles of resistance quickly turned into a stream, as other suburban 
communities backed Pasadena. One by one, outlying municipalities demanded that they 
be left out of the proposed taxing district or that they receive a greater say in the planning 
of the system’s services. Some wealthier, almost exclusively white suburban 
municipalities in the northern and northwestern parts of Harris County supported 
HARTA because the leaders of these growing areas secured service promises—mostly 
rapid bus service—from the board.78 However, by the end of July 1973 the larger 
working-class municipalities to the city’s southeast, including Pasadena, Baytown, La 
Porte, Deer Park, and South Houston, stood staunchly opposed to a system that would 
take “10 years to get to Pasadena,” and “25 to get to La Porte.”79  
Piling on to the opposition act, Leonel Castillo, a prominent ethnic Mexican 
leader and Houston City Controller, announced his opposition to HARTA. In his 
complaints against the Authority, Castillo focused on the emissions tax and the slow 
implementation of such a large system. Castillo criticized the system’s financing plan as 
“the imposition of an unfair and phony tax” on Houstonians and argued that HARTA 
would just become “another huge bureaucracy for citizens to cope with.” Castillo did not 
simply oppose HARTA, however; he also proposed his own mass transit plan. Castillo 
called for the expansion of many smaller forms of transit such as taxis, rental cars, 
jitneys, and car pools. He also argued for tighter pollution ordinances, for the buying of 
the private bus system, and for the creation of park & ride systems. In summing up his 
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own plan, Castillo said the city should take quicker, less expensive steps first, that it 
should “try the Chevy before…the Rolls Royce.”80 
Transit advocates responded to this growing opposition by ramping up their 
campaign and shifting their tactics. In order to deflate criticisms against the details of the 
Voorhees plan, elected officials and even the HARTA board began to distance 
themselves from it, intimating that after its creation, the Authority would not have to 
implement the plan’s details. Willoughby Williams, a HARTA board member, signaled 
the shift away from the Voorhees plan by insisting the board possessed flexibility in the 
creation of the ultimate plan. Willoughby assured Houstonians that, once permanently in 
place, the board would start “compiling a list of as many alternative” plans as could be 
found “and communicating with the community about those alternatives.”81 HARTA 
board members and other transit supporters hoped that acknowledging the complaints of 
critics and opening the possibility of a different plan would appease voters and let the 
Authority sort out details later. 
With just weeks remaining before the vote and transit supporters scrambling to 
extinguish the many, but growing fires of criticism, the most prominent opponent yet 
announced his opposition to HARTA. On September 20th, Harris County Commissioner 
Tom Bass announced that for months he “had private reservations” about the vote that he 
could no longer keep to himself. Given the choices facing the region, Bass argued, the 
best option for the region was to “vote the proposal down, go back to the legislature and 
hammer out a specific proposal that offers a solution” to the region’s problems. Bass 
insinuated that transit supporters purposefully made the referendum into a special 
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election avoiding the higher turnout of a November vote. In Bass’ eyes this tactic 
epitomized the unfortunate “’public be damned’ attitude” embraced by transit advocates 
in the debate. Bass concluded by asking twenty questions of transit supporters and said he 
would “quite willingly support the October 6th referendum” if advocates could answer 
them satisfactorily. Echoing complaints of other opponents, Bass challenged the powers 
of the HARTA board and the board itself. He labeled the board a “super government,” 
and worried what an unelected entity with unlimited taxing powers and no one to hold it 
accountable would do to the region.82  
 In response to Bass’ questions, advocates attempted to dispel concerns about the 
board’s power, arguing that the Authority did not possess more powers than those of the 
county or the city. Supporters also maintained that state statutes proscribed HARTA’s 
rights of eminent domain. In response to the accusation that the board would be 
unaccountable to Harris County residents, advocates pointed out that other entities, such 
as the Houston Port Authority and the Harris County Hospital District, possessed similar 
powers and appointed boards, yet had not caused any major problems in the region.83 The 
League of Women Voters and other supporters also tried to deflate Bass’ critiques. The 
League urged Houstonians to trust the HARTA board in the same way that Texans had 
always trusted the appointed Texas Highway Commission, which “planned well and gave 
us the finest freeway system in the country.”84 If residents trusted HARTA, the League 
argued, the board would provide the city with an effective and fair system.   
 Opposition to HARTA slowly built up in Houston’s African American and ethnic 
Mexican communities over the summer and came to a head in September, when the five 
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recently elected minority representatives held a news conference to announce their 
opposition to HARTA. In planning the vote campaign, transit backers banked on the 
support of the city’s communities of color because they believed the many transit-
dependent individuals within these population would want the system and push for its 
approval.85 When, with just two weeks remaining before the election, state 
representatives Mickey Leland, Craig Washington, Anthony Hall, Ben Reyes, and 
Senfronia Thompson, all of whom but Reyes, voted for the enabling legislation in the 
previous state legislative session, jointly announced that they could no longer back 
HARTA, they shook the foundation of the Authority’s support. The legislators said that 
more time was needed for their constituents to discuss and clarify the goals of a transit 
authority. Channeling their constituents’ concerns that a transit system might recreate the 
displacements of the highway building era, the Representatives discussed their worries 
that the board could abuse its power to “levy taxes, issues bonds, condemn private homes 
and businesses and employ its own police force.” Finally, just as suburbanites felt their 
communities would have to wait for years to see service, Leland and the other 
representatives wondered whether the oft-ignored central city communities would 
likewise have to “wait 10 years before they see any benefit” from the system.86  
 The effect the opposition of such visible and vocal leaders of Houston’s African-
American and ethnic Mexican communities had on the electorate was unmistakable. In an 
article a few days after the announcement, the Houston Informer, one of the city’s largest 
African American newspapers, lauded the representatives for their courage in “acting on 
behalf of the people” they represented. The officials’ actions captured the ongoing 
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undercurrent of mistrust many African American and ethnic Mexican Houstonians felt 
toward city and state officials. Given the negative experiences these groups had with 
earlier infrastructure projects and long-running issues with the city’s police force, fears of 
lawful seizure of property and untrammeled political and police power seemed like 
substantial issues to many Houstonians of color.87 The final straw for both the legislators 
and their supporters, though, was the lack of “commitment to any plan whatsoever in 
structuring the system” after the abandonment of the Voorhees plan.88 The Authority’s 
inability to present a definite plan amplified feelings of mistrust, because voters wanted 
to see concrete details in order to guarantee that “transit lines will not be detrimental to 
minority neighborhoods.”89  
 HARTA board member Carole Pinkett recalled that the effort to convince African 
Americans to support the proposal suffered greatly because of the lack of a plan. In the 
public meetings she attended Pinkett witnessed countless Houstonians ask important 
questions about details which she and other board members could not address because of 
the move away from the Voorhees plan. Pinkett also believed that the HARTA board had 
failed to connect with the right power brokers among non-white Houstonians. The board 
made connections with traditional institutions and leaders, ignoring the obvious political 
need to recognize the emergence of new leaders like Leland and Thompson. Pinkett 
recalled that, while the board appealed to church leaders and some prominent black 
business leaders, these leaders no longer possessed the same level of power they did in 
the 1950s because the civil rights organizations they headed in that decade had declined 
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in importance by the 1970s. Without effective organizations to act as mouthpieces for 
their message, this group of leaders failed to convince other African Americans of the 
need to support HARTA.90 They also could not secure the backing of major black civil 
rights groups or labor groups, seeing both the NAACP and the AFL-CIO, which had 
many working-class white members along the ship channel, join the opposition. The 
leader of the city’s NAACP argued the city needed transit, but could not risk creating “a 
Frankenstein over which the people have no control.”91 The board faced similar problems 
with Houston’s ethnic Mexican residents. The Political Association of Spanish Speaking 
Organizations announced their opposition on October 1st. The organization highlighted 
their concern that the emissions tax would “impose a heavier tax burden on the elderly, 
those on fixed incomes and those on welfare,” as their primary reason for opposing the 
referendum.92  
The opposition of the five state representatives and the evaporation of support 
among Houston’s African American and ethnic Mexican populations, coupled with 
announcements of opposition from the remainder of the Harris County Commissioners 
and the Harris County Mayors and Councilmen’s Association, dissolved any semblance 
of political unity on the subject of HARTA within the HMA.93 In the summer of 1973, it 
appeared to the HARTA board and its supporters that they possessed a united political 
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front for their campaign; that they had the sort of wide-ranging support that guaranteed a 
victory. The disappearance of this support left only city officials, transit backers, and 
some state legislators standing to attempt a last ditch sell of the Authority and to hope for 
a sliver-thin victory. Board member Carole Pinkett believes that the miscalculation of 
political support and the inability to maintain backing from politicians during the 
campaign ultimately doomed the vote.94  
In the final days of the campaign, hoping to garner just enough support to 
succeed, HARTA backers released a final public relations push through the newspapers. 
The Houston Chronicle reminded readers that “it has taken us years to get into our 
present transportation mess—and it is a mess—and only by starting now can we extract 
ourselves without bogging down.” It warned that either “the Authority is approved 
Saturday or we will continue to stew for additional years in our traffic jams” and watch as 
“federal funds now offered pour out of our city.”95 The attempt to link the Authority to 
the wider acquisition of mobility, though, could not overcome the snowballing opposition 
and the concerns of HARTA’s critics. 
THE OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Well before officials tallied the final votes on the evening of October 6th, the 
results were clear—local voters rejected the HARTA referendum by a three-to-one 
margin. In the end, despite months of lead-up and constant media coverage, only sixteen 
percent of the registered voters in the proposed taxing district cast a ballot. In areas of 
substantial opposition, such as the southeastern suburbs of Pasadena, Deer Park, and 
South Houston, the margin of defeat was closer to four-to-one. The same ratio held in 
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predominantly African American and ethnic Mexican precincts as well. In total, 98,457 
people voted against the referendum and only 35,680 approved.96 
The post-mortem dissection of the vote’s failure began almost immediately. 
HARTA member Willoughby Williams placed most of the blame on working-class 
suburban opponents. Newspaper accounts also chalked the defeat up to the resistance by 
liberal and minority leaders like Leonel Castillo and the five state legislators.97 Other 
board members believed that they had not been given enough time to sell Houstonians on 
the concept.98 Thomas Tyson agreed with HARTA board members. Writing to inform 
Jerome Premo of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration about the results of the 
vote a few days after the defeat, Tyson said that the major flaw lay in giving the board 
only five weeks “to educate the public to the need of mass transit in the area and the 
associated need for the regional authority.” Tyson lamented the still stinging reality that 
“an uninformed or poorly informed public will generally vote down a tax increase.”99  
Reflecting on the vote, Carole Pinkett now believes that officials saw the HARTA 
attempt not as a realistic opportunity for transit, but rather as a test case for the concept of 
transit in the city. Pinkett believes that from early on, few higher-up officials actually 
thought the vote would pass on its first attempt and simply wanted to start the transit 
conversation.100 While the previous years of activity around transit in the city contradict 
Pinkett’s perspective, what is undeniable is that after the defeat transit proponents quickly 
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began using language that described the HARTA vote not as a failure but rather as a 
stepping-stone for later transit development. This rhetorical shift indicated that many 
proponents remained committed to bringing mass transit to the city.  
As proponents of HARTA began to spin the stepping-stone argument, they were 
joined in their calls for future consideration of mass transit by many of their recent 
opponents. Newspaper editorials insisted that “opponents and supporters must close 
rank…regroup and restart.”101 When HARTA board member Knox Askins reflected on 
the defeat he concluded that the chance to start a “good public debate and discussion” 
was the best thing to come out of the negative vote. Sam Bowman, another HARTA 
board member, asserted that “’there will eventually be a HARTA or the like…we should 
go back to the people with another referendum.’”102 Louie Welch, referring to Atlanta’s 
numerous unsuccessful referenda before the creation of that city’s transit authority, 
pointed out that “sometimes it takes two or three times to get” the Authority 
established.103 Even opponents of HARTA like County Judge Bill Elliot began to call for 
a new plan “acceptable to the people.”104 The call for a focus on future transit by both 
sides of the HARTA debate showed that Houstonians recognized that the city needed 
some sort of solution to its traffic and mobility problems. Moving forward from that 
common recognition, however, proved difficult for Houstonians, who could not agree on 
what form that solution should take or who should direct it.  
 Despite the seemingly widespread support for a “new plan” on the heels of the 
1973 vote, conflicts around the city’s politics of mobility did not become any easier to 
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resolve. The rejection of HARTA strengthened the city’s dependence on roadways as its 
primary provider of mobility and response to congestion. Further, the emergence of white 
working-class suburbanites, African Americans, and ethnic Mexicans into the 
contestation of the city’s politics of mobility meant that the desires of new constituencies 
had to be considered during ensuing debates about transportation.  
 With one transit plan rejected, Houstonians attempted to find another way 
forward. Newly elected Mayor Fred Hofheinz moved to buy the bus lines soon after his 
1974 inauguration, completing the purchase in April 1974 with funds from the federal 
government.105 After completing the step of buying the system, however, the city’s path 
forward turned bumpy. Without a tax-supported transit authority with which to manage 
the new transit asset, bus service continued to struggle. In addition, when state officials 
attempted to pass new enabling legislation for another try at creating local transit 
authorities, road advocates and lobbyists prevented the passage of new enabling 
legislation.  
In 1974, Texas revised most of its state constitution. During revision debates, 
mass transit funding and use of highway funds were once again discussed. Fred Hofheinz 
testified before the state legislature during the convention, arguing that while Houston’s 
freeways were essential to its early successful growth, the city had outgrown its 
“automobile-and-concrete transportation system” and required a way to convert a car city 
into a place with a “balanced transportation program…that is both viable and 
affordable.”106 This shift, Hofheinz acknowledged, would take money from both the state 
and the federal government. At this suggestion, as before, rural legislators and road 
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advocates attacked such plans, arguing that “the real motive behind the assault on the 
sacred highway trust fund [was] to get rural Texans to pick up the tab for big city mass 
transit systems.”107 In addition to rural Texans, suburban municipalities continued their 
resistance to Houston-centric transit plans. Houstonians and transit advocates attempted 
to alter the legislation in ways that opponents could accept, but ultimately enabling 
legislation would not be passed again until a 1978 special session.    
 Discussing the HARTA vote, a KXYZ radio editorial pointed out that never 
before had a measure with the backing of the “’Houston Establishment’”—people like 
“Mayor Welch and [prominent lawyer] Leon Jaworski,” and groups like the Houston 
Chamber of Commerce—been defeated, much less defeated three-to-one. Exploring the 
vote’s results in more detail, Houstonians noticed that while most middle-to-upper class 
whites supported the referendum, “Blacks, Mexican-Americans, lower-income whites, 
young people and many other groups” rejected it. Whereas earlier in Houston’s political 
history a supporting group could have successfully stifled turnout or simply expected low 
turnout, by 1973 “too many Blacks and Mexican-Americans vote to discount their 
importance.” While the editorial bemoaned the fact that this new political reality 
coalesced in the defeat of what in their eyes was a much-needed referendum and in other 
debates like the Harrisburg fight, it concluded that something positive came from the 
defeat. No longer would the establishment alone simply decide what was best for 
Houston and institute it through a nominal vote. Rather, after 1973, political aspirants 
would need to “go to the many groups who compose our population, involve them in the 
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planning process,” and in the case of a future transit network, “convince each [group] of 
the importance of mass transit, both to them and to the city.”108  
The fact that Fred Hofheinz stood before the state legislature during the 1974 
constitutional debates as mayor of Houston confirmed the emergence of Houston’s 
African American and ethnic Mexican citizens as important forces within local and state 
elections. The influence they demonstrated in the 1973 HARTA vote carried over into the 
1974 mayoral race, as Hofheinz, a young candidate from outside the city’s political order 
running against a handpicked successor to Louie Welch, garnered greater support and 
turnout in the black community than any other white candidate before him on his way to 
victory.109 The embrace of Hofheinz by these citizens demonstrated their political 
consistency and revealed the real rationale for their rejection of HARTA. African 
American and ethnic Mexicans voted against HARTA because they saw it as a top-down 
proposal, not because they disliked or did not desire transit. In 1974, they likewise 
backed Hofheinz because his campaign worked more than any before it to incorporate 
their concerns and leaders into its plans.   
The newly elected Mayor Hofheinz appointed both African American and ethnic 
Mexican Houstonians to prominent roles within the city government. He saw this 
moment as a “handing over the reins of power…the actual reins of power of government 
to very common people.” He recalled 1973 as the beginning of Houston’s urban 
coalition—made up of communities of color, liberals, and labor—and a move away from 
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the city’s old-boy, elite political system.110 Hofheinz’s integration of the city government 
signaled a larger outcome of the HARTA debate’s impact on the political balance of the 
HMA. The vote demonstrated to elected officials throughout the HMA that African 
American, ethnic Mexican, and working-class suburbanites were populations whose 
opinions on metropolitan issues could no longer be dismissed. While the coalition of 
voters that defeated HARTA only voted together on transportation issues once more, as 
Chapter Five will show, from 1973 onward the mobility demands of these groups 
increasingly came to fruition and as their new stake in Houston’s political system grew. 
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Building A Transit Constituency: 
The 1978 Creation of the Metropolitan Transit Authority 
In January 1976, just after taking the oath of office for the second time, Houston 
Mayor Fred Hofheinz reflected upon Houston’s place in the hierarchy of American cities. 
“America is moving away from the older, more established centers of industry,” 
Hofheinz intoned, shifting instead toward “the younger, newer cities; to the frontier; to 
the places where America’s dreams still can be a reality; to the South, the Southwest and 
to Houston.”1 The city’s growing stature, as well as its economic growth amid a national 
recession, gave Hofheinz reason to be optimistic about the future. Yet, for its many 
strengths, Hofheinz also knew that Houston faced a number of challenges. During his 
second term he, and citizens throughout the HMA, would contend with one such 
obstacle—the city’s essential, yet volatile growth. 
 Increases in Houston’s territorial size and population at once drove the HMA’s 
economy and caused its most pressing problems. The city’s at-capacity sewer system, its 
congested highways, and its poorly maintained infrastructure all exhibited strain from 
five decades of explosive development. Hofheinz asserted that despite the economic 
increases that accompanied it, untrammeled growth represented “the greatest hazard 
which lies ahead for Houston.” Without proper planning and “the expenditure of funds 
now to avoid problems then,” he warned, the city would crumple under the pressure of its 
own expansion.2 No issue better captures the double-edged nature of Houston’s growth 
than the HMA’s attempts to solve its transportation problems.  
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 The defeat of the Houston Area Rapid Transit Authority (HARTA) referendum in 
1973 forced the city to start from square one if it wanted to augment its jammed highway 
network with rapid transit. In its first years, the Hofheinz Administration focused on 
bringing attainable improvements to the bus system and easing road congestion. The city 
purchased the failing private bus company in early 1974 and created HouTran to run the 
system.3 Hofheinz also inaugurated the Office of Public Transportation in January 1975 
to plan and construct an effective system.4 Finally, city officials rehashed the idea of 
creating a self-supporting public transit agency to be called the Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (METRO). The push to create the Authority culminated in another referendum 
in August 1978.5 Determined not to repeat the mistakes that led to HARTA’s defeat five 
years earlier, city and METRO officials carried out a carefully planned campaign aimed 
at gaining HMA-wide approval. 
 The 1978 proposal evolved from lessons learned from the HARTA failure and 
from the ongoing fight around the Harrisburg Freeway. As Chapters Three and Four 
demonstrated, the growing political power of the city’s African American, ethnic 
Mexican, and suburban white working-class populations meant that ignoring these 
constituencies would make passing any HMA-wide initiative difficult. In fact, after the 
HARTA vote, the political power of these groups only increased as black, ethnic 
Mexican, and white migrants came to the city in hopes of capitalizing on its economic 
strength during the national recession.6 
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 The population growth of African Americans and ethnic Mexicans between 1970 
and 1980 propelled Houston toward majority-minority status. In 1970, 316,551 African 
Americans resided within the city of Houston and represented 25.7 percent of the total 
population. Houstonians of Mexican origin accounted for 150,000, or 12 percent of the 
total. By 1980, the population of black Houstonians jumped to 436,392 and made the 
group 27 percent of the city’s total. The number of Houstonians of Mexican origin grew 
to 281,331 meaning this group represented 18 percent of the city’s total. By 1978, the 
groups represented approximately 45 percent of the city’s electorate, giving them 
significant influence over the approval or rejection of METRO.7  
 The population of white suburbanites in Harris County and its four neighboring 
counties—Galveston, Montgomery, Fort Bend, and Brazoria—also grew rapidly between 
1970 and 1980. In total, 912,624 people moved into these five counties during the 
decade, and, of those, 695,879 or 76 percent, were white. Nearly two-thirds of the 
newcomers settled within Harris County, but outside of Houston. Another quarter moved 
to the four surrounding counties. The remainder, just over a tenth of the total, came to 
Houston. Black and ethnic Mexican populations also grew in non-Houston areas, 
increasing by about 120,000, with most settling in Harris County.8  
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 1989); Nestor Rodriguez, "Hispanic and Asian Immigration Waves in Houston," in Helen 
Rose Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz (eds.), Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and 
Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations (Walnut Creek, CA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 
7 City of Houston, Race/Ethnicity: 1980-2000, 
http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/Demographics/docs_pdfs/Cy/coh_race_ethn_1980-2010.pdf, last 
accessed January 28, 2014. Roberto Treviño Jr., Church in the Barrio: Mexican American Ethno-
Catholicism in Houston (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), Appendix A, 217. Social 
Explorer, Harris County Census Records, 1970 and 1980, www.socialexplorer.com, last accessed January 
28, 2014. U.S. Census Population of the Largest 100 Cities, 1980, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab21.txt, last accessed January 28, 
2014. 
8 Social Explorer, Harris, Brazoria, Montgomery, Fort Bend, and Galveston County Census Records, 1970 
and 1980, www.socialexplorer.com, last accessed January 28, 2014. U.S. Census Population of the Largest 
100 Cities, 1980, http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab21.txt, last accessed 
January 28, 2014. 
 
213
 Leaders of the METRO campaign confronted these new demographic realities by 
offering a plan that attempted to balance the conflicting views of mobility held by its 
diverse constituents.9 The interim board increased the number of public meetings in both 
communities of color and the suburbs. METRO promised all voters that any new system 
would bring service to their communities within a few years. To black and ethnic 
Mexican Houstonians the agency promised to use affirmative action in hiring. 
Recognizing that nearly every suburban adult drove a personal automobile and depended 
upon the city’s highways for their daily movements, METRO offered auto-oriented 
transit improvements like park-and-ride lots and contraflow lanes. They also argued that 
backing transit would lead to open roads for those who chose to remain in their cars. 
Finally, METRO altered the structure of the Authority to ensure that non-Houston 
municipalities would have more representation and created two citizen oversight boards 
to create accountability and provide a check to the Authority’s powers.  
 The passage of the METRO referendum on August 12, 1978, signaled the success 
of officials’ campaign strategy and marked the second time in five years that a majority 
of Houston’s African American and ethnic Mexican citizens joined a plurality of white 
suburbanites to shape a key moment in the city’s mobility development. The METRO 
coalition had one key change from HARTA. Unlike the earlier referendum, in the 1978 
vote wealthier white suburbanites replaced working-class whites as the allies of non-
white Houstonians. This switch occurred because Houston’s fast-growing northern and 
northwestern suburbs all hoped METRO would improve their mobility. On the other 
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hand, white working-class suburbanites maintained their disdain for new taxes and mass 
transit systems that could not guarantee service. Despite the change, the alignment of 
these blocs remained unique. Beyond these groups, METRO enjoyed the support of most 
white Houston voters. That city and suburban residents combined to support METRO 
differentiated Houston’s metropolitan politics from those of its national peers. At the 
same time that Houstonians brokered a metropolitan compromise, suburbanites in other 
American cities were engaged in full-blown tax revolts. Due partially to Houston’s 
expansive political reach and to the fact that neither city residents nor suburbanites 
possessed the power to dictate terms to the other, the HMA did not descend into this type 
of fragmentation. This metropolitan equilibrium did much to determine the course of the 
METRO debate.10 
If METRO’s approval captured a moment of metropolitan compromise, its 
implementation contained the roots of division. While officials intended for the 1978 plan 
to address the HMA’s transportation needs for the foreseeable future, suburb-heavy 
metropolitan growth upset the HMA’s political balance and complicated METRO’s 
attempts to spread resources evenly across the metro area. Nonetheless, the metropolitan 
approval of METRO can be viewed, like the HARTA vote before it, as another moment 
when non-elite and non-professional Houstonians asserted themselves into transportation 
decision-making. In 1973, citizens rejected yet another official-generated plan. In 1978, 
they approved one that they played a major role in crafting. The choices to create 
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METRO gave Houston its first public transit system and presented city officials with a 
new weapon in the fight to address the city’s mobility problems. 
TRANSIT FOR HOUSTON: PAVING THE WAY FOR METRO 
After the HARTA defeat and with the fight around the Harrisburg Freeway 
ongoing, Houstonians interested in having a conversation about transit attempted to bring 
as many perspectives to the table as possible. The Citizens’ Environmental Coalition 
hosted a forum in March 1974 with just such a reorientation in mind. The event, “’A 
Fresh Look’ at Mass Transit,” included actors from both sides of the HARTA debate. 
While participants did not reach any major accords, speakers did reflect upon the lessons 
of the HARTA debate. Acknowledging the influential role white suburbanites, African 
Americans, and ethnic Mexicans played in the final outcome of the vote was a common 
refrain at the forum. Speakers on both sides of the transit question tried to puzzle out the 
key to winning the support of these groups. City officials, for their part, used the forum to 
recalibrate their transit sales pitch for future attempts. Jerry King, executive secretary to 
Mayor Hofheinz, told listeners that the city learned a great deal from the HARTA 
outcome, especially from critiques about the proposal’s opaqueness and lack of details. 
King guaranteed that “any future authority will actively include and involve 
representatives from all political subdivisions” whose opinions “relative to mass transit 
are many and varied.”11 By acknowledging the diverse set of expectations that 
Houstonians brought to the politics of mobility and insisting that the city would not fail to 
account for this diversity in the future, King and the city began the work of building 
METRO’s constituency well in advance of the Authority’s birth.  
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If city officials projected confidence that careful work would lead to the eventual 
creation of a transit system, others at the forum expressed concern that HARTA’s defeat 
ensured greater delays in addressing the city’s transportation needs. Many worried that 
without the added capacity of a transit system, highway congestion would worsen, 
affecting the pace of economic growth. The national recession loomed over the local 
issues. Forum attendees were well aware that the economic slowdown limited the amount 
of funding federal and Texas lawmakers were willing to give for mass transit. While 
Houston’s booming oil sector kept the city’s economy humming, it felt the absence of 
state and federal aid for major projects. Coupled with HARTA’s defeat, many 
Houstonians worried that a lack of funds would mean that no major projects could be 
inaugurated. Because of these concerns, some suggested embracing limited, but 
immediate actions to alleviate traffic issues. Leonel Castillo, the city controller who 
opposed HARTA because of its size and what he saw as an unfair tax burden on the 
city’s poorest, called for a system oriented around helping Houstonians “get to and from 
work, play, church, school” with ease. Castillo believed a small-step approach could win 
approval because voters would pay for a system that proved it could “provide them with 
better and more efficient service.”12 
Searching for answers after the forum, the city embraced the approach promoted 
by leaders like Castillo. Its purchase of the private bus line in 1974 fit this mold, as did 
announcing plans for the building of a park-and-ride system on area highways. Even 
these immediate steps came with caveats. Many felt that ownership of the bus system 
would only increase the city’s debt burden. Officials, well aware of the massive financial 
commitment transit companies required, hinted that it would consider placing another 
referendum for the creation of a public transit authority before Houstonians in order to 
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find a funding stream for the buses.13 This idea remained just that, though, as worries 
about the political and economic costs of another failure led officials to build up to a 
second referendum over several years. Even without a plan in the wings, officials worked 
to finds answers to the sticking points of the HARTA debate. Addressing citizen concerns 
about the lack of public input that went into HARTA became a primary focus. Barry 
Goodman, the inaugural director of the Office of Public Transportation, explained the 
import of this task when he asserted that only by cultivating “public awareness and 
participation in the planning and development” of any proposed new system could 
officials guarantee its passage.14 
Houston’s slow approach to a second proposal drew the attention of national 
transit advocates who felt the time was ripe for American cities to implement mass 
transport systems. At a conference held in late 1976, Terrell Hill, an administrator for the 
Chicago Transit Authority, urged Houston and other cities still lacking a public transit 
agency to stop letting citizen referenda stand in their way and instead simply build the 
systems without voter approval. “Mass transit is accepted as a public service” and 
governments “continually take positives steps to make the quality of life better and 
nobody is asked to vote on them,” Hill argued.15 While Houston officials remained 
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committed to an eventual large-scale program, many, including former Mayor Louie 
Welch and Goodman, rejected Hill’s advice to act fast. They worried that memories of 
the divisive HARTA debate might sour Houstonians toward any rushed proposals. 
Instead, they stuck with their plan to pave the way for a future referendum by first 
implementing lower-cost, traffic-relieving measures. City officials hoped these 
improvements would serve to ease immobility and give Houstonians a reason to back an 
authority.  
In addition to taking several smaller actions, officials attempted to incorporate 
Houstonians into the transit planning process by soliciting feedback through participatory 
planning mechanisms. A series of surveys showed that citizens were cognizant of the 
pressure growth placed on the HMA’s mobility situation. A 1976 study conducted for the 
Office of Public Transportation found that nearly fifty percent of Houstonians listed 
transportation as a serious problem, ranking it behind only utility rates and crime as the 
city’s most pressing issues. The survey also showed that residents linked traffic directly 
to metropolitan growth. Despite making this link, most of the Houstonians surveyed felt 
that the growth should still be encouraged because its positives outweighed its associated 
complications. The survey also showed that residents knew of the city’s efforts to 
confront transportation problems. Nearly 84 percent of respondents could name an active 
Office of Public Transportation initiative such as CarShare or high occupancy vehicle 
projects.16 Officials took these responses as a sign that Houstonians were willing to 
support a system so long as it proved effective and could facilitate the city’s growth.  
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As officials laid the groundwork for a new system, they remained keenly aware 
that the HMA’s political balance required a diversely marketed plan. The 1976 survey 
attested to this fact, with its conclusions urging transit officials to recognize that different 
segments of the population possessed divergent expectations for transit and mobility. In 
order to create an effective coalition, officials intended to frame mass transit in ways that 
appealed to this variety of expectations. Attuned to the stance white suburbanites took in 
the HARTA debate, the survey concluded that the “affluent, ‘enlightened,’ suburban 
segments” of the city represented the Houstonians who were “most interested in the issue 
of transportation, and most critical of efforts to date.” Because officials understood this 
population to be more discerning and educated than working-class Houstonians, they 
argued that drawing support from this population would require an “ongoing outreach 
program…conveyed by means of a number of imaginative forums and techniques” that 
could convince suburbanites of the sagacity of transit. An entirely different approach 
needed to be taken to appeal to  “those at the lower socio-economic strata,” specifically 
those central city African American and ethnic Mexican citizens with lower incomes. 
These citizens, the survey claimed, would respond best to plans with “near-term service 
improvements, new buses and routes and other innovations expanding current public 
transit service” in their parts of the city. Promises of general congestion relief would 
entice upper and middle-class city residents of all races to support the system.17   
 To get citizens and their disparate visions for the city’s mobility systems onto the 
same page with city officials, the city of Houston created the Transportation Advisory 
Group. This organ allowed citizens interested in shaping the city’s transportation 
priorities to engage directly with the city. An Office of Public Transportation-produced 
newsletter, “TransPlan,” published in both English and Spanish, documented the group’s 
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actions between April 1977 and mid-1979. The newsletter’s earliest issue made calls for 
participation from suburban and city residents alike and backed a system that addressed 
the needs of the entire HMA. The group acknowledged that many suburban Houstonians 
relied almost exclusively on cars for transportation, so they planned for a transit system 
that could draw drivers off the road and onto buses. At the same time, they argued that 
any new system needed to account for those without vehicles by making sure bus routes 
served the areas of the city where this population lived, mainly the lower-income East 
End and central city wards.18  
Prominent African Americans and ethnic Mexicans expressed support for 
participation mechanisms like the Transportation Advocacy Group. They urged voters 
from their communities to embrace these systems and, in the process, built upon the 
coalition the two groups created when they expressed shared concerns about HARTA. 
Dr. Gurney Pearsall, an African American, lauded the Transportation Advocacy Group 
and other feedback measures as tools that allowed black and ethnic Mexican residents of 
Houston to help “shape the future transportation plan so that our specific concerns will be 
addressed.” Robert Rodrigues, an ethnic Mexican businessman, agreed with Pearsall and 
urged all Houstonians to see the transit discussion as a “time for each community to 
identify and vocalize its needs” for the new transportation system.19 By legitimizing its 
public participation mechanisms, leaders from these two important political 
constituencies contributed to the growing momentum for a new plan. Answering the calls 
of community leaders and corroborating the conclusions of earlier citizen opinion 
surveys, dozens of citizens came to Transportation Advocacy Group meetings. These 
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Houstonians brought with them their personal knowledge of the city’s transportation 
situation and a plethora of ideas about how to improve it.20 
METRO AND THE 1978 PLAN 
By the summer of 1977, the Office of Public Transportation and the city bus 
service, HouTran, had successfully implemented a number of transit improvements 
ranging from Park-and-Ride lots to contraflow lanes. Director Barry Goodman and other 
officials from the office believed these new assets proved to area residents that the city 
was serious about, and capable of building, an effective transportation system.21 Using its 
growing services as justification, the Office of Public Transportation pushed the city of 
Houston to pursue the creation of a public transit authority. In August 1977, Mayor 
Hofheinz acted on the suggestion, announcing his intention to form an interim board that 
could campaign for passage of a countywide referendum and create an authority with 
taxing powers.22 By October 1977, the proposed authority had a name: the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority of Houston and Harris County or METRO. Between METRO’s 
formation and the release of its official plan in July 1978, citizens and officials worked 
together to form a proposal that would draw support from throughout the HMA.  
 During the earliest discussions of METRO, officials made it clear that they 
intended to include as much public input as possible in order to avoid the 
misunderstandings that derailed HARTA. In September 1977, Mayor Hofheinz called a 
public hearing to consider the first steps of creating a transportation authority. As he 
opened the meeting, Hofheinz told listeners that the Authority needed to “be of benefit to 
persons and property situated within” its boundaries and had to serve the “public interest” 
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above those of any single group.23 As the previous surveys indicated they would, 
Houstonians applauded Hofheinz’s action. The hearing brought a wide sample of citizens 
together and collected an almost unanimous show of support for a general transit system. 
A few nagging questions did emerge at this meeting, revolving mostly around the 
Authority’s potential boundaries and the position of suburban communities within the 
agency as compared to Houston. Most speakers at the hearing, including the mayor, 
attempted to gloss over these issues by insisting that in its final form METRO would 
cater to the entire HMA. Other officials echoed Hofheinz and downplayed potential 
geographic divisions. Warren Henry of the Houston Chamber of Commerce argued that 
success for transit would be ensured by a “system that is deserving of the support of the 
voices of this region.” Henry lauded the broad-based efforts at citizen participation 
already put in as “democracy in action.”24 Beyond indicating that Houstonians recognized 
the merits of a metropolitan transportation system, calls for a HMA-wide system 
acknowledged the city-suburb balance in metropolitan politics since the HARTA vote. 
 Buoyed by the initial positive reception, the Office of Public Transportation and 
city moved forward by authorizing the formation of an interim METRO board on 
October 5, 1977.25 METRO’s enabling legislation gave the mayor of Houston the power 
to select five of the seven interim board members with the Harris County 
Commissioner’s Court selecting the sixth for the unincorporated parts of Harris County, 
and the mayors of all non-Houston cities within Harris County selecting the seventh. 
Hofheinz made his selections with an eye toward building a coalition of support. He 
named leaders who could speak to “the black community, the Mexican-Americans, the 
urbanites, the suburbanites—all of Houston.” Clearly, Hofheinz planned to use members 
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of the board to convince voters of every class and race to support the Authority. He 
appointed Albert Hopkins Sr., an African American pharmacy owner, and Frumencio 
Reyes, an ethnic Mexican lawyer and civic leader, to lead the push among the cities two 
largest minorities. Because he possessed a confrontational political history, Reyes could 
not be confirmed by the City Council so Hofheinz chose Ninfa Laurenzo, an ethnic 
Mexican restaurateur and one of the highest profile ethnic Mexican women in the city, to 
take his place.26 Hofheinz’ appointed three white men with his remaining selections. E.L. 
Oakes, a labor leader, would work with Houston’s labor organizations and blue-collar 
workers in suburbs such as Pasadena. Howard Horne, a businessman and Houston 
Chamber of Commerce member, would chair the board. And John Butler Jr., another 
Houston-area business leader, would serve as well. The outlying cities and county court 
would add two more white men to the board—George DeMontrond, a north Houston car 
dealer and businessman; and William Black, the former mayor of suburban Deer Park.27 
The Chamber of Commerce also acted as a mouthpiece for the Authority. The 
Chamber urged Houstonians to recognize that congestion and immobility were crippling 
problems, not simply inconveniences. The group highlighted what it saw as the 
democratic and transparent nature of the board itself. It also noted key differences 
between METRO and HARTA, such as the built-in checks on the board’s authority and 
pre-determined dissolution dates if a referendum failed. Further, the Chamber reiterated 
that the METRO plan intended to bring a metropolitan solution to transportation 
problems. “Houston is a region, not just the nation’s fifth most populous city…We are a 
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community of communities,” and the extent to which residents embraced METRO’s plan 
“will be a measure of their foresight.”28 
 Transportation Advocacy Group meetings continued throughout this process and 
the input solicited through the gatherings helped establish the parameters of the METRO 
proposal. Transportation Advocacy Group members insisted that easily implemented 
improvements remain the focus of the agency. Still wary of the risks attached to a 
massive public works project such as rail, the group urged incremental improvements that 
could ease congestion at low cost.29 The sheer dimension of Houston’s mobility problems 
represented the biggest obstacle facing citizens and officials as they attempted to hash out 
plans for the proposed system. Despite agreement that numerous low-cost improvements 
could be made on area highways, “the best first step [was] not so easily identifiable.” For 
each sector of the city a number of project options existed. Should the first changes occur 
on Interstate 45? Or on Highway 290? Should new highways be built or the old ones 
improved?30 Such questions captured the difficulty of resolving even generally agreed 
upon aspects of the METRO plan. Deeper divisions that revolved around how to pay for 
the system or about who would benefit from improvements sparked even greater debate.  
 With rough sketches of a new proposal in place, the superstructure of the 
Authority began to take shape. It quickly became obvious that only a dedicated tax could 
support such a massive entity. Hoping to disassociate the METRO proposal from the 
disastrous emissions tax plan of the HARTA vote, officials embraced a sales tax plan. 
Some critics, though, including incoming mayor Jim McConn, advocated an altered form 
of emissions tax because of its less regressive nature and its focus on the users of the 
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roads.31 A secondary discussion emerged around how to deal with the existing HouTran 
bus system and equipment. Some thought it best for METRO to take over the old system, 
while others advocated starting from scratch.32 These debates—about what the mode and 
focus of early improvement efforts would be, how to pay for them, who could access it, 
and what would happen to the city’s existing transit system—shaped the plan released by 
the METRO board in July 1978. It advanced a three-stage, 20-year, $3.1 billion regional 
transit program that would serve the entire HMA.33 Continuing to promote the broad and 
inclusive approach taken during the crafting of the proposal, the cover of the plan 
trumpeted the fact that “the METRO board listened to planners, engineers, other transit 
professionals…and to thousands of Harris County residents,” as they outlined the 
program.34 The same day that they released the plan, officials set a public referendum for 
August 12, 1978.35  
METRO officials framed the authority as Houston’s only hope in dealing with the 
dual challenges of growth and increasing immobility. Echoing Mayor Hofheinz’s earlier 
focus on the perils of rampant expansion, the introduction to the plan concluded that 
while “regional growth patterns have already been influenced by one of the nation’s most 
outstanding transportation systems: the extensive freeway network,” the city’s ability to 
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expand capacity was limited.36 Many feared that any increases in congestion would cause 
a slowdown in economic growth, an outcome every Houstonian wanted to avoid at a time 
when the city was a rare bright spot at a moment of national recession. The proposal 
offered an independent, metropolitan-wide agency to take on the mounting problems of 
transportation and keep the city moving. Only the creation of such a “regional transit 
system will…meet the challenge of maintaining mobility while accommodating 
growth.”37  
 The interim board also trumpeted the efforts they went to during the formative 
stages of the plan to encourage public participation. Wanting to avoid the stigma of 
unchecked authority that negatively affected HARTA, METRO promoted the fact that it 
had held thirty official community meetings where more than 2,000 residents expressed 
their thoughts. More than simply acknowledging that these citizen voices had been heard, 
though, the METRO plan brought them to the fore. The 1978 proposal included a number 
of citizen recommendations drawn from the Transportation Advocacy Group meetings. 
By folding citizen thoughts into its founding document, the interim board showed that 
they were taking Houstonians views of mobility seriously, not simply collecting and 
ignoring citizens suggestions.38 In addition, the plan called for the creation of a group 
called the Citizen Advisory Board, which would hold monthly meetings with the 
METRO board and advise them about user concerns.39 
 The plan consisted of three stages that reflected the mix of realism, hope, and 
caution that planners and the METRO board brought to the process. The first stage 
promised a continuation of the improvements that the city started to implement in 
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previous years. Among these were expanded and timely bus service, more crosstown 
routes, improved bus maintenance facilities, expanded park-and-rides, and the instituting 
of carpooling, carsharing, and vanpooling systems. The second stage aimed to ease 
general congestion through a series of infrastructural improvements and more advanced 
traffic management practices. This revolved mainly around the construction of high 
occupancy vehicle (two or more passengers) and contraflow lanes on area highways, but 
also covered improving traffic light systems on main arterials and making grade 
separation improvements at some of the city’s most congested intersections. Finally, the 
third stage in the proposed plan, which was the most ambitious and the most long-term, 
called for construction of dedicated, separated transitways on most major highways. 
According to the plan these routes would begin as dedicated busways, before 
transitioning to rail or other larger capacity transit systems when ridership merited such a 
shift.40  
 METRO officials’ attempts to cater to the HMA’s various political constituencies 
clearly shaped the final proposal. The slow, cautious approach of the first two stages 
reflected official fears that too ambitious of a plan might result in a rejection by voters. 
The plan offered something for both city and suburban voters. The bus system and grade 
separation improvements aimed to satisfy the demands of intra-city transit users—mostly 
lower-income African Americans and ethnic Mexicans who did not own cars, but, 
increasingly, a population that included a number of white-collar Houstonians who 
commuted by bus from wealthier, predominantly white suburbs to the north and 
northwest of the city. The high occupancy vehicle lanes, park-and-rides, and contraflow 
lanes appealed to commuters. White working-class suburbanites applauded METRO’s 
lackluster discussion of non-road mass transit because most maintained their dislike of 
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this option. The participation and feedback channels put in place by the Transportation 
Advocacy Group and those proposed by the Citizen Advisory Board also demonstrated 
the agency’s commitment to avoid characterizations of METRO as an unresponsive, 
untouchable bureaucracy. Finally, in an attempt to assuage suspicions that Houston 
would dominate the Authority, METRO officials made it clear that the system would 
serve the entire HMA. 
“NO TRANSPORTATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION”: BUILDING A CONSTITUENCY41 
In the summer of 1978 with the plan circulating, the interim METRO board and 
its supporters shifted their attention to garnering support for the Authority. As the details 
of the plan made clear, white-collar commuters from throughout the HMA, African 
Americans, and ethnic Mexicans were the primary focuses of this drive. The METRO 
board approached each group with a different set of selling points. When speaking with 
African Americans and ethnic Mexicans, the board linked the METRO program with job 
creation, political access, and improved mobility in the city’s core. When talking with 
white-collar car commuters both inside and outside the city limits, the board highlighted 
the economic promise the initiative brought to the whole region and focused on the 
mobility improvements it planned for drivers.  
Unlike the HARTA campaign, where mostly white city officials and prominent 
transit proponents tried to secure the backing of community leaders from the African 
American and ethnic Mexican communities, during the METRO push the board tasked 
members Ninfa Laurenzo and Albert Hopkins Sr. with winning over the two important 
constituencies. Laurenzo and Hopkins did more than discuss the plan with the leaders 
from the two groups. They engaged with the public through the Transportation Advocacy 
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Group meetings and held public information sessions throughout the city. Laurenzo also 
adroitly secured the backing of prominent minority-owned media outlets and employed 
the pages of El Sol, an ethnic Mexican newspaper based in the Second Ward, to tout the 
merits and need for METRO to the newspaper’s readers.42  
To woo suburbanites, the board pushed the fact that the more incorporated cities 
that voted for METRO, the greater their representation would be on the inaugural board. 
With allies in several of the enclave cities—communities such as Bellaire that were 
completely surrounded by Houston—and suburban board members stumping for the 
program throughout Harris County, the board believed they had a good chance to 
convince suburban voters to support METRO.  
The referendum election pushed transit officials to engage with Houstonians over 
transportation and to project their own ideas about the politics of mobility. This time, 
though, officials would aim to reconstruct the fragile alliance that derailed HARTA in 
1973 and put it to use in their favor. During the campaign the board experienced great 
success among the city’s minority populations, but continued to flounder in attempts to 
gather broad suburban support. Whether they could strike and maintain a balance 
between large slices of the two coveted constituencies, while still holding on to 
supporters in the city, would prove to be the difference between a second straight defeat 
for transit and a resounding, metropolitan victory. 
Despite going to great lengths to avoid many of the criticisms Houstonians 
leveled at the HARTA plan, METRO still faced significant opposition. The Authority’s 
proposed powers of eminent domain and taxation, its service area projections, and its 
structure proved particularly problematic. Even before the release of the full METRO 
proposal, some suburban mayors resurrected the rhetoric of the HARTA debate and 
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began throwing barbs in the direction of the Authority. Mayor John Harrison, of suburban 
Pasadena, rehashed a refrain commonly heard during the 1973 campaign when he 
insisted that “what’s good for Houston is not necessarily good for the suburban cities.” 
To Harrison, any tax dollars his community put into the METRO coffers would benefit 
Houston and not Pasadena, reason enough for his city to reject a the Authority.43 Harrison 
was not alone in his skepticism toward the METRO plan.  
The Tax Research Association of Houston and Harris County also criticized the 
plan with arguments that echoed those against HARTA and some that applied directly to 
the new proposal. It attacked the eminent domain powers the Authority would be vested 
with, calling them unnecessarily expansive.44 Additionally, the group argued that 
Houstonians would not abandon their cars to use a transit system, making it unlikely that 
ridership would be high enough to merit creation. These realities, the association 
contended, made any attempt to build a system a wasteful sink for public money. The 
association also repackaged Mayor Harrison’s Houston-centric criticism, broadening it as 
an attack of the entire notion of a metropolitan government. “District government is a bad 
system…inconsistent with the representative system” that would install appointed 
bureaucrats “beyond the reach of the voters” and be “unresponsive to the public.” 
Suburban leaders and interest groups throughout America employed a similar line of 
argument during the 1970s while trying to avoid forms of government that tied them to 
central cities through taxation or metropolitan authorities.45   
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Unlike the HARTA debate, however, some suburban leaders backed the METRO 
plan. Interim METRO board member and mayor of Deer Park, Bill Black, worked hard 
for the plan in Houston’s suburbs. Likewise, Katy Mayor Dan Cox jumped to the 
METRO side of the debate and argued that suburban cities needed to do all they could to 
support the economic viability of Houston because the health of the city was attached to  
the health of the suburbs.46 In addition to the backing of leaders like Cox and Black, the 
proposed Authority had the strong endorsement of leaders from enclave cities such as 
Bellaire and West University Place. These non-Houston supporters gave METRO 
officials hope that the initiative would succeed. Officials particularly coveted enclave 
support, knowing that passage of the referendum within these communities would 
demonstrate that, at least in Houston, a mandate for improved transportation existed.  
The involvement of prominent ethnic Mexican leaders like Dr. Héctor García, 
president of the statewide Political Association of Spanish-Speaking Organizations and 
founder of the American G.I. Forum, and Houston state representative Ben Reyes showed 
that ethnic Mexican Houstonians throughout the HMA viewed the METRO debate as an 
opportunity to improve the quality of life for Houstonians of Mexican origin. As they had 
during the HARTA debate, at the outset of the METRO discussion many ethnic Mexicans 
doubted that a transit plan would benefit them either in terms of service provision or 
employment. Only after METRO official met with leaders like García and Reyes and 
assured them that planned improvements and expanded transit routes would be geared 
toward all Houstonians and that jobs and construction contracts would come to ethnic 
Mexicans did these leaders give the plan their endorsement.47  
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African American leaders like U.S. Congresswoman Barbara Jordan and state 
representative Mickey Leland also elicited promises of minority hiring and service to 
predominantly black neighborhoods prior to expressing their support. Jordan urged voters 
to “help initiate a new era by voting for the transit plan,” and touted the access the system 
could provide to jobs throughout the HMA. Leland critiqued the Authority’s proposed 
sales tax, which he correctly labeled as regressive, but also admitted that access to transit 
was so important to his constituents that it was time “to bite the bullet” and accept the 
tax.48 These officials broadcast their support by lending their images to METRO 
advertisement run in black newspapers.49 (Figure 5.1) Other ads featured a diverse 
collection of Houstonians expressing their appreciation of the pre-METRO system 
improvements such as more comfortable seats and fewer delays. Such ads implied that 
these changes would continue under METRO.50 The Authority’s openness to citizen 
feedback and the support of key elected officials pushed hesitant voters and groups to 
endorse the plan. Despite lingering concerns, after African American politicians 
announced their support, a number of black religious groups did as well. 
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Figure 5.1: METRO Advertisement  
This advertisement, run in the Houston Informer two days before the METRO vote, trumpeted the 
endorsement of local black politicians Anthony Hall, Senfronia Thompson, Mickey Leland, and Andrew 
Jefferson. Houston Informer, August 5, 1978, HMRC. 
While the Black Organization for Leadership Development and the Houston Pastors and 
Ministers Fellowship remained wary that an unelected board could easily rescind earlier 
promises, they also recognized that “40,000 black folks are dependent daily on transit” 
for reaching places of employment, school, and recreation and felt that the METRO plan 
at least offered these Houstonians improved service.51  
In addition to running advertisements for the approval of METRO, African 
American newspapers ran several editorials asking readers to support the referendum. A 
Houston Forward Times article published prior to the referendum announced the 
                                                




newspaper’s endorsement of METRO. The newspaper appreciated the fact that “the 
METRO plan places immediate and heavy emphasis on expanding and improving the 
present bus service,” and intended to direct this improvement toward “the inner-city.” 
Further, the editors of the Forward Times told Houston’s African American population to 
“take a special interest in the August 12 election” because “we will be voting for an issue 
that will affect out way of life—our very survival—for years to come.”52  
METRO’s willingness to meet ethnic Mexican and African American community 
groups on their turf during the campaign and their inclusion of citizen feedback into the 
plan itself helped secure support. The level of citizen input into the METRO plan 
dwarfed that solicited during the campaign to create HARTA. Citizens were cognizant 
that the Authority was listening to their concerns. In one El Sol article explaining the 
terms of the debate, the author lauded METRO for interviewing a “large number of 
residents…about the direction of this new project” and questioning them about what 
improvements they hoped to see in the new plan.53 
The interim Authority convinced citizens of the sincerity of these outreach efforts 
by putting citizen suggestions into action. Just two months before the vote, the Office of 
Transportation’s Barry Goodman stood in east Houston to announce the inauguration of 
minibus service to the East End and Third Ward, two predominantly minority 
communities. Discussing the new routes, Goodman acknowledged that citizen 
participation had influenced his office and METRO’s plans. “Both of these [minibus] 
services are aimed at meeting a distinct need that has been a called to our attention by 
residents” of the two communities.54 By implementing programs in direct response to the 
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demands of citizens, transit officials demonstrated their commitment to improving 
mobility throughout the city.  
Ethnic Mexican Houstonians celebrated the political empowerment they felt 
during the METRO debate. El Sol editorials and articles noted that the debate expanded 
the role ethnic Mexicans played in city politics. In article after article published in the 
weeks prior to the referendum, the newspaper marked each new endorsement from a 
community organization as an indication of the population’s growing political power. 
The paper framed the active support of ethnic Mexican groups from across the political 
spectrum as a significant statement of unity in the community. When the Political 
Association of Spanish-Speaking Organizations endorsed the plan, El Sol asserted that 
their move represented “the frosting on the cake of the growing political awareness and 
clout” of Houston’s ethnic Mexican population.55 When the Mexican Chamber of 
Commerce, a Houston-based organization of ethnic Mexican businessmen, expressed 
support after a meeting with Laurenzo, the newspaper claimed that it demonstrated the 
“power of the large Hispanic community of Houston.”56 
In a piece written in support of METRO two days before the referendum, Ninfa 
Laurenzo both connected the system to the broader political power of the city’s ethnic 
Mexicans and noted the improvements it would bring to the daily lives of citizens. 
Reflecting back on the planning and community input processes, Laurenzo asserted that 
the METRO board “has addressed itself to what the community wants and, more 
importantly, what the community needs.” This engagement with the community’s 
mobility expectations, she argued, was a result of citizen protests against being “excluded 
from the planning stage and the subsequent development steps of programs that affect us 
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the most.” Laurenzo lauded the ethnic Mexican community for acting as one interest 
group and displaying “a critical and progressive level of social and political maturity.” 
She asked, that as voters, they not let those gains disappear. She encouraged readers to go 
to the polls on August 12 to “speak out as a community and demonstrate our concerns 
and our responsibility” by voting for the creation of METRO.57  
A cartoon published in El Sol the same day as Laurenzo’s editorial reinforced 
many of her points. The comic, drawn by Alfonzo Vazquez, juxtaposed two ethnic 
Mexican men. The first, intended to represent either a working-class ethnic Mexican or a 
recent Mexican immigrant, was clearly the butt of the joke. He wore a t-shirt that 
proclaimed “I do not vote” in Spanish, rode a stressed-out donkey, and suggested to his 
“compadre” that his burro, not the bus he was about to board, was the answer to his, and 
Houston’s, transportation problem. The second man, dressed in a suit, looked back at the 
man in exasperation, clearly disregarded his advice, and boarded the bus, which was 
plastered with pro-METRO campaign materials. The cartoon was loaded with meanings. 
First, it critiqued ethnic Mexicans who did not support METRO as backward and 
comically, if not dangerously, anti-modern. Such people, the comic suggested, damaged 
the reputation of all of Houston’s ethnic Mexicans with their boorish behavior. Not only 
was the man a buffoon for riding a donkey, but he proclaimed that he would not vote, an 
even more damning fact for readers of El Sol who so celebrated their access to the 
franchise and their growing influence over city politics. With this line of commentary, the 
comic echoed Laurenzo’s call for voter turnout and reconfirmed the importance of the 
ethnic Mexican electorate. Second, the cartoon hinted at the economic benefits the 
creation of METRO could provide. “Your jobs depend on transportation,” a poster on the 
front of the bus proclaimed. The statement could be read as a reference to the 
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maintenance, driver, and administrative jobs that were promised to ethnic Mexicans 
during the METRO campaign or as a reminder of the fact that many ethnic Mexicans 
were literally dependent on transit to reach their workplaces throughout the HMA. Either 
way the message was clear—vote for METRO or risk hurting the members of the ethnic 
Mexican community who would have found, or kept, employment because of METRO. 
Finally, the donkey, and the suggestion that a four-legged ride might be an easier way to 
navigate the city’s gridlocked traffic, was a reminder of the growing immobility facing 
the HMA.58  (Figure 5.2) 
As the day of the election drew near, El Sol continued its full-court press on 
readers by running one final endorsement—its own. Echoing Laurenzo, the paper laid out 
the importance of the debate to both the HMA and to the standing of minority voters 
within it. Declaring that most suburbanites perceived of transit as a service for “the black, 
the Mexican-American and the poor white communities within the inner city,” the paper 
explained that combining the votes of city residents were key to the Authority’s creation. 
                                                




Figure 5.2: El Sol METRO Cartoon  
This cartoon ran the day before the METRO referendum and suggested to Houston’s ethnic Mexicans that 
in order to be forward thinking they needed to support the Authority. El Sol, August 10, 1978, HMRC, 3. 
While this perspective generalized the opinions of white suburbanites and dismissed the 
support some municipalities and many individuals expressed for METRO, it also echoed 
the arguments forwarded by some critics who worried the Authority would not serve 
them. By pointing out the need to counterbalance these voters, the newspaper hoped to 
spur turnout beyond white Houstonians. The editorial further asserted that an alliance 
between blacks, ethnic Mexicans, and working-class whites within the city could create a 
formidable political bloc that city officials would have to take seriously, but pointed out 
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that such a group would have to display that power via the METRO vote. The newspaper 
noted that voters from these groups “pulling together can determine the outcome of the 
election or any election in Harris County and most certainly in Houston.” Just as 
Laurenzo had in her editorial, El Sol urged voters to support the referendum as a way to 
improve regional mobility and to consolidate minority political power.59 Such 
suggestions of interracial coalition building took the loose voting alliance of the HARTA 
vote further and sought to formalize connections. While it became increasingly obvious 
by the end of the METRO debate that working-class suburban whites would not be 
joining Houston’s black and ethnic Mexican populations in a political alliance, working-
class and middle-class whites within Houston did act on these calls, as Chapter Six will 
explore in more detail. 
Suburbanites and central city African American and ethnic Mexican voters were 
not the only groups wooed by METRO officials, of course. Two other key constituencies 
cultivated by the board and generally supportive of the transit plan were a majority of 
white residents from Houston and residents of the HMA who, for quite some time, had 
advocated for mass transit. White Houstonians, of course, did not possess the same ideas 
about transit, but having faced nearly two decades of slowly worsening traffic on city 
highways, a larger majority agreed that the Authority might offer some form of relief. 
Since both groups at least tacitly backed the METRO plan from the beginning, neither 
received as much attention as suburbanites or African American and ethnic Mexican 
communities. Yet the pitch the board directed toward these groups, and, more 
significantly, the campaigning carried out by the pro-transit Houstonians separate from 
that of the board, illustrates key strategies in the push to convince all Houstonians that the 
referendum needed to pass.  
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In discussions with white voters in the city, METRO supporters recycled many of 
the same rationales offered to suburban whites. The roads would be less congested; the 
HMA’s economy would grow; Houston would secure its position as a world-class city. 
METRO proponents warned that Houston, “the nation’s fastest growing metropolitan 
area,” was “starting to choke on its own success” and argued that only a mass transit 
system could adequately address the problem.60 These arguments resonated with 
Houstonians long invested in improving the city. The METRO board recognized that 
while this group was not the most likely to use a public transit system, they would 
embrace the peripheral benefits it could bring them, and most essentially, be the ones 
who would vote. Hoping to ensure that this demographic would come to polling places 
on the 12th, and echoing the warnings El Sol and the Forward Times offered, a Chamber 
of Commerce newsletter cautioned white residents that “the real danger to this 
worthwhile proposal does not seem to be voter opposition so much as voter apathy.”61 
Disappointed by the HARTA defeat and the subsequent delay it caused, transit 
backers, a loose collection of white environmentalists from groups like the Citizens’ 
Environmental Coalition, political and social organizations like the League of Women 
Voters, and Houstonians concerned about the development problems facing the city, 
worked diligently to promote the new plan, often rebroadcasting and building upon the 
arguments forwarded by the METRO board. Forming an action group called Citizens for 
Better Transit, these Houstonians focused a great deal of their attention on the 
metropolitan nature of transportation decisions and on the environmental benefits of mass 
transit. Echoing earlier official statements and speaking directly to suburban neighbors, 
Citizens for Better Transit argued that “transit problems and needs do not stop at City 
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Lines. The future of every community, every neighborhood in Harris County is at stake. 
The day we no longer can get around is the day we cease to grow, to prosper.” The group 
countered suburban criticisms of onerous taxation by asserting that sharing the tax burden 
would lighten the hit to any one group or municipality: “we share the burden; we share 
the benefits.”62 
Joining with national campaigns that aimed to address issues of air pollution by 
cutting back on automobile use or supporting the implementation of stricter pollution 
controls on vehicles such as catalytic converters, Citizens for Better Transit offered the 
most comprehensive environmental rationale for implementing the transit plan. Moving 
beyond figures of traffic levels and the number of new cars added, the group noted that 
the real toll of congestion was taken on the city’s air quality. The 120,450 additional cars 
that came to Houston’s streets each year certainly caused congestion, but more ominously 
and invisibly, they added 30,623 tons of pollutants to the air. According to the 
Environmental Protection Agency, this pollution cost the city $25 million a year in 
“damage to our health, crops, material and property values.” Greater reliance on 
automobiles also meant more use of fossil fuels. Having just emerged from the crippling 
oil crisis, many Americans remained wary of the fragile existence fostered by 
dependence on oil. Citizens for Better Transit estimated that METRO’s plan would save 
energy resources, lower air pollution, and save Houstonians money.63 To them, this made 
the right choice obvious. 
In the final weeks before the vote, the board and supporters attempted to address 
the remaining questions about METRO. Responding to those worried about the 
appointed, rather than elected, nature of the board, officials responded that a non-elected 
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board removed politics from “decisions such as where to put a bus shelter, how close a 
bus route should come to any particular person’s house, whether to put an overpass over 
this railroad crossing.” Such decisions, the city claimed, “should be determined 
objectively…with a businesslike eye on results, not votes.” Responding to the backseat 
planners, those with plans of their own, officials gently chided: “each of us goes 
somewhere in Harris County each day. Each of us is a transit expert. Each of us know 
some improvement that needs to be made…but remember: a lot of people put this plan 
together.”64 The message from the interim board and city officials was clear: the plan is 
solid, the plan is vetted, and you should support it. In its final editorial before the vote, 
the Houston Post echoed the thoughts of city officials. It told readers the referendum 
would provide an answer to whether residents wanted to bring “Mass or Mess?” to the 
city. There were a number of factors to consider, the paper admitted, but, in the end, there 
was “only one practical, sensible, forward-looking choice. We must vote for mass 
transit.”65  
The METRO board worked for months to build support for their plan. They 
elicited citizen feedback, developed arguments aimed at particular groups, and added 
protections and guarantees to the plan to appease the voters they most coveted. This 
strategy demonstrated the changing political landscape of the city and the attention 
officials paid to those shifts. Learning from HARTA’s defeat and the outcomes of the 
Harrisburg Freeway fight, officials knew they could not afford to ignore minority voters. 
Likewise, to entice suburban voters, they framed the program as one for the entire 
metropolitan area, not Houston alone. Officials believed that this diverse approach would 
ensure the referendum’s passage. On August 12 voters cast their ballots. The results 
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would show the efficacy of this campaign and test the strength of minority power in both 
the city’s mobility debates and the larger political sphere. 
THE VOTE  
On August 12, 1978, some 231 residents from the tiny suburban community of El 
Lago approved METRO by a single vote—116 to 115. In Jersey Village, the results broke 
the other way. Out of the 233 voters, 117 voted METRO down, beating 116 supporters by 
a single vote. The razor thin margin and opposite outcomes in the results of these two 
suburban cities spoke to a split among suburban voters over the need for the Authority. 
Despite a lack of cohesion, a large enough minority of suburban voters supported the 
referendum that combined with the votes of a majority of Houstonians, voters moved the 
HMA into to the transit business for the first time. 
 Voters in the twenty-three incorporated cities at least partially within Harris 
County, and those from the five districts that made up the unincorporated remainder of 
the county, cast ballots on August 12. Houston, which, for the purposes of the vote, 
included its enclave cities, passed the referendum by a nearly 16,000-vote margin, 63,510 
to 47,596. The results outside of Houston reflected a continued hesitancy toward transit 
in working-class suburbs and those areas to which METRO offered no immediate 
services. Of the twenty-two incorporated Harris County cities and five unincorporated 
sections of the county, a minority of nine approved the Authority. This contingent was 
led by Friendswood to the north of Houston, Missouri City to the southwest, Katy to the 
northwest, and the North Harris County unincorporated area. All four of these locations 
were among the metropolitan area’s fastest growing and most desirous of easier mobility. 
Of the fifteen entities that rejected METRO, the working-class suburbs of Pasadena, Deer 
Park, and South Houston did so by the largest margins. The final regional tally was 
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80,219 for and 65,883 against, with 12 percent of the electorate, average for a countywide 
election, casting a vote.66  
The results reflected the divisions apparent during the campaign, but also 
demonstrated how political lines had shifted in the city since 1973. In the HARTA 
campaign, a similar proportion of suburban voters rejected the system, and, joined by 
African American and ethnic Mexican voters, doomed that proposal. On METRO’s go-
round, hesitant working-class suburban voters stood alone, as the city’s black and ethnic 
Mexican voters felt assured that METRO would meet their mobility needs. For the 
second straight transportation election black and ethnic Mexican voters played a 
prominent role in the outcome. In addition, the fact that a minority of suburban voters 
supported the referendum provided METRO with an ostensibly metropolitan mandate 
and inaugurated one of the HMA’s earliest and most powerful metropolitan governance 
bodies. The city and its now-fully-employed transit officials hoped that METRO would 
grow to have a strong presence in the HMA over the coming years. The results of the 
vote encouraged officials to maintain the balanced approach between city and suburbs. 
Officials also quickly realized that passage of the vote would not mean an end to 
opposition or the victory of any one groups’ idea about the politics of mobility.   
The election results determined the structure of the METRO board and shaped the 
Authority’s service area. With only a few suburban areas approving the Authority, the 
board’s makeup would remain the same as before the election. It would consist of seven 
people—five appointed by the mayor of Houston, one by the Harris County 
commissioners, and one by the mayors of the participating suburbs. In terms of service 
area, the Authority would eventually bring transit to every approving entity, practicing “a 
closed-door policy” in those areas that rejected the proposal. This meant that even if a 
                                                
66 1978 Referendum results available at Houston City Secretary’s Office, Box Election Misc. 1922-1984.  
 
245
route crossed through a non-participating community on its way to a part of the service 
area beyond it, buses could not stop to pick up or drop off passengers. Communities that 
rejected the proposal could join the Authority in the future if they passed enabling 
legislation. If abstaining cities joined the Authority, the METRO board would grow in 
proportion, to a maximum of eleven members. After choosing to join the Authority, 
though, communities were bound to remain within it unless state law changed 
membership protocols. METRO officials were confident that within a few years of 
service those who voted against its creation would be clamoring to join. 67 
Many commentators remarked that the timing of METRO’s approval, in the midst 
of nation wide tax revolt, spoke to the depth of the city’s mobility problem and the 
resolve of area voters to address it. One Houston Post columnist chalked up the results of 
the vote to Houston’s tradition of biting the bullet and embracing necessary 
improvements, “even if there was a price tag attached.” Almost every commentator noted 
the importance of the coalescence of black, ethnic Mexican, and white voters into a 
winning constituency.68 For many, the voter breakdown mattered much less than the 
simple fact that METRO now existed. Whereas a week earlier Houston “had a huge 
traffic problem and no machinery to deal with” it, upon passage of METRO “the 
machinery” was in place, “thanks to citizens who rose to the occasion” and supported the 
plan.69 Ninfa Laurenzo feted supporters with “margaritas and a mariachi band” at her 
Navigation Boulevard restaurant. For Laurenzo, the night was a “double victory” with 
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METRO’s successful creation and “an impressive showing of Mexican-American vote-
getting,” each counting as major accomplishments.70  
The results within Houston highlighted METRO’s patchwork constituency. 
Election results showed that African American voters from every economic level 
approved METRO, with middle and upper class African Americans overwhelmingly 
supporting the system. The same pattern held true for ethnic Mexican voters. Middle and 
upper class whites represented both the largest slice of voters and passed the referendum 
by the largest margin, reaching nearly a 70-30 breakdown in support. While working- and 
poor Houstonians from all racial backgrounds were more hesitant to support the system, 
with margins of approval hovering around the 51-49 range, the results were most likely 
close because of a less than 10 percent turnout rate among the group.71    
While leading black and ethnic Mexican campaigners acknowledged that turnout 
was low among their constituencies, they argued that the METRO campaign had helped 
increase political discussion and awareness of issues, even if it did not actually cause an 
uptick in voting. An editorial in El Sol proclaimed that it was “gratifying to see that the 
Hispanic community of Houston is slowly becoming more sophisticated in its grappling 
with issues.” Rather than simply voting along party lines or following the advice of a 
single leader, the METRO vote demonstrated that the community was increasingly 
“striving to decide on them [votes] on the basis of their merit.” Concluding, and 
defending the role of ethnic Mexicans in the victory, the paper argued that the readers  
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“should see the steps being taken and mark well the milestones reached,” but also insisted 
that they, and other Houstonians, needed to hold METRO to its promises.72  
 Opponents of METRO were quiet in the days after the referendum. Those 
communities that rejected the proposal felt they had dodged a bullet of taxation and 
opponents of the system within the city announced that they would monitor the 
performance of the fledgling Authority, giving notice that they refused to relinquish their 
own views of the politics of mobility. 
CONCLUSION 
Like the HARTA vote before it, the 1978 decision to create METRO followed an 
unexpected path. The loose coalition of blacks, white working-class suburbanites, and 
ethnic Mexican Houstonians who had voted together to reject HARTA, reconfigured 
itself in 1978 as wealthier white suburbanites replaced their working class neighbors. To 
black and ethnic Mexican leaders like Mickey Leland and Ninfa Laurenzo, the role that 
their constituencies played in the creation of METRO proved their indispensible position 
within metropolitan politics. The vote was the second successful foray of these groups 
into transportation debates and convinced many, like the author of the El Sol article 
written in the days before the election, that black and ethnic Mexican Houstonians could 
form a potent political constituency in the future. If they incorporated working-class and 
middle-class white residents from within Houston into a coalition, such a bloc would 
represent a formidable political voice in city and metropolitan politics, one that could 
protect and project city residents’ interests onto debates about transportation and a host of 
other issues. 
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Not all Houstonians understand the creation of METRO as a political watershed, 
however. Many framed the Authority’s approval as an opportunity for the city to extricate 
itself from increasing immobility or saw its embrace of mass transit as an important sign 
that Houston could choose new forms of growth and mobility. Others, mainly suburban 
opponents of its creation, continued to view the Authority as a colossal waste of money 
and as an abusive agency of an overly powerful central city. No matter how Houstonians 
understood the METRO vote, its contestation had provided residents of the HMA with 
yet another opportunity to use transportation debates as a means to assert broader 
political and social expectations into metropolitan discussions.  
In its first years of operation METRO faced a number of problems that slowed the 
implementation of its systems and opened the agency up to criticism. Opponents of 
METRO seized upon the Authority’s operational difficulties in order to convince 
residents throughout the HMA that transit was taking the city in the wrong direction. 
Accusing METRO of financial mismanagement and criticizing its service failures, 
opponents drummed up popular opposition to the Authority. METRO survived this early 
storm and improved its services by 1980. But metropolitan demographics and politics 
continued to shift and Houston’s relatively peaceful metropolitan equilibrium broke into 
broader conflicts as suburb-city tensions and disagreements among residents of different 
economic and racial categories boiled over. These disputes manifested in a 1983 
transportation debate with METRO once again at its center. The results of this debate 





By Road or By Rail?  
The 1983 Transit Debate  
Returning to the 1983 public forum that opened this dissertation, we can now 
better contextualize its meaning within Houstonians’ shifting understandings of mobility. 
Coming five years after the creation of METRO, the forum, and the broader discussion it 
was a part of, occurred at the same time that the Authority’s suburban constituency was 
fracturing. That night at St. Patrick’s Catholic Church, a divided citizenry from across the 
HMA debated the merits of proposals for the Harris County Toll Road Authority 
(HCTRA) and METRO’s heavy rail system. Planning for both systems began in 1979 and 
the debate around them dominated metropolitan politics between 1980 and 1983. Local 
officials placed the final decision in the hands of HMA voters through two referenda: the 
first in June 1983 would consider METRO’s proposal and the second in September 1983 
would deal with the HCTRA plan. The level of citizen input that went into the proposals 
reflected the influence the two-decade struggle over transportation issues had given 
Houstonians in metropolitan debates. 
Amid the crowd at the church, a white Catholic priest held a hand-painted sign 
aloft that read, “Surely, Houston, more imagination than another 20-mile parking lot.”1 
(Figure 6.1) The message not only conveyed many Houstonians’ doubts that more roads 
could solve the city’s congestion problems, it also hinted at the deeper stakes of the 1983 
debates. The priest, a member of a citywide, multi-racial, interfaith community 
organization called The Metropolitan Organization (TMO), was there with several dozen 
fellow members to advocate for the rail plan. TMO turned out in such force because its 
                                                
1 Clipping, Northeast News, April 26, 1983, Central Chancery Files (CCF), Archives of the Archdiocese of 
Galveston-Houston (AAGH), Houston, Texas. 
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membership voted to make transportation issues, especially the fight against the toll road, 
a priority. For many members, including dozens who lived within the corridor that 
housed key parts of each proposed system, the debate revolved around protecting their 
homes, not transportation. TMO, though, was not the only party weighing in on the issue. 
For more than two years the organization and other pro-rail Houstonians had debated a 
population of mostly white suburban Houstonians and elected officials who supported 
toll roads. This group believed the roads would provide for suburban mobility and 
growth. Moreover, most remained wary of METRO and its mass transit plans. Prior to 
the referenda, pro-toll road citizens blanketed the HMA with door hangers and mailings 
calling METRO’s plan, “A Colossal Boondoggle,” and urging Houstonians to “Vote no 
[on] METRO Bonds…Don’t be fooled by more empty promises.”2 (Figure 6.2) These 
opposing groups and the tense atmosphere of the public forum illustrated how 
transportation decisions came to engulf Houston politics for much of the early 1980s.  
The clashing of plans, and of Houstonians, pushed the HMA away from the 
fragile coalition of suburban and urban residents that ushered in METRO in 1978. As 
Houstonians articulated their positions on the transportation proposals, they posited 
incompatible visions for the city’s future and of the politics of mobility. This divergence 
made conflict seemingly unavoidable. Suburban Houstonians desired not only easier 
commutes, but also hoped to improve and sustain the economically and racially exclusive 
neighborhoods and suburban lifestyle automobiles and roadways helped ensure. 
                                                
2 Neighborhood Transportation Forum, “Boondoogle” Door Hanger, Box 4, Michael Berryhill Collection 
(MBC), MSS 074, Woodson Research Center (WRC), Rice University.   
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Figures 6.1 and 6.2: Hardy Corridor Images 
These images demonstrate competing thoughts about the toll road and rail proposals put before 
Houstonians in 1983. Figure 6.1 an anti-tollway Houstonian protesting at a Houston City Council meeting. 
Figure 6.2 is an anti-rail door hanger. Figure 6.1, Northeast News, April 26, 1983, CCF, AAGH, Houston, 
Texas. Figure 6.2, Box 4, MBC, MSS 074, WRC, Rice University.  
While the majority of residents within the city also sought projects that provided them 
easy movement, many also fiercely resisted projects that threatened to damage their 
communities. During the 1983 fight, city and suburban officials and residents abandoned 
rhetoric about balancing metropolitan transportation needs and backed the plan they 
believed best matched their interests. In the end, the rail plan was defeated by more than 
40 percent. A few months later, the creation of the HCTRA was approved by nearly the 
same margin.3 The results of the votes led HMA officials to orient the development of 
transportation systems toward the suburban fringe, a return in function, if not exact form, 
to the infrastructure priorities of the 1950s and the 1960s. The lopsided defeat of the rail 
plan signaled that the influence of suburban voters had eclipsed that of city residents in 
HMA-wide issues. Furthermore, it represented a setback for African American and ethnic 
                                                
3 The results of both elections can be found at the Harris County Clerk’s office in Houston, Texas. 
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Mexican political power within the HMA, which, during the decade preceding the votes, 
had been on the rise and central to Houston’s transportation decisions.  
Changes in the federal government’s stance toward transportation and urban 
policy during the early 1980s also affected the outcome of Houston’s debates. Under 
President Reagan, federal highway officials devolved decision-making power to the state 
and local level and deregulated a number of transportation industries. While federal 
officials maintained control over the amount of money devoted to transportation, they 
deferred to their state level counterparts in project priorities and allocation. State officials, 
in turn, relied more on local actors, giving Houstonians and their elected officials more 
power than ever to shape their city. Devolution also strengthened citizen oversight and 
environmental protection measures that were put into place in the late 1960s and early 
1970s by giving citizens even more direct input into infrastructure decisions.4 
Not all federal policies benefitted local decision-makers and citizens, however. 
The Reagan administration drastically cut back on funds devoted to mass transit, for 
example. METRO’s rail project only progressed after intense lobbying by leaders at the 
national level succeeded in securing earmarks. Cuts and realignments to streams of 
federal money for social programs sent officials and citizens scrambling as well. Federal 
support for community development initiatives that had survived intact through the 1970s 
declined in the 1980s. The Community Action Program and the agencies it supported, 
which were popular during the Johnson presidency, were reshuffled into the Community 
Block Grant Program under President Nixon, and in the 1980s that modest support was 
                                                
4 For devolution discussion see Mark Rose and Raymond A. Mohl, 3rd Edition, Interstate: Highway 
Politics and Policy Since 1939 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2012). 
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removed.5 In response to these changes, a new generation of community organization 
such as TMO emerged that relied less on federal dollars.6  
Beyond these changes, two other major trends shaped Houston and the decisions 
residents made in the transportation debates. When oil prices reached an all-time high in 
1980, Houston stood at the peak of a wave of petroleum-based prosperity that had been 
surging for nearly seventy years. In 1981, however, a double blow of national recession 
and dropping oil prices crippled the city’s economy. The price of oil plummeted from 
thirty-one dollars a barrel (eighty-eight dollars in 2014) in 1980 to just over twelve 
dollars a barrel (twenty-five dollars in 2014) by 1986.7 Fifty-five percent of the city’s 
workforce was either directly or indirectly connected to the oil industry and the drop in 
prices led to massive layoffs.8 In 1982-1983, the city lost 160,000 jobs and the 
unemployment rate rose to 9.8 percent. By 1986, the rate had grown to 15 percent, higher 
than during the Great Depression.9 The economic decline affected Houstonians’ 
perspectives of the city. According to the Houston Area Survey, a yearly study of 
attitudes and beliefs of Houstonians conducted since 1982, the number of Houstonians 
who believed that Houston offered excellent job prospects dropped from 76 percent in 
                                                
5 Robert Fisher, Let the People Decide: Neighborhood Organizing in America, 2nd ed, (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1994), 168-176. 
6 William S. Clayson, Freedom Is Not Enough: The War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement in 
Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 150-156. 
7 2011 Annual Energy Review, United States Energy Information Administration, 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.cfm?t=ptb0518, last accessed February 21, 2014; For 
a general discussion of changes in oil prices between 1979 and 1986 see Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The 
Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power 1st ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 699-764. 
8 Joe R. Feagin, Free Enterprise City: Houston in Political-Economic Perspective (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1988), 85. 
9 Beth Anne Shelton, Nestor Rodriguez, Joe R. Feagin, Robert D. Bullard, and Robert D. Thomas, eds. 
Houston: Growth and Decline in a Sunbelt Boomtown (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1989), 
25; Nestor Rodriguez, “Latino Settlement Patterns in ‘The Free Enterprise City,’ in Robert D. Bullard, J. 
Eugene Grigsby III, and Charles Lee, eds., Residential Apartheid: The American Legacy (Los Angeles: 
Center for Afro-American Studies Publication, University of California Los Angeles, 1994): 203. 
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1982 to 11 percent by 1986.10 More than just perception, however, businesses, residents, 
the city and state governments struggled to pay their bills without the profits, economic 
growth, and taxes that came with elevated oil prices. Bankruptcies and foreclosures were 
commonplace. In 1986, some 25,000 homes and businesses were foreclosed upon. 
Bankruptcies, which in 1980 occurred at the rate of twenty-five per month, rose to ninety-
three a month by 1984, with retail, real estate, and energy businesses the hardest hit.11  
On top of economic changes, a massive influx of immigrants from Central 
American and Asian countries altered the demographic makeup of the city and reshaped 
its settlement patterns. Approximately 100,000 Central Americans and 50,000 Southeast 
Asians came to the city during the 1980s.12 Because of their larger number, Central 
American immigrants were most directly linked with the shifts occurring throughout the 
metropolitan area. Predominantly from the war-torn countries of El Salvador and 
Guatemala, these immigrants settled outside of traditional ethnic Mexican neighborhoods 
on Houston’s east side, giving Houston a diverse Latino population. Both Central 
American and Asian immigrants moved into west Houston apartment complexes 
originally constructed to house the white-collar workers prior to the economic bust. 
Seemingly overnight the ethnic makeup of entire sections of the city changed.13 The 
                                                
10 Stephen Klineberg, “Houston Area Survey (1982-2007): Findings from the 26th Annual Survey,” Kinder 
Institute for Urban Research, Rice University, 2007, 2. http://has.rice.edu/downloads/, last accessed 
February 22, 2014. 
11 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 96-105. 
12 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 254-255; Nestor Rodriguez, "Hispanic and Asian Immigration Waves in 
Houston," in Helen Rose Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz, eds., Religion and the New Immigrants: 
Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations (Walnut Creek, Calif.: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2000), 24; Nestor Rodriguez, "Undocumented Central Americans in Houston: Diverse Populations,"  
International Migration Review, vol. 21 (Spring 1987): 4-25; Arnoldo De León, Ethnicity in the Sunbelt: 
Mexican Americans in Houston (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 225; Fred von der 
Mehden, ed., The Ethnic Groups of Houston (Houston, Tex.: Rice University, 1984), 63-112. 
13 Rodriguez, "Hispanic and Asian Immigration Waves,” 24; Shelton et al, Houston, 93-122; Rodriguez, 
“Latino Settlements,” 204-216; Nestor Rodriguez and Ximena Urrutia-Rojas, “Impact of Recent Refugee 
Migration to Texas: A Comparison of Southeast Asian and Central American Newcomers,” in Wanye 
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combination of economic uncertainty and new residents increased competition for 
resources and raised the stakes of HMA-wide debates.14   
Despite connections to national and international trends, most Houstonians 
framed the transportation debates in decidedly local terms. A close examination of 
Houstonians’ participation in the contests shows that many citizens dealt with the city’s 
uncertain future by attempting to exert control over their immediate surroundings. In that 
vein, while this chapter considers how the argument played out across the city, it will also 
look closely at its contestation within the Hardy corridor, a 400-foot-wide swath of land 
that ran for several miles from downtown Houston north toward Montgomery County. 
This area was slated to house either one or both of the rail and toll road networks, which 
placed it at the center of the broader struggle over the systems. Defined here as the land 
that falls in the rough triangle made by I-45, SH 59, and current-day Beltway 8, the 
corridor contained just under 180,000 Houstonians in 1980. (Figure 6.3) White residents 
made up 66 percent of that number. African Americans represented 15 percent and Latino 
citizens made up an additional 17 percent. White residents dominated the northern parts 
of the corridor, while black and Latino residents made up majorities in several downtown 
census tracts. The median income of households in the corridor was $21,266 ($60,300 in 
2014), making it a solidly middle-class section of the city.15 
                                                                                                                                            
Holtzman and Thomas Bornemann eds., Mental Health of Immigrants and Refugees (Austin, Tex.: Hogg 
Foundation for Mental Health, 1990), 263-278. 
14 For attitudes about immigration and the impact it had on the HMA see the Houston Area Survey for data 
and questions see http://has.rice.edu/surveytopics/, last accessed February 22, 2014. From the 1980s 
onward attitudes about immigrants have slowly become more positive according to the survey and its 
reports see Stephen Klineberg, “An Historical View of Immigration in Houston, Based on the Houston 
Area Survey,” Center For Houston’s Future, 2008, http://has.rice.edu/downloads/, last accessed February 
22, 2014. Rodriguez and Urrutia-Rojas, “Impact of Recent Migration to Texas,” 273-277. 
15 Statistics taken from Social Explorer, 1980 US Census, 41 Census Tracts in Hardy Corridor as defined 




Figure 6.3: The Hardy Corridor 
1989 highway map illustrates the focus of the 1983 debates. The Hardy Street Corridor is shaded in green 
above. The black line represents the path of the Hardy Toll Road, which also would have been the route of 
the rail. The incomplete green circle is the still in progress Beltway 8. Status of Freeways, Houston-
Galveston Regional Transit Study, Jan 1989, Transportation Map Drawer TXR MC B3, R-818, HMRC. 
As previous chapters have shown, Houstonians’ understandings of place often 
shaped reactions to infrastructure projects. Just as conflicting perspectives about the Fifth 
Ward influenced decisions about the interstates, so too did competing meanings predicate 
the discussion around the Hardy corridor. Many residents of the racially and 
economically mixed corridor area belonged to TMO. With the help of the organization, 
these citizens resisted the toll road plan because it threatened their neighborhoods with 




place, but because they did not identify with the corridor beyond seeing it as a possible 
congestion relief valve, Houstonians from outside of area did not worry about the 
potential negative effects toll road construction might have on residents who lived near it. 
In the end, the way many Houstonians voted in the two 1983 referenda boiled down to 
where they lived and how they perceived the places they did not.16 
Given the political, social, and economic situation that swirled around the 1983 
transportation debates, framing the conflict as one between suburbanites and city 
residents, or African Americans and whites will not suffice. A diverse collection of actors 
from Houston and its environs participated in the dispute and held varying 
understandings of mobility and about how the decision would affect the future of the 
HMA. Houston’s 1983 debate was hard to define. At one moment, it concentrated upon a 
single right-of-way; at the next, it connected with national-level policy debates. Other 
cities confronted similar transportation problems as Houston did in the 1980s and did so 
within the same national framework. Yet, citizens in each locale made choices unique to 
their circumstances.17 The plasticity of these debates not only altered the way citizens 
discussed and understood the contests, but also helped determine their outcomes, 
illustrating how patterns of metropolitan development in American cities were shaped by 
both national frameworks and local peculiarities.  
                                                
16 These conceptions of place-making owe a debt of scholarly gratitude to Matthew Klingle, whose 
conception of an ethic of place has helped influence my own thinking on how to view urban landscapes as 
simultaneously urban and natural spaces. For more on Klingle’s thoughts on the ethic of place see, 
Matthew Klingle, Emerald City: An Environmental History of Seattle (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 2007.) 
17 John Mollenkopf, The Contested City (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 139-179. 
Mollenkopf discusses the ways that local decision-makers interpreted and implemented federal policies in 
divergent ways dependent on a variety of local factors. Houston’s rejection of a train system did make it an 
exception among major American cities in the early 1980s, many of which embraced such systems. See 
Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff, Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2003), 208.  
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THE PRIMARY ACTORS 
As details of the toll road and rail proposals emerged beginning in 1979 and 1980, 
it became clear that there would be friction due to their overlapping routes. At one point 
it appeared possible that the rail and toll systems could be built on shared rights-of-way, 
but divisions soon emerged that scuttled possible compromises.18 When the city’s 
economic prospects nosedived, the projects and their massive price tags became all the 
more contentious. Given the see-sawing nature of the HMA’s political balance between 
suburban and city interests and the gamut of attitudes about METRO, the transportation 
debates quickly morphed into a skirmish in the larger fight to control political power in 
the HMA. The battle lines of the 1983 debates were not clean, however. Some suburban 
residents supported rail. Some city residents clamored for toll roads. While the opposing 
sides were not monolithic, on the whole, the contest pitted mainly residents from within 
the city limits against those from beyond them. Many from each group had, just five 
years earlier, joined forces to create METRO. This alliance dissolved at the precise 
moment that citizens—especially suburban whites, African Americans, and Latinos—
gained greater decision-making power in American urban politics. In Houston, these 
groups found themselves embroiled in a clash over who possessed the power to 
determine the city’s future.19  
                                                
18 There was one suggestion of a shared right-of-way, but neither side could agree to the compromise, or 
upon which system should be built first. Texas Turnpike Authority, “Hardy Tollway-METRO Rail 
Compatibility Study: Preliminary Engineering and Financial Feasibility Report,” May 1983, Planning 
Library, Texas Department of Transportation, Houston Branch. 
19 Carl Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1987), 185-262. Abbott argues that suburban political power and independence 
increased concomitantly with minority voices in urban areas. The contests between these two powerful 




In April 1982, METRO made a splashy hire. The Authority tapped Alan Kiepper, 
one of the nation’s leading experts on and managers of public mass transportation 
systems, to head the agency.20 The hiring of Kiepper, the man who steered the 
construction of Atlanta’s Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority in the 1970s, sent 
an obvious signal to Houstonians: METRO was serious about building a rail system.21 
Kiepper and METRO argued that a train system would cement Houston’s place in the 
pantheon of the nation’s elite cities. Houston officials pushed the rail plan, worried that 
the city would fall behind its peers if they did not.22 This trope—the idea that a city’s 
transportation structures equated to or reflected its progress and growth—held a central 
place in the rhetoric of both sides during the debates.23 With the backing of city leaders, 
Kiepper and the staff of transit veterans he imported from Atlanta expanded and 
accelerated the development of the rail plan that METRO began formulating in 1980.24  
                                                
20 “Mayor Reaches to Atlanta for Possible End to City’s Police, Mass Transit Woes,” Houston Informer, 
April 3, 1982; “Atlanta Transit Chief Resigns for Houston Job,” New York Times, June 12, 1983, 26; Jan 
Rich, “Rail Likely to Stay Top Transit Issue in ’83,” Houston Chronicle, January 4, 1983.  
21 Patrick Jankowski, “MTA’s New Driver,” Houston, August 1982, HMRC, 46-50, 71-72. 
22 “Seize the opportunity,” Houston Chronicle, June 10, 1983, H-Elections-MTA Rail-1983 Vertical File 
(VF), HMRC. METRO officials pointed to systems in other cities as models in agency publications, press 
releases, and newspaper articles. John Sedlak also recalled that METRO was aware of other ongoing transit 
projects, John Sedlak, interview by author, April 11, 2012, Houston, Texas, audio recording. Federal 
lobbying by local officials made it clear that they recognized they were competing against other locales for 
financial support, see Dan Arnold, interview by author, January 31, 2012. Finally, even critics were aware 
of mass transit projects across the nation. Texas State Highway Commissioners grilled Dan Arnold about 
the efficacy of transit systems during the 1981 public hearing. State Highway and Public Transportation 
Commission (SHPTC) Public Hearing, June 23, 1981, Box 1990/11-1, Texas State Department of 
Highways and Public Transportation, Public Hearing Dockets, 1979-1988, Texas State Archives (TSA), 
28-45. 
23 Dan Arnold hinted at this desire at the 1981 Texas State Highway Commission hearing, SHPTC Public 
Hearing, June 23, 1981, 35. A number of scholars have discussed the drive to become an “elite” city by 
building a mass transit network. See, Zachary Schrag, Great Society Subway: A History of the Washington 
Metro (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Jonathan Richmond, Transport of Delight: 
The Mythical Conception of Rail Transit in Los Angeles (Akron, Ohio: Akron University Press, 2005).  
24 John Sedlak was one such hire. The migration of transit experts from Atlanta to Houston highlights the 
exchange that existed between American cities. John Sedlak, interview by author, April 11, 2012. 
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METRO’s rail proposal walked the line of balanced suburb-city service that the 
agency promised during the campaign for its creation in 1978. As we saw in Chapter 
Five, in an effort to garner the support from residents in both areas, METRO officials 
embraced approaches that evenly distributed the consequences and benefits of 
transportation structures across both the city and its suburbs. METRO sold rail to 
suburban voters by touting the plan’s intention to connect the job centers of west Houston 
to the homes of commuters north of the city. For city residents, METRO echoed its 1978 
campaign, promising that the line would provide improved movement for all city 
dwellers, especially transit-dependent residents from the near northside.25 
Impressed by the balanced elements of the rail plan and convinced that such a 
system offered the best way forward, TMO became one of the staunchest supporters of 
METRO’s rail efforts. A majority of TMO’s membership consisted of poor and working-
class Latino and black citizens from Catholic churches across the city. A significant 
minority of working-class and middle-class white Catholics also belonged to the group, 
as did congregants from a handful of black and white Protestant churches and Jewish 
synagogues. The organization modeled itself on the San Antonio-based Communities 
Organized for Public Service (COPS) and its umbrella organization the Industrial Areas 
Foundations.26 Similar to COPS, TMO secured financial support through dues paid by 
                                                
25 METRO, “Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Southwest/Westpark Corridor Alternatives 
Analysis,” September 1980, Box 2, MBC, WRC. 
26 Mike Snyder, “TMO’s Theory: Confrontation Gets Power,” Houston Chronicle, April 4, 1980, H-TMO 
VF, HMRC. For more about COPS, the Industrial Areas Foundation, and its founder, radical theorist and 
organizer, Saul Alinsky, see, Saul Alinsky, Reville for Radicals (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 
1946); Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1971); Mark R. Warren, Dry Bones Rattling: Community Building to Revitalize American 
Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); Susan Fainstein and Ann R. Markusen, 
Urban Policy: Bridging the Social and Economic Development Gap (Piscataway, N.J.: Rutgers University 
Press, 1993); Ernesto Cortes, Reweaving the Fabric: The Iron Rule and the IAF Strategy for Dealing with 
Poverty through Power and Politics (Piscataway, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1993); Mary Beth Rogers, 
Cold Anger: A Story of Faith and Power Politics (Denton: North Texas University Press, 1990.) 
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member congregations, which gave the groups an independence that previous community 
organizations did not possess.27 TMO strived to bring marginalized Houstonians into 
civic discourse. Tackling a disparate slate of topics including immigration reform, voting 
rights, transportation, and government accountability, at its peak in 1980, TMO brought 
members together from nearly 80 congregations.28  
TMO’s emphasis on citizen participation echoed earlier actions in Houston that 
offset official-driven planning. Rather than act as advocates for Houstonians, TMO 
organizers aimed to cultivate leaders from among the group’s membership and empower 
them to create the group’s agenda.29 Ramona Toliver, whose experiences with the 
interstate were explored in Chapter Two, belonged to the organization in the 1980s and 
recalled that the group encouraged members to act on their own behalf. TMO taught 
Toliver to remember “that whatever you stand for, you stand for. You don’t change.”30 
Having members in leadership roles meant that TMO was intimately connected to its 
constituents and their immediate concerns. 
TMO appealed to many Houstonians of faith because of its emphasis on self-help, 
citizen empowerment, and mission for social good. These tenets meshed particularly well 
with Catholic beliefs that touted service to the poor and personal liberation.31 The city 
possessed a diverse Catholic population that included African Americans from Louisiana, 
ethnic Mexicans, white Houstonians, and, increasingly during the early 1980s, Central 
                                                
27 See William Clayson, Freedom is not Enough, 150-156. 
28 Letter from Rev. Dan Scheel to Parish Council Presidents, November 25, 1980, Box 3, John McCarthy 
Files (JMF), Accession 98-18, AAGH. For a brief history of TMO’s founding and connection with 
Industrial Areas Foundation see, Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 59-65; Rogers, Cold Anger, 143-154; 
Shelton et. al., Houston, 60-63. On community organization in the 1970s and early 1980s, see Fisher, Let 
the People Decide, 132-167. 
29 See Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 15-72; Fisher, Let the People Decide, 132-167. 
30 See Ramona Toliver, interview by author, April 20, 2013. 
31 Trevino, Church in the Barrio, 167-171; Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 190-198. 
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American immigrants.32 TMO’s rise coincided with a moment when the broader Catholic 
Church and the leaders of the Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston were confronting two 
decades of immense change and theological revolution. Vatican II, the rise of liberation 
theology in Latin American, and the social action demands of the Civil Rights and 
Chicano Movements all challenged the Church to help alleviate poverty and inequality.33  
During the late 1960s and 1970s, many Catholic leaders in Texas, including those 
in Houston, responded to the desires of their lay members by offering support for the 
social causes pushed by ethnic Mexican and African American congregants. While 
Church officials in Houston and Texas reacted strongly against the radical actions by 
some congregants during the Chicano movement, by the mid-1970s most Catholic leaders 
supported campaigns for social justice.34 In the mid-1970s John Morkovsky, Bishop of 
the Galveston-Houston Archdiocese, backed the formation of the Metropolitan 
Ministries, a predecessor to TMO.35 Morkovsky, his auxiliary Bishop John McCarthy, 
and several prominent priests backed TMO from its inception.36 These leaders recognized 
that such organizations not only adhered to Catholic teachings, but that they improved the 
communities of their congregants and brought Catholics from across the city together. In 
addition, they served to shore up loyalty to the Catholic Church. The early 1980s was a 
time when Pentecostal churches were gaining ground on the Catholic Church in Latin 
                                                
32 On black Catholic Roots, Pruitt, The Other Great Migration, 113-117; ethnic Mexican, see Treviño, 
Church in the Barrio; de Léon, Ethnicity in the Sunbelt.  
33 Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 193-195. On Liberation Theology, Donal Dorr, Option for the Poor: A 
Hundred Years of Vatican Social Teaching (Dublin : Maryknoll, N.Y: Gill and Macmillan ; Orbis, 1983); 
Daniel H. Levine, Popular Voices in Latin American Catholicism, Studies in Church and State (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1992). On Vatican II, see Jay P. Dolan, The American Catholic 
Experience: A History from Colonial Times to the Present (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1992); Gene Burns, The Frontiers of Catholicism The Politics of Ideology in a Liberal World, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992). 
34 Treviño, The Church in the Barrio, 167-177; Rogers, Cold Anger, 107. 
35 Rogers, Cold Anger, 145-146. 
36 Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 45, 49, 196. 
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America and within immigrant populations in the United States. Leaders recognized that 
supporting groups like TMO might help keep parishioners content and prevent an exodus 
to other Christian sects.37  
The fact that TMO consisted of mainly Catholics and received such support from 
the Catholic Church differentiates the group from other community organizations that 
were shaped by the leadership of other Christian denominations. In the South, African 
American Christian churches possessed a long history of participation in a variety of 
political causes, none more prominent than leadership during the Civil Rights Movement. 
These denominations had different interactions with and perspectives towards the 
activism of their congregants than the Catholic Church. Houston’s Protestant and Jewish 
congregations did get involved with the group, but did so to a lesser extent than the city’s 
Catholics. While both traditions possessed long histories of engagement with social 
justice causes, the decentralized structure of Protestant congregations and TMO’s 
struggles to convince non-Catholic groups that their interests would be valued in a group 
dominated by Catholics and Latinos made recruiting these congregations difficult. Once 
the balanced, participatory methods of TMO and the power of citywide collective action 
became clear, several synagogues and Protestant congregations joined the group.38  
TMO’s effectiveness as a political organization rested on the religious institutions 
from which it drew its members. As stable community anchors with dedicated members 
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and deep connections to distinct parts of the city, church communities provided many 
resources from which TMO could draw. The knitting together of religious institutions 
cultivated a network of racially and economically diverse residents from across the city 
and formulated a formidable political coalition. Unlike the neighborhood level resistance 
of the Houstonians who organized against the Outer Belt or the Harrisburg freeway, 
TMO’s citywide constituency possessed a broader set of concerns and could bring greater 
pressure to bear on politicians. 
TMO combined traditional electoral significance—its role as a mouthpiece for 
thousands of religious Houstonians—with progressive, often confrontational political 
tactics to bring attention to the issues it wanted to address. Once members identified 
transportation as a major topic of interest, TMO engaged deeply with debates and 
forwarded member’s perspective of the politics of mobility. The group advocated for the 
provision of adequate access to mobility systems for all city residents and called for 
greater citizen input in the transportation decision-making process. Propelled by the 
concerns of its members, TMO became one of the main combatants in the 1983 debates. 
Residents of the Hardy corridor wanted to protect their homes. Black and Latino 
members living in neighborhoods underserved by buses hoped the rail plan would make 
their daily movements less stressful. TMO campaigned to secure each of these outcomes 
and in the process a diverse constituency of Houstonians worked together in an effort to 
shape the city’s future. The group invested a good deal of its political capital into the rail 
plan and pressured local, county, and state leaders to reject toll roads.  
As groups like TMO joined METRO and other city officials in backing the rail 
plan, they elevated the stakes of the transportation debate. The involvement of TMO and 
other citizens made it clear that, like the HARTA and METRO decisions, the 1983 
debates would not be settled by officials alone. Residents took full advantage of federal 
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devolution and citizen oversight mechanisms to participate in the debates.39 Rail 
proponents argued the system could solve the metropolitan area’s traffic problems, vault 
Houston into the national elite, and balance the needs of both the central core and the 
booming suburbs. Just as pro-rail citizens felt strongly about rail and exercised their right 
to participate in the decision-making process, however, so too did supporters of the toll 
system feel warranted in pushing back against the rail plan and advocating for toll roads.  
TOLL ROAD SUPPORTERS 
As Kiepper and his METRO staff busily drew up rail plans and consolidated 
support, toll road proponents promoted their system. Offered first by the Texas Turnpike 
Authority (TTA) in 1979, the toll road plan took off after Harris County Judge Jon 
Lindsay proposed the creation of a county run toll system. County officials like Lindsay 
recognized that metropolitan-level decisions offered an avenue through which they could 
attain more political power. Buoyed by burgeoning suburban populations and these 
communities’ defection from METRO, county politicians strengthened their hold on 
power by catering to non-city voters and vesting themselves with greater governing 
authority through metropolitan bodies like the HCTRA.40 In selling the toll road plan, 
promoters argued that a user fee approach would provide funding for infrastructure at a 
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time of shrinking federal budgets and ballooning local needs.41 Further, HCTRA backers 
pointed out that creating a toll road authority would put control of the metropolitan area’s 
roadways into local hands. 
Structured to benefit the political aims of county officials and the transportation 
needs of suburban residents, the toll road proposal scrapped the balanced approach to 
metropolitan transportation. It offered few projects that aided the central city, focusing 
instead on facilitating the movement of suburban residents into and out of downtown. 
Despite the fact that the toll roads would only reach certain sections of city, just like the 
rail system, Lindsay shrewdly sold the system as an improvement upon the entire 
metropolitan area’s mobility. This tactic allowed the HCTRA to gain broad support, 
unlike METRO, which failed to convince voters that the rail system presented a 
metropolitan solution. Pitching the system as a whole, rather than attempting to fight over 
its individual parts, also allowed supporters to avoid becoming mired in particularly 
divisive debates such as those around the Hardy corridor.  
White suburbanites took an active role in the debates, most often supporting the 
toll road plan because they felt it would be cheaper than rail and because they doubted 
that METRO and Houston officials had their best interests at heart. Some suburbanites, 
and many city residents for that manner, did not support transit because they feared 
allowing systems into suburbs and exclusive neighborhoods would lead to non-white and 
poorer citizens moving into those areas.42 The actions suburbanites took in the debates 
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demonstrated that the HMA was becoming increasingly fragmented. While Houston 
officials effectively avoided this problem during the METRO decision, city leaders could 
no longer ignore the demands of increasingly powerful suburban constituencies and 
jurisdictions. As they grew in population and political power, these entities threatened to 
separate themselves from Houston’s control.43 In hopes of stemming some of the calls for 
autonomy, Houston officials catered more and more to suburban voters and their 
officials.  
Beyond suburban politicians and residents, the most politically influential 
promoter of the toll road plan was the Houston Chamber of Commerce. While the 
organization gave tacit support to the rail referendum, it wholeheartedly embraced the 
Toll Roads and clearly preferred them to mass transit. The organization’s feeble support 
for rail signaled its ongoing shift from a Houston-oriented group to a metropolitan-
focused one.44 Like Harris County officials, the Chamber recognized that Houston’s 
incredible outward growth made broadening its message and focus essential. Chamber 
leaders believed that because roads encouraged development along the suburban fringe, 
these systems could do more to promote the HMA’s economic growth than rail. The 
backing of this powerful interest group, one that had influenced Houston policy for 
decades, played a big role in convincing many Houstonians to support the toll road plan. 
                                                                                                                                            
113; Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2005): 248-251; Charles Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place 
in the City of Dreams (New York: Verso, 1996): 155-158; Ronald Bayor, Race and the Shaping of 
Twentieth-Century Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).  
43 Several scholars have written about the process of fragmentation and incorporation. See, Robert O. Self, 
American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2003); Colin Gordon, Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 2008); Lassiter, Silent Majority. 
44 When weighing in on the 1983 debates the organization’s publication, Houston, long a champion of 
Houston business development and booster of the CBD, began a steady shift toward the promotion of 
suburban growth. The most concrete signal of this shift would be the group’s name change in 1989 to the 
Greater Houston Partnership.  
 
268
As earlier chapters showed, few Houstonians who found their homes and 
neighborhoods within the projected routes of transportation systems viewed this position 
as a positive. Indeed, both toll road and rail plans elicited a number of not-in-my-
backyard (NIMBY) reactions from residents across the city. Outside of TMO member 
objections about the tollway in the Hardy corridor, some of the loudest complaints came 
from elite Houstonians who lived along the southwestern leg of the proposed rail system 
in the Rice University, Bellaire, and Montrose areas. While NIMBY responses to 
infrastructure projects were by no means new, as land for rights-of-way became 
increasingly difficult to secure in Houston, officials confronted greater citizen pushback 
than ever before.45 In the lead up to the 1983 votes, most Houstonians agreed that 
something needed to be done about the city’s traffic problems, but no one—not the 
working-class residents of the northern Fifth Ward nor the middle-to-upper class 
residents of Bellaire—wanted the solution to run through their communities.  
THE HARDY CORRIDOR AND THE ROOTS OF DEBATE 
The roots of the 1983 transportation referenda can be traced to 1979 and 1980, 
when the TTA first proposed an HMA-wide toll system with a leg running through the 
Hardy Corridor and METRO proposed a plan for a west Houston rail line that would later 
expand to include a line through the Hardy corridor. The announcements instigated a 
metropolitan wide debate that persisted until the votes. TMO, led by white, Latino, and 
black members who lived in the corridor, rose to prominence during these initial 
discussions and objected to the TTA’s plans by articulating a place-based defense of their 
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neighborhoods. This opening salvo defined the actors, rhetoric, and parameters of the 
1983 referendum campaigns.  
In early 1979, when the TTA announced that it would study the possibility of 
bringing toll roads to Houston, it initiated studies for three possible routes—one along 
Hardy Street, one through the Westpark corridor, and one that followed the much-
contested Harrisburg route.46 Given the tensions around highways in east Houston, the 
Harrisburg route was quickly dismissed, leaving only the Hardy corridor and Westpark 
routes as possibilities. Eventually, the TTA concluded that the Hardy corridor presented 
the most feasible option for the first arm of a broader toll road network. With the support 
of Houston officials, the TTA conducted feasibility study on the Hardy Toll Road near 
the end of 1979.47 In its final assessment of the corridor’s suitability, the TTA asserted 
that toll road could only succeed in the corridor if “no directly competing toll road or 
other expressway-type facilities…or mass transit projects” were built in or near the 
area.48 This conclusion made the stakes over controlling the corridor’s future obvious. 
The construction of one transportation system would likely prevent the building of others. 
METRO forwarded a plan for the Westpark corridor in a September 1980 draft 
environmental impact statement. The Authority called for the construction of a heavy rail 
system, similar to Chicago’s El or New York’s subway, which would run from the 
western suburbs into downtown.49 TMO and other rail proponents immediately asked 
METRO to expand their proposal to include the Hardy Corridor. At this initial stage, 
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Harris County officials, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Houston City Council all 
expressed support for the Westpark plan, but none openly called for its expansion.50 At a 
public hearing on the rail line, County Judge Lindsay happily reported the county’s 
backing. In his remarks he lauded rail as an important first step in addressing the region’s 
mobility problems. He pointed out, though, that “we have a very complex transportation 
problem in Harris County. It’s not only a rail system that’s needed, but all facets of 
transportation.” In order to address the region’s traffic problems, Lindsay concluded, “we 
need to work together.”51 Although this cooperative approach seemed possible for a brief 
moment, conflicts emerged as details for the plans solidified and expanded.  
A rift between the road and rail proposals emerged when TMO and other pro-
transit Houstonians refused to give the same support to the toll roads that county and 
suburban officials gave to rail. TMO immediately criticized the toll road proposal’s 
potential impact on the Hardy corridor and called for extending the rail line into the 
corridor. Well aware of earlier damaging highway projects, TMO argued that a toll road 
would create long-term problems for residents in the area. The road would bring 
“increased air pollution, wasteful energy use…increased runoff and flooding, and 
aesthetic blight” to the neighborhoods through which it ran. TMO called upon citizens to 
embrace the “cleaner, safer, and more efficient” option of mass transit. They insisted that 
the “primary concern for transportation in Houston in the next twenty to thirty years” 
needed to be a “focus on how best to move more people, not more automobiles.”52  
TMO also contended that the Hardy Toll Road’s true purpose was to benefit a 
small cohort of builders and developers with vested interests along and at the end of the 
route. As we saw in Chapters One and Two, developers possessed significant power in 
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directing, and benefitting from, Houston’s growth. This reality had not disappeared by 
the 1980s. The Houston Planning Commission still consisted mainly of men with direct 
ties to construction industries. In addition, Houston Mayor Jim McConn and Harris 
County Judge Jon Lindsay owned construction firms involved in suburban development 
and both received campaign support from development interests.53 Many residents from 
the Hardy corridor believed the road was planned only as a way to benefit these 
developers and the communities they built north of the city, such as the Woodlands.54 By 
highlighting what they saw as insider politics, TMO and other rail advocates hoped to 
dispel toll road proponents “regional good” rhetoric. 
Finally, TMO asserted that the TTA was downplaying the actual costs—both 
financial and physical—of their plans. TMO leader Brian McCann, a white resident of 
the Hardy Corridor, argued that descriptions of the toll road plan purposefully 
underestimated the footprint the road would leave on the surrounding areas. According to 
Louie Welch, Houston’s one-time mayor and Chamber of Commerce president during the 
debate, the toll road’s right-of-way would be approximately 135 feet. McCann, looking at 
other area highways and consulting the engineering standards of the Texas Highway 
Department, concluded that when all was said and done the actual right-of-way would 
come in at more than 550 feet. Such a right-of-way, McCann argued, meant that parts of 
bordering communities “would be wiped out.”55  
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Despite TMO’s formation just two years earlier, the response of local politicians 
to its protest of the Hardy toll road plan demonstrated the group’s tangible political 
power. Many officials whose districts overlapped with the Hardy corridor came out 
against the toll road. U.S. Representative Bob Eckhardt, who also opposed the proposed 
Harrisburg Tollway in the 1970s, derided the potential road as “the same old worn-out 
solution” to Houston’s congestion problems.56 Houston City Councilman Dale 
Gorczynski, a former member of TMO, argued that while the toll road would benefit “the 
trucking industry and Montgomery County,” he could not envision any such benefits for 
those “residents living along it.”57 Councilman Ernest McGowen joined Gorczynski in 
opposition and pledged at the annual TMO meeting to defeat the tollway “even if it 
means lying down in the street.” McGowen lauded the hard work of TMO, telling them 
that they were “talking loud enough for City Hall to hear you.”58 Because TMO 
mobilized a vocal set of citywide voters, local officials clamored to support the group’s 
agenda in the early 1980s. 
The furious pushback by TMO and their political backers against the toll road 
plan nearly led to the TTA abandoning the proposal. TMO tried to ensure this outcome 
by convincing the Harris County Commissioners Court to withdraw their support of the 
plan. While TMO representatives made a withering presentation against the plan at an 
August 1980 Commissioners Court meeting, Judge Lindsay convinced his fellow 
commissioners to maintain their support of the toll road plan.59 Undeterred by this 
setback, rail advocates turned their attention to the Houston City Council. Hundreds of 
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TMO members converged on a September 1980 meeting. The speakers represented 
TMO’s diverse membership—a priest, a labor leader, a pharmacist, a teacher, and a 
neighborhood association president all spoke against the toll road plan.60 In front of the 
roiling crowd, the Council passed a resolution that established “rail as a preferred mode 
of mass transportation for the Hardy Road corridor,” but took no definitive action.61 
While not a complete victory, the resolution gave TMO and its allies momentum in their 
fight to stop the toll road plan. 
Not convinced that local resolutions alone could protect corridor residents, TMO 
redoubled their efforts against the toll road project by joining METRO officials on a trip 
to promote the city’s rail proposal in Washington D.C. Along with Rep. Eckhardt, TMO 
representatives and METRO officials met with the U.S. Secretary of Transportation Neil 
Goldschmidt in October 1980.62 METRO officials likewise continued to lobby the 
recalcitrant Reagan administration for federal support.63 By joining with local officials 
and taking the METRO plan before federal officials, TMO actively participated in the 
national conversation surrounding transit. While no funds were guaranteed at the original 
meeting, the lobbying efforts brought Houston’s plans to federal attention and by 1983 a 
large chunk of funds were earmarked for Houston.64 Buoyed by federal support, the 
METRO board fulfilled TMO’s hopes and broadened their rail plans by designating the 
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Hardy corridor as a path for a future rail line.65 The announcement marked a victory for 
TMO and rail advocates. It also ensured that the corridor, now home to two transit 
proposals, would hold a central place in the contest to shape the city’s transportation 
decisions. 
TMO’s success during the early stages of the debate irked its opposition. 
Numerous public officials who found their views or themselves the target of TMO 
critiques expressed concern about the group’s agenda and tactics. TMO used direct 
confrontation—attending meetings en masse, putting tough questions to officials, and 
demanding that promises be put down in writing—among other methods. Texas Highway 
Commissioner Ray Barnhart accused TMO of using scare tactics to drum up opposition 
to the toll road plans. Barnhart said TMO “mobilized blacks, browns, and the elderly and 
then invaded city hall saying ‘they’re going to destroy our neighborhoods,’” without truly 
considering the importance of the highway.66 Barnhart’s overtly racist critique showed 
that some white Texans, including many traditional power brokers, still dismissed the 
political action of African Americans and Latinos as a nuisance and as illegitimate. The 
motivation for such attacks stemmed from the reality that TMO, with its multiracial, 
broad constituency, was making real political waves. Barnhart’s blustering tried to cover 
up and dismiss the efficacy of the group, but his comments belied the fact that officials 
were both aware and wary of the growing political influence of TMO. 
Leaders of the Galveston-Houston Archdiocese and TMO staff responded to such 
hostility by arguing that the organization provided an essential organ for confronting the 
pressing problems of life in urban America. Joseph Fiorenza, the Galveston-Houston 
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Diocesan Director for Social Action, urged leaders to resist allowing criticism to corral or 
cajole the Church into denying support to TMO.67 Auxiliary Bishop John McCarthy 
responded directly to criticisms in a letter written to TMO member churches. McCarthy 
told leaders to continue their work with TMO, reminding them that “religiously 
committed people struggling for social justice have always encountered criticism, slander 
and worse. Continue your noble efforts to develop a strong multi-issued, ethnically 
diverse, widely based community organization.”68 The responses of Catholic officials to 
these critiques strengthened the resolve of TMO members and emboldened them to 
continue the fight for the future of the Hardy corridor. 
The corridor debate became a key part of the 1982 mayoral election. The election 
marked an end to the first stage of the city’s transportation debate and served as a 
launching pad for discussion of the 1983 referenda. It also represented the high point of 
TMO’s influence and political power in the city. Amplified by the group’s involvement 
with the corridor fight, TMO’s agenda received a huge amount of attention during the 
election, leading to promises ranging from service improvement in black and Latino 
neighborhoods to immigration reform from candidates.69 The group’s participation in the 
race and their vocal role in the transit debate mirrored the actions of African American 
and ethnic Mexican residents during the Harrisburg, HARTA, and METRO fights. In all 
four of these campaigns, Houstonians challenged political officials and forwarded their 
own visions about the city’s transportation structures. In the November election, 
Houstonians elected Kathy Whitmire, whom TMO endorsed. After the election, TMO 
continued to push its agenda upon the mayor they helped elect, giving special emphasis 
to their concerns about the Hardy corridor.  
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THE ACCELERATING DEBATE 
If the 1982 mayoral election signaled the peak of TMO’s influence, the ensuing 
transit debate marked its waning. After Whitmire’s election, Houstonians who felt the rail 
program would hurt the city’s growth refused to let TMO, mass transit advocates, and 
METRO dictate regional transportation policy. Suburban officials and residents, the 
Houston Chamber of Commerce, and other toll road advocates began to push back 
against the early momentum enjoyed by rail backers. 
The Houston Chamber of Commerce waded into the transit debate with the 
release of its Regional Mobility Plan just weeks after Kathy Whitmire’s election. Given 
Houston’s lack of zoning and subsequently weak planning department, the reports of 
groups like the Chamber held great weight in city discussions.70 The plan called for a 
$16.2 billion program that, while not directly dismissing rail, clearly emphasized road-
based improvements on the grounds that such projects were far cheaper and could be 
built faster than higher-cost rail projects. The plan called for the construction of almost 
300 miles of new freeways, 1,400 miles of new arterial streets, and 30 miles of 
transitways. It also sought an expansion of the bus fleet, the widening of nearly 200 miles 
of existing freeways, and the resurfacing of older roadways.71 It assented that rail and 
other high-cost projects could eventually be built, but only once “travel demands cannot 
be met by lower cost options,” i.e., roads.72 Initially the report garnered support, or at 
least praise, from many groups, including TMO, for bringing the thoughts of almost all 
the major transportation agencies and advocates into one document.73  
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Despite these plaudits, however, TMO harbored a number of concerns about the 
Regional Mobility Plan. Just as with the group’s quick attacks on the TTA, TMO wasted 
no time in laying out its critiques of the report. Most of its objections focused on the 
broad “financial, social, and environmental problems they believed would result” from 
the program. Unsurprisingly, TMO offered particularly strong criticism of the plan’s pro-
toll road stance for the Hardy corridor, its general road-based emphasis, and its apparent 
lack of citizen input. They lamented its continued reliance on automobiles and again 
called for a system that could “begin now to provide alternatives” to roads and cars.74  
In response to the TMO criticism, the Houston Chamber of Commerce and pro-
toll road Houstonians defiantly championed the Hardy Toll Road and the wider road 
network. In a supplemental report to the Regional Mobility Plan, the Chamber concluded 
that toll roads were the most economically viable choice and maintained that the Hardy 
route would result in fewer displacements than earlier road projects.75 In their eyes, the 
benefits of the road outweighed the costs it would engender. Citizens for Better 
Transportation, a coalition of suburban residents and businesses that sprouted up during 
the debate, joined the Chamber in supporting the toll roads. The group played a major 
role in the referendum debates, often directly engaging with TMO in exchanges that 
displayed the growing antagonism between suburban and city residents.76  
 The Regional Mobility Plan accelerated METRO’s rail plans. Hoping to act 
before road construction could impede its agenda METRO announced a new rail plan in 
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September 1982. The updated proposal called for an 18.2-mile heavy rail line to run 
through both the Westpark and Hardy corridors along what the agency called the “spine 
corridor” (Figure 6.4). The plan was the brainchild of Alan Kiepper, who quietly 
commissioned a feasibility study for the broader system using $28 million in federal 
funding shortly after his arrival in Houston. Only after the METRO board released the 
plan did Kiepper make the work his agency conducted public.77  
 
 
Figure 6.4: METRO Proposal 
The proposed route of METRO’s spine corridor rail plan. The solid line represents the 18.2 mile first 
section. The dotted lines are proposed future extensions. The line from “Downtown” north runs through the 
Hardy Corridor. METRO, “Regional Transit Program: Metro Stage One,” October 1982, Texas Department 
of Transportation, Planning Department Document Library, Houston, Texas. 
                                                
77 “Rail System Has Been Planned Quietly for Months with Little Public Input” Houston Chronicle, 
September 30, 1982, Box 1, Folder 21, HSTRCC.  
 
279
METRO moved toward implementation immediately, beginning the process of right-of-
way purchasing and preparing for the first stage of construction, which together would 
cost $190 million.78 
Rail opponents criticized METRO’s adjusted proposal and scrambled to respond. 
Jon Lindsay accused the agency of overreaching its authority, ignoring the Regional 
Mobility Plan, and unilaterally forcing an expensive project upon residents. METRO’s 
actions spurred suburbanites from north Houston, backed by some of the largest 
developers and corporations of the area, to form the North Houston Association in 
November 1982, to oppose the expanded rail plan. Citizens for Better Transportation and 
the North Houston Association together claimed 250,000 members and put that 
constituency to work pressuring the Houston City Council and Mayor Kathy Whitmire to 
support the toll road proposal.79  
While neither Council nor Whitmire took definitive action on the toll road plan, 
the political pressure of road supporters did secure a guarantee that the rail plan would be 
put before voters. The 1973 and 1978 votes provided precedent for such a referendum. 
Given the results of the 1978 election and despite its early hiccups, METRO officials felt 
confident that a vote would result in the passage of the rail plan. Surveys the Authority 
conducted during the debate corroborated this confidence with as many as 77 percent of 
Houstonians saying they supported the rail system.80 As 1982 came to a close, Whitmire 
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called for the scheduling of a referendum on the rail plan and Kiepper assented, despite 
his own desires to begin construction immediately.81  
 METRO’s announcement prompted Jon Lindsay to take action on formally 
creating the HCTRA. Working with State Representative Erwin Barton, Lindsay 
submitted a bill to the Texas State Legislature that gave Harris County permission to 
form a toll road agency.82 As his plan moved through the legislature, Lindsay wrote to 
Houston City Councilman Dale Gorczynski to convince him of the merits of the HCTRA 
and to seek a compromise between tollway and rail supporters. Lindsay promised that the 
county did not intend to ride roughshod over the city or its citizens. Further he reiterated 
that METRO and the HCTRA could work together to improve the metropolitan area’s 
transportation. After offering these conciliations, however, Lindsay made it clear that he 
would not let TMO or pro-rail opposition spoil his toll road plans. The region’s “rapidly 
deteriorating traffic situation indicates it’s past time for plans and studies…it’s time for 
someone to pour concrete.”83 
SETTLING THE DEBATE: THE REFERENDA 
With Lindsay’s HCTRA proposal out in the open, the 1983 transit debates 
assumed their final form. The April 1983 public forum once more sheds light onto how 
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this debate was joined. The rail and toll road proponents openly clashed at the meeting. 
Both sides accused the councilmembers of catering to the interests of the other. 
Addressing the meeting, a TMO member and Hardy Corridor resident asserted that far 
from anti-progress “vigilantes,” he and his neighbors were “citizens, taxpayers, and 
voters” who simply did not want the toll road to “uproot homes for the benefit of just a 
few people.” Another corridor resident, Ramiro Villareal, promised to support any 
proposal that did not force him and his family to “find new homes, new churches, new 
friends, and new ways of life.” Road proponents responded to this passionate plea by 
reiterating that Hardy Street presented “a natural corridor coming out of central 
Houston,” and that the toll road plan presented “a once in a lifetime opportunity.”84  
The two perspectives presented in the breakout session demonstrated the deep 
divide between suburban and corridor residents over the future shape of the area and its 
meaning in their lives. Supporters of each system possessed wholly different conceptions 
of the Hardy Corridor as a physical landscape. To area residents, the debate concerned 
the future of their homes. To suburban commuters, the corridor simply presented an 
“opportunity” for improved mobility. For the remainder of the debate, corridor residents 
focused on preventing negative physical changes to their communities, while 
suburbanites concentrated on easing their commute. When METRO released a 
supplemental draft environmental impact statement on the rail system, corridor residents 
celebrated its conclusion that rail rapid transit represented the best path forward. The 
report stated that a rail line would result in less air pollution and necessitate fewer 
displacements than the toll road.85 Much of the transit debate pivoted on these hyper-local 
                                                
84 “City Council Hearing on Hardy Toll Project Draws 300,” North Freeway Leader, April 28, 1983, Box 
1, Folder 22, HSTRCC. 
85 Urban Mass Transit Administration; METRO, “Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement: 
Houston Rail Rapid Transit Project,” March 1983, MBC, WRC, 5-2, 5-3.  
 
282
concerns. Houstonians supported the system they felt best matched their individual 
interests.  
“JUST A RAIL BAD DAY FOR METRO”86 
While METRO officials preferred to start construction on the rail system without 
a vote, Kiepper and others did not want to jeopardize the agency’s steadily improving 
reputation. Begrudgingly, the agency scheduled the vote for June 11, 1983. While the 
referendum potentially represented a clear path for the construction of the system, it also 
placed the fate of the plan solely in the hands of voters. The risk for METRO was clear. 
As agency leaders acknowledged, if the vote failed they had no financial backup plan and 
would be left adrift.87 
 During the lead up to the June referendum, it became clear that no matter the 
outcome, the balanced transportation approach of the previous decade would be 
abandoned. Given the growing city-suburb divide, only one side would get what it 
wanted. Local officials, community groups, and voters lined up behind the rail proposal 
or made their opposition clear. The makeup of the two sides held few surprises. City 
leaders mostly backed the rail plan and many county officials stood firmly in opposition. 
The majority of city residents, mainly working- and middle-class Houstonians of all 
races, expressed support for rail. Many elite white Houstonians and most white 
suburbanites did not. Two interesting exceptions to expected allegiances did emerge. 
First was the West Houston Association, a consortium of businesses located near the 
western terminus of the proposed rail line in the Galleria area, which supported the rail. 
While the rationale for the WHA’s support was clearly economically motivated, they 
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were nonetheless one of the few business groups to support the system. On the anti-rail 
side, the most unexpected action was Judge Lindsay’s relative silence. Despite the energy 
he poured into pushing against the plan, Lindsay refused to endorse or oppose the 
referendum after its announcement, choosing to remain apart from a vote that did not 
directly involve his jurisdiction. Lindsay did make it known, however, that his focus 
remained on forming the HCTRA and pushing for its passage, a tacit statement of 
disapproval.88 
 While METRO campaigned throughout the HMA and aimed to convince a wide 
range of citizens to support the rail, just as with the 1973 and 1978 referenda, Authority 
officials believed that the support of the city’s African American and Latino voters and 
politicians would be key to the success of the election. After working closely with 
METRO and TMO throughout the process, most HMA black and Latino politicians came 
out in support of the referendum. State Representative Anthony Hall voiced his approval 
once METRO forwarded a plan to bring rail to his southeast Houston district. State 
Representative Ben Reyes of east Houston pointed specifically to the jobs that the 
construction of the system would bring to many of his constituents as the primary 
rationale for his support.89 METRO took these endorsements as a positive omen for the 
referendum’s result. 
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 African American and Latino Houstonians who supported the rail proposal also 
promoted the system independent of their political leaders. Many black and Latino 
Houstonians active in TMO had campaigned against the Hardy Toll Road and likewise 
threw their support behind the rail plan. Black, white, and Latino members kept up a 
constant stream of editorials, attended meetings, and held rallies to encourage 
Houstonians to vote for rail. The community newspaper, El Sol, much as it had during the 
earlier 1978 METRO debate, endorsed the proposal after Alan Kiepper and other 
METRO officials held a meeting with Latino community leaders in May 1983.90 The 
paper appealed to Houston’s Latino residents to “turn out to the ballot box and vote.” 
Echoing TMO’s arguments against the toll road plan, El Sol’s editorial team pleaded that 
voters not let the “small but potent self-interest groups that oppose its passage” win the 
day. The paper urged its readers to “show Houston what the Hispanic and Mexican 
American community can do in unison” and vote for the referendum.91  
Pro-rail groups also targeted black and Latino constituencies with advertisements 
in El Sol, The Houston Defender, and the Houston Informer. In El Sol, The Committee 
For Houston Bus and Rail—a consortium of rail supporters put together to campaign for 
the referendum—talked up the positive economic benefit the project would have both in 
terms of jobs and growth. It promised more buses, better service, and revamped facilities. 
It also warned voters that “the problems of transit are worse than we can Imagine!” and 
asserted that “Houston needs to plan—now!” Demonstrating the importance of local 
power brokers, the advertisements also listed the prominent leaders and politicians 
                                                
90 “MTA,” El Sol, May 11, 1983, Box 1982-1983, HMRC, 4; “Junio 11 Voto para Financiamiento del 
Metro” (June 11 Vote for the METRO Bonds), El Sol, May 18, 1983, Box 1982-1983, HMRC, 1. 
91 “Get Out the Vote,” El Sol, June 8, 1983, Box 1982-1983, HMRC, 3. 
 
285
supporting the referendum.92 Ads placed in the Informer and Defender took the same 
approach (Figure 6.5 and 6.6).93   
While rail supporters campaigned for passage of the rail bonds, opponents 
sharpened their critiques. If many pro-tollway politicians refrained from directly 
criticizing the rail plan, their supporters did not. White suburban community groups like 
the Cypress Creek United Civic Association and Meyerland Community Improvement 
 
              
Figure 6.5 and 6.6: Pro-rail advertisements 
Ads in support of rail taken out in African American and Latino community newspapers. Figure 6.5, 
Houston Defender, May 20, 1983, HMRC. Figure 6.6, El Sol, June 8, 1983, HMRC.  
Association initiated letter-writing campaigns and published editorials attacking the rail 
plans.94 Playing on Houston and Texas’s self-governing ethos, David Legge, the editor of 
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Houston City Magazine, also criticized the rail plan. Legge argued that “Houston…is the 
least likely candidate for heavy rail in America. It’s spread out, free-spirited, and 
independent-minded.”95 Legge went on to suggest that support for the rail plan was 
tantamount to supporting the infringement of the individual rights so sacred to many 
Texans. Through this tactic Legge changed the nature of the vote from METRO’s vision 
of freedom via a new transport mode into one that represented rail as a power grab by a 
government agency. For many, especially those still unconvinced by METRO’s overall 
effort, this tactic proved convincing.  
 Despite this vocal criticism, in the days before the election, the momentum, as it 
did in 1973, appeared to be on the side of passage. A Houston Chronicle article pointed 
out that proponents of the rail plan outspent their opponents by a wide margin. With three 
days remaining before the election, the Committee for Houston Bus and Rail had spent 
$114,657 of an estimated $185,000 raised on the campaign. In comparison, two 
opposition groups—The Neighborhood Forum and Citizens for Better Transportation—
reported expenditures of little more than $15,000.96 Given this financial advantage, the 
support of many prominent Houstonians like Bus and Rail Committee Chair Ben Love, 
and the commitment by many black, Latino, and white city residents, METRO officials 
felt positively about the chances of the referendum’s passage. 
 Writing on the day of the rail referendum, Houston Post columnist Lynn Ashby 
defended METRO’s efforts during its first four years of existence and urged voters to 
support the rail plan. While the opposition had a right to ask questions of METRO and its 
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plans, Ashby feared they had gone too far—becoming impediments to progress rather 
than paragons of the democratic process. Inverting Legge’s version of Texas self-
governance, he reminded fellow Houstonians that their city “was not turned from a 
backwater village on an unknown bayou into the fastest-growing city in the nation by a 
bunch of whiners and naysayers. It was built by doers.” After delivering this admonition, 
Ashby called on voters to go to the polls and to support the referendum.97  
 To any Houstonian who could remember the 1973 HARTA election, June 12, 
1983, must have dawned with an extreme sense of déjà vu. Just as in 1973, nearly two-
thirds of voters rejected a transit referendum that looked destined to pass only weeks 
earlier. METRO officials expressed shock and disappointment, with many blaming low 
voter turnout in areas of expected support and a lack of voter understanding as the root 
causes of the referendum’s defeat. Just 110,978 voters, approximately 12 percent of those 
Houstonians who lived within the Authority’s jurisdiction, cast a ballot.98 Unfortunately 
for supporters of transit, those who turned out overwhelmingly opposed the rail. The 
geographic distribution of “no” votes reflected continued suburban disdain for “Houston-
centric” transit plans as suburban precincts such as those in Fort Bend County rejected 
the referendum by ratios approaching 3-to-1. In addition, the vote expressed the 
trepidation held by the wealthier residents who lived along the proposed Westpark 
segment of the system and likewise voted down the proposal.99   
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The rejection of the rail plan led to three major outcomes. First, it vaulted the 
HCTRA agenda to the fore of metropolitan transportation politics. Second, it resulted in 
the loss of federal funding for mass transit in Houston. Third, it shifted METRO’s agenda 
toward meeting suburban mobility needs. Furthermore, given the fact that African 
American and Latino Houstonians had given the referendum staunch backing, its failure 
marked the first time in nearly a decade that minority votes had failed to swing an HMA 
transportation vote. The fact that these voters had combined their votes with many white 
rail supporters and still lost also demonstrated the limits of city-based political power in 
the increasingly suburbanizing HMA.  
The rejection of the referendum almost immediately resulted in a redistribution of 
earmarked federal transportation funds. Members of the House committee that promised 
Houston the money for the project if the referendum succeeded announced that they 
would be sending a $110 million meant for Houston to other cities. They lamented the 
fact that “one of the nation’s most promising” transit projects had fallen apart. Houston-
area national politicians also began to back away from their efforts to secure transit 
dollars. U.S. Representative Jack Fields, one of the leaders who brought money to the 
project, announced that he would cease all efforts to attain federal funding.100 U.S. 
Senators Lloyd Bentsen and John Tower, each of who were instrumental in convincing 
the Department of Transportation to keep some mass transit funding in its budget, 
expressed disappointment at the defeat and wasted allocation.101 The rejection of the rail 
referendum made it unlikely that national leaders would support such an ambitious plan 
in Houston any time soon. 
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After the referendum defeat, METRO faced, as one newspaper article put it, 
“soul-searching time.”102 Having invested between $50 and $90 million into the system’s 
planning, preparation, and engineering, the agency stood at a crossroads, faced with 
several ways forward.103 Even as they shut down the preliminary work started in 
anticipation of the referendum’s passage, Authority officials weighed the possibility of 
returning to voters with a different plan in the coming months. Regardless of how they 
moved forward, Alan Kiepper, acknowledged that the defeat “shot us [METRO] down 
pretty solidly…We are eating Humble Pie…We thought we had a good plan, but we’ll 
have to come up with another one.”104 METRO responded to the defeat by announcing 
that it would start long-term transit planning anew, with a special focus on bringing 
citizen feedback into any new proposal.105 METRO’s next transit proposal, which took 
more than a year to create, oriented the agency in a new direction—toward the suburbs. 
Because of the sound defeat of the 1983 rail plan, the agency conceded that it needed to 
account for suburban needs, a decision that caused shifts to the region’s mobility choices 
for the next twenty years.  
TOLL ROADS RUSH IN 
Two days after the rail referendum, Jon Lindsay asserted that “the METRO bond 
election is now history” and asked Houstonians to support the creation of the HCTRA.106 
“The community is hungry for a solution to its traffic problems,” Lindsay insisted and 
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toll roads represented the only feasible answer.107 HCTRA supporters, learning from the 
defeat of the rail vote, painted the plan and its proposed system as one for the entire 
metropolitan area. (Figure 6.7) This tactic allowed the HCTRA to insulate the proposal 
from the fractious Hardy Toll Road debate. Lindsay and other officials recognized that, 
given the significant opposition that remained from groups like TMO, they might not be 
able to pass a stand-alone, yes/no referendum on the Hardy Toll Road. Instead, they 
lumped all of the proposed roads into one ballot measure, thereby ensuring wider support 
and capitalizing on Houstonians’ general frustrations with traffic.108 
Many Houston officials came over to the toll road camp after the rail defeat. 
Several former supporters of the rail plan realized that they would have to take a position 
on the toll road proposal, and more and more expressed support due to doubts that 
another transit plan would emerge.109 Officials who had opposed the rail plan, including 
Councilman Goodner, lauded this embrace of the HCTRA plan and hoped that its quick 
passage might prove that Houston was not “negative on transportation.”110 
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Figure 6.7: The HCTRA toll road proposal. 
The light blue lines represent the toll routes that would be built after the proposals passage, the dark blue, 
future routes. Absent from this early rendition is the Westpark toll road. Houston-Galveston Regional 
Transportation Study, October 1983, MBC, WRC, 5.  
Goodner’s line once more hinted at Houstonians’ fear that continued problems with 
traffic, or even just the bad publicity of a divisive debate, could damage Houston’s 
national reputation.   
Despite the defeat of the rail plan, toll road opponents refused to allow the 
HCTRA’s creation without a fight. Councilman Gorczynski, ignoring Judge Lindsay’s 
earlier olive branch, helped form an anti-tollway group, Taxpayers Against Toll Road 
Bonds, which consisted of several TMO-supported politicians and other civic 
organizations sympathetic to the anti-tollway cause.111 The group and TMO offered the 
most cohesive resistance to the HCTRA in the lead-up to the September 13 election day. 
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Taxpayers Against Toll Road Bonds grounded most of its attacks in financial concerns 
about the system and the risks it brought to county taxpayers. The group projected, that 
with interest included, the actual cost of the toll system was projected to be $2.35 billion, 
not the $900 million county leaders estimated.112  
 TMO, which like METRO was reeling after the defeat of the rail referendum, 
once again focused on the Hardy corridor and attacked the developers and wealthy 
Houstonians they believed would benefit most directly from the Hardy Toll Road. During 
the HCTRA debate, the organization asked the Houston Conduct Review Board to 
initiate an official inquiry into possible conflicts of interest Houston City Council 
members had with the Hardy Corridor proposal. TMO argued that the fact that developer 
Walter Mischer Sr. owned significant acreage along the corridor and had donated money 
to twelve of the fifteen councilmembers constituted a conflict.113 TMO’s accusation 
infuriated the Houston City Council. While the review board quickly dismissed TMO’s 
complaint, the levying of it stoked criticism of the group.114 Several Catholic councilmen 
wrote a public letter to Bishop John Morkovsky, leader of the Galveston-Houston 
Archdiocese, questioning the role of TMO in city politics and the Church’s support of the 
organization. The councilmen labeled TMO’s paid staff outside agitators and suggested 
that the group exploited poorer churches.115 Bishop Morkovsky responded to the 
questions of the Council with unwavering support for TMO. He assured councilmembers 
that funding for TMO was secured voluntarily through member congregations using 
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benefits and donations.116 Despite the ongoing support, the lack of traction gained by 
TMO’s critiques confirmed the group’s declining political influence.  
As TMO and toll road opponents searched for arguments that could cut into the 
HCTRA’s momentum, the vote approached. Pro-toll road citizens helped form the Harris 
County Citizens for the Toll Road Alternative and released a pamphlet entitled 
“Restoring Mobility” that argued the passage of the referendum would create regional 
mobility and that its failure would mean continued congestion.117  
Toll road proponents trumpeted the system’s ability to bring mobility to the entire 
city. The Chamber of Commerce stumped hard for the referendum, highlighting the 
promises of the Regional Mobility Plan and telling voters that a “yes” vote for toll roads 
was a “vote for mobility.”118 Toll road proponents’ focus on easing congestion hit a chord 
with many Houstonians who were sick of sitting in traffic. Even those who did not feel 
strongly about the toll road plan leaned toward supporting it simply to see some sort of 
action take place. In the days before the election, Houston Post columnist Lynn Ashby, 
who had also supported the rail referendum, reflected this attitude when he wrote a 
column supporting the toll road plan. While he continued to lament the missed 
opportunity represented by the failure of the rail referendum, Ashby, nearly parroting toll 
road proponents’ arguments, asserted that the toll road plan at least gave the city “a 
second chance to do something about our traffic.” Ashby concluded that in the face of 
feeble state and federal funding, the user fee model of the toll road plan was a necessary 
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evil. Summing up the situation, Ashby concluded “we either build these needed roads 
ourselves or the job doesn’t get done.”119 
On September 13, 1983, Harris County electorate, which was 100,000 people 
larger than the METRO electorate, overwhelmingly approved the HCTRA. In an 
inversion of the rail referendum results 95,524 (70 percent) county residents approved the 
bonds and 40,055 (30 percent) voted against. With 12 percent of eligible county voters 
weighing in, more than double other contemporary county elections, the importance of 
the vote was clear.120 Lindsay said the victory showed that Harris Country was not going 
to sit idle as its traffic piled up. Suburban civic groups and officials that supported the 
bonds celebrated their victory.121 
The toll referendum’s result highlighted the efficacy of both toll road proponents’ 
metropolitan mobility pitch and the limitations of place-based political stances. The 
defeated TMO begrudgingly admitted that its singular focus on the Hardy Corridor 
during both referenda hurt its chances in each.122 The toll road vote was yet another blow 
to TMO. Its inability to muster much of a turnout and the sound defeat of its preferred 
action gave another sign of its waning influence.123 Further, the success of the 
referendum meant that the communities of many corridor residents would soon be 
changed forever. If passage of the HCTRA presaged TMO’s decline, it signified the 
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arrival of suburban residents and business leaders as new regional powers. Nothing made 
these political shifts as clear as the financial details of the HCTRA campaigns. Pro-toll 
road groups raised more than $400,000 to support the referendum. On the other hand, the 
toll road opponents could muster no outside funding for their campaign against the 
proposal, a significant shift from the support they found during the rail push and a signal, 
perhaps, that most Houstonians wanted to move forward with some form of solution.124 
 Harris County moved quickly on the toll roads after the vote. The Commissioners 
Court created the Authority on September 22.125 By early 1984, plans for acquiring right-
of-way in the Hardy corridor were under way. Ultimately, the county removed 70 homes 
and 54 businesses and another 500 properties were affected.126 Hoping to accelerate the 
acquisition process and speed construction, a number of developers and landowners along 
the Hardy corridor donated nearly 14 percent of the total right-of-way, land valued at $6 
million, to the county.127 The alacrity with which the county moved to build the toll 
system was a product of Houstonians’ intense demand for a resolution to the city’s 
congestion. Ground was broken on the Hardy Toll Road in September 1984. On the same 
day that bulldozers made the ceremonial cuts in the earth, the HCTRA announced that it 
would be accelerating the construction process and aiming to have the Hardy Toll Road 
opened to traffic, and collecting fares, by July 1988.128  
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Hundreds of bicycles rushed down the smooth lanes of the Hardy Toll Road in 
September of 1987. Almost exactly four years after the passage of the inaugural HCTRA 
bonds, the northern section of the roadway opened to great fanfare: a parade, marching 
bands, and a bike race took over the road during the celebrations.129 Two years later, the 
pop band the Bangles headlined a concert from a stage built across the surface of the new 
Sam Houston Tollway (Beltway 8) in celebration of that road’s official opening, playing 
for 25,000 people.130  
These celebrations announced more than just the completion of two toll roads. To 
many, the opening of the roads represented the attainment of relief from congestion, a 
decades-long goal in Houston. To others, especially to those Houstonians who had 
engaged in the heated 1983 debates, the inauguration of the roads marked a significant 
place in the struggle to influence the growth of the city. For those on the winning side of 
the debates, the roads represented the embrace of their hopes for the city. For those who 
had resisted the highways, the opening was a reminder of their inability to see their 
visions for the future upheld. No matter how one framed its significance, though, the 
opening of the toll roads undeniably established both Houston’s highway-centric 
development pattern and its suburb-first transportation planning.  
After 1983, TMO’s influence in city politics declined precipitously for reasons 
that went beyond the ability of suburban areas to outvote the city in metropolitan debates. 
The oil bust of the 1980s crippled Houston’s economy and left many Houstonians 
unemployed and impoverished. The pressures of poverty undoubtedly affected the ability 
of some TMO members to devote time and money to the organization. In addition to 
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personal circumstances, the recession exacerbated many of the problems that TMO had 
tried to address within the city during the early 1980s. However, because the city now 
possessed so few resources to devote to social programs or with which to try to improve 
the condition of schools, streets, and police service anywhere, the complaints of TMO 
became just one in a long backlog of problems the city faced during the 1980s. The 
recession also accelerated the flight of white-collar workers of all races out of Houston 
and re-inscribed de facto segregation across the HMA based on both income and race. 
The economic and social distance these processes placed between working-class and 
middle-class Houstonians of all races made coalitions like TMO increasing harder to 
build. Finally, the rise of suburbs and conservative politics cannot be underestimated. The 
ascent of the Republican Party to power in suburban Houston and Texas led to increased 
animosity between cities and suburbs. Newly elected Republican leaders and the 
constituencies that supported them maintained their resistance to supporting projects in 
the city of Houston, often preventing county and state aid from reaching the city. 
Weakened by political defeat, the economic struggles of its membership and Houston, 
and challenged by the conservative politics of the Houston suburbs and the federal 
government, TMO, like community organizations across the country, shifted away from 
direct confrontational tactics and embraced new forms of organization that meshed more 
easily with the political moment.131 While city residents by no means stopped  
participating in metropolitan debates, all of these factors gave their suburban neighbors 
the upper hand.  
Given this new metropolitan political order, METRO, county and city officials 
increasingly catered to the needs of suburban residents.132 Because they often ignored 
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jurisdictional lines, transportation decisions illustrated this reality better than most other 
metropolitan topics. The creation of the HCTRA so quickly after the rejection of the rail 
plan forced METRO officials to reevaluate their future plans. In line with the region’s 
car-centric growth and realigning political realities, the Authority embraced a suburb-
focused system. METRO continued the improvement plan it began in the early 1980s: 
increasing bus service, reducing maintenance problems, improving safety. In addition, the 
agency prioritized travel between the central city and the suburbs. To meet this goal 
METRO built more Park and Ride lots and opened HOV lanes on almost every highway.   
After spending the first year after the referenda implementing changes intended to 
meet suburban mobility needs, METRO unveiled three potential options for its mass 
transit program in 1984. The options put forward, however, reflected the agency’s 
suburban orientation, as none aimed to improve transit service to the central city 
residential communities most in need of it. Further establishing its commuter focus and 
exacerbating service shortages in the city, all three plans centered on express busways 
that ran entirely on highways and provided no local service. The transit elements in one 
proposal serviced only employment centers and Park and Ride lots.133 METRO’s 
suburban orientation emerged even in its rhetoric. The agency no longer aimed to provide 
basic mobility to all Houstonians; rather, it hoped to give commuters “an attractive 
alternative to the automobile,” a goal clearly attainable only by convincing suburban 
drivers to convert their daily journey from car to transit.134 It was not until Mayor Lee 
Brown, the city’s first black mayor, successfully combined METRO, Houston, and 
federal funds to open the first leg of a proposed light rail system in 2004 that METRO 
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reestablished a semblance of city-suburb balance to its system. This suburban 
reorientation intensified the immobility of Houston’s poorest residents. As jobs, 
resources, and services moved out of many parts of the city, those without access to cars 
or public transportation found themselves stuck.135  
METRO’s approach to transportation after the 1983 transit debates reflected the 
city’s transition—physically and cognitively—into a car-centric landscape.136 On top of 
the HCTRA’s and the Texas Highway Department’s continued construction of highways, 
Houston’s development continued to decentralize, and automobile transportation—either 
car or bus—became the sole means of movement for most residents.137 Residents of the 
Hardy Corridor, like those before them in the Third and Fifth Wards, swallowed hard as 
the toll road came through their community. The new road not only reshaped the physical 
landscape, but also influenced the perceptions of the neighborhoods through which it 
passed. To most Houstonians the homes in the Hardy Corridor became simply the 
backdrop to the highway (Figure 6.8). As with other projects, the erasures brought by the 
road faded as new developments filled empty lots and the city moved on. Yet the legacies 
of the fight remained visible in the homes that hung on in the shadows of the toll road and 
in the minds of displaced residents and those who fought against its construction.  
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Figure 6.8: Aerial photograph of Hardy Corridor 
This image demonstrates the physical impact the Hardy Toll Road would take on corridor neighborhoods. 
Howard, Needles, Tammen, and Bergendoff, “Preliminary Engineering Feasibility Study: Hardy Tollway,” 
November 1981, Box 1, Folder 18, HSTRCC, RG F 18, HMRC. 
These changes did not mean that a suburban vision of the politics of mobility 
went uncontested after 1983. While suburban Houstonians seemingly took control during 
the 1983 campaigns, the contentiousness of the debates illustrated the fraught nature of 
transportation decisions. The efforts of city residents and officials during the campaigns 
proved that these Houstonians would not simply cede the political arena. While central 
city voters could not outvote suburbanites, neither could suburbanites completely ignore 
the will of city residents. This dynamic became even more complicated as immigration 
into Houston from Central America, Asia, and the Middle East, and the diversification of 
the city’s suburbs ensured that no single racial, economic, or political group would be 
able to dictate HMA policy without creating coalitions and compromises.  
The 1983 transit debates represented just one of the many factors that influenced 
the city’s continued growth from the 1980s to today. The outcomes of the contest ensured 
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that the city’s transportation network and future mobility systems would be particular to 
Houston. Residents from across the metropolitan region—urban and suburban; politician 
and voter; transit backer or toll road advocate—shaped the terms of the debate and the 
choices the city made in 1983. Through those they fashioned the city itself. The contest 
between road and rail captured Houstonians’ thought process in action and demonstrated 
the decidedly local flavor mobility decisions had taken on because of devolution and 
increasing citizen participation. Struggling to contend with a rapidly changing 
demography, economy, and metropolitan landscape, Houstonians argued, compromised, 




When I am on the toll road, I get a strange feeling. Forgive my enthusiasm, but when I 
am on that road I am overwhelmed with confidence in this community, its citizens, its 
ambitions. I believe cities are built by people who decide to put down roots and actively 
plan for the future to make their part of the Earth a better place to live. That toll road tells 
me a lot of us consider Houston home. 
 
Mark Anawaty, Houston Chronicle, August 7, 1988 
 
When there’s a benefit to be passed out, we [African Americans and ethnic Mexicans in 
the Fifth Ward] somehow or another don’t get the respect. But when it comes to a burden 
being passed down, we somehow get more than our fair share. 
 
Texas Representative Harold Dutton, Houston Chronicle, January 1, 1991 
 
Discussing Houston’s transportation structures in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
two starkly different comments, one by the white Houston Chronicle journalist, Mark 
Anawaty, and the other from African American state representative, Harold Dutton, 
captured the complicated nature of Houstonians’ relationship to their city’s transportation 
network and their understanding of the history that shaped it. Reflecting upon his 
experience of driving on the newly completed Beltway 8, Anawaty celebrated 
Houstonians’ embrace of toll roads earlier in the decade. In his estimation, citizens had 
made a smart choice in the 1983 transportation debates, one that signaled their 
commitment to the city and its growth. From the vantage point of 1988, though, Anawaty 
normalized Houstonians’ participation in the vote. His telling smoothed over the 
immense contestations involved in the 1983 debate and took the broader history of 
Houstonians struggle to shape the politics of mobility, a past that told of the lengths to 
which Houstonians went to gain a voice in HMA decision-making, for granted.  
Dutton’s words could have just as easily been lifted from a newspaper in 1950 or 
1970, as from their actual source in 1991. Indeed, for all the progress that had occurred 
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toward democratizing transportation decision-making and equally dispersing its benefits 
and consequences since 1950, much about the HMA’s growth practices appeared, to 
Dutton and many others, to have not changed at all. The physical costs of Houston’s 
growth continued to fall disproportionately onto working-class and non-white 
populations throughout the HMA. However, the fact that Dutton spoke in 1991, and not 
1950, mattered a great deal, because the historical context surrounding transportation had 
shifted markedly. Most significantly, in the postwar period black Houstonians from 
Dutton’s Fifth Ward had little formal recourse when highways bore through their 
neighborhoods. By 1991, however, when Fifth Ward African Americans faced 
infrastructure challenges they could expect support from elected officials at the local, 
state, and national level who, like Dutton, came from their neighborhoods and shared 
their concerns for its future.  
Anawaty’s and Dutton’s comments illustrated the evolution of Houston’s politics 
of mobility over the previous four decades. That Anawaty could frame Houstonians as 
decision-makers or that a representative like Dutton could deploy his political weight to 
express dismay about potential displacements, reflected the decades-long efforts of a 
diverse collection of Houstonians to first demand access to and then claim influence over 
HMA mobility debates and transportation planning. These passages, though, are detached 
from this contested history. As easy as it was for Anawaty to ignore the intense political 
battles of the toll road debate after the highway existed, it was equally as hard for Dutton 
and Fifth Warders to escape the legacies of problematic transportation decision-making 
when new projects focused in on their communities. However, neither perspective 
offered an accurate accounting of Houstonians’ relationship to the politics of mobility 
because both ignored central aspects of the history that lay behind it. 
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The changing perspectives Houstonians held of mobility and the structures that 
allowed it between 1950 and 1985, resulted in Houston’s particular physical form and 
politics. Unlike northeastern cities where dense downtowns and well-established 
suburban and urban public transit networks resulted in a transportation system built for 
multiple modes, Houston exemplified the auto-centric development of southwestern and 
southern cities. Its rapid population increase, the embrace of highways by elected 
officials and citizens, and the resulting proliferation of low-density urbanization were 
trends visible in cities across the Sunbelt after World War II. Houston’s transportation 
decisions were unique from those in Los Angeles or even Dallas, however, because 
Houstonians’ particular understandings and contestations of the politics of mobility gave 
rise to a Houston-specific development pattern. While it shared characteristics with other 
Sunbelt cities, Houston’s choices in mass transit debates, the constituencies who 
participated in the struggles to define the city, and the influence the implemented systems 
had on the course of Houston’s development were uniquely its own.  
But, it is precisely that distinctiveness that makes Houston and its shifting politics 
of mobility an essential model to study in order to situate the role of similar forces in 
other Sunbelt cities. Houstonians’ struggle to build and define the city’s highways and 
mass transit system, overlapped with other contests concerning metropolitan politics, 
economic and racial equality, and the growth pressures of a developing metropolis. 
Engagement in transportation debates, then, afforded all Houstonians a platform from 
which they could assert their opinions and expectations about broader political topics. 
While permutations of socio-economic, demographic, political, and cultural details in 
other Sunbelt cities tweaked the makeup of these cities’ iterations of contests around 
mobility and resulted in divergent choices for these cities’ built environment, the 
parameters of Houston’s transportation debates nonetheless offer a lens that frames such 
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contests, as well as their connections to other urban systems and processes, as an integral 
aspect of metropolitan Sunbelt development. 
As this study has shown, the scope and significance of citizen participation in 
Houston’s transportation debates changed drastically over time. While a collection of 
nearly all white and male elected officials, professional planners, and private developers 
held immense power over the decision-making process in the 1950s and 1960s, they 
never completely controlled it. The actions of citizens outside that group—from the 
protests of white middle- and upper-class suburbanites in Memorial Bend against the 
Outer Belt to the complaints of African Americans in the Fifth Ward about lack of 
pedestrian overpasses—at least forced leaders to acknowledge, if rarely embrace, the 
divergent perspectives citizens held of transportation and the politics of mobility. By the 
mid-1970s, aided by changes in federal oversight and citizen participation regulations, as 
well as by their own assertions of political power, an increasingly diverse set of 
Houstonians—male and female, African American, ethnic Mexican, and white, urban and 
suburban, rich and poor—possessed more influence over the city’s choices. 
Simultaneously, residents’ competing conceptions of mobility engendered new contests 
for power in the 1970s and 1980s. These fights included more citizens than ever and 
brokered unique metropolitan alliances, but they also highlighted Houstonians’ new 
calculations about how best to defend their homes and promote their interests through 
transportation structures.  
The shifting nature of Houston’s development debates showed that the politics of 
mobility was never static, nor were fights about the structures that this politics considered 
ever settled. As the example of TMO and Harold Dutton’s opening quote show, the 
access Houstonians secured to the decision-making process never resulted in an equal or 
consistent distribution of political power. Rather, influence in the city rose and declined 
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in connection with larger metropolitan and national forces. Further, individual’s 
conceptions and expectations of mobility changed over time. White suburbanites living 
near the projected route of the Outer Belt might have applauded the construction of 
Interstate 10 in the 1960s because it gave them access to the central city, but by the 1980s 
those same residents might have derided the construction of the renamed Beltway 8 
because it threatened their property values. Understanding the blurred nature of 
individual’s relationship to the politics of mobility requires contextualizing their 
changing circumstances.   
Two current transportation projects in Houston—the Grand Parkway and the 
METRO light rail—grew out of the city’s earlier projects and the disputations 
surrounding each show how past decisions about infrastructure can remain influential for 
decades after systems are put into place. The historic roots of these projects lead to 
important questions about how they will function in the twenty-first century city and how 
Houstonians will use them as definitions and expectations for mobility change. 
Sitting nearly 30 miles from the center of Houston and running for a total length 
of just over 180 miles, the Grand Parkway, Houston’s third ring road, appeared on maps 
in the 1960s. It remained on metropolitan plans until the late 1970s, when officials 
removed it because ongoing transportation fights made such a long-term project seem 
untenable. After the creation of the Harris Country Toll Road Authority, when suburb-
oriented visions of mobility became ascendant in the choices of the HMA, the highway 
reappeared. Construction began in the 1980s and continues to this day. Since it has been 
an active project for more than 50 years, the parkway’s drawn out planning and 
construction process reflect the historical contours of Houston’s transportation decision-
making process in ways other transportation structures cannot.   
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Part of the parkway’s significance stems from the public-private partnership that 
governs the road’s routing and fundraising. The Grand Parkway Association was 
commissioned by the state of Texas to head a public-private initiative that would allow 
landowners along the route, mostly real estate speculators and developers, to donate the 
land that the state would build the parkway upon. To pay for the construction the state 
would make the parkway a toll road. This funding structure was crucial given the huge 
demands placed on Texas’ infrastructure budgets by a statewide population increase of 
more than four million people between 1980 and 2000. Facing huge demand, the Texas 
State Highway Department could barely keep up with maintenance needs on the state’s 
more than 72,000 miles of highway, much less afford to build massive new roads. The 
parkway’s public-private partnership model, while allowing developers an inordinate say 
over the route, also allowed construction to continue in spite of funding difficulties.   
 While the Grand Parkway Association made promises of improved suburban 
mobility, like the Outer Belt before it, citizens’ concerns about the road’s impact on their 
community led to contests around its construction. Suburbanites whose homes lay in the 
path of the road stood at odds with neighbors whose communities were unthreatened. 
Objecting to the routing near his suburban Governor’s Place home west of Houston, 
Brant Malby levied a complaint that would not have been out of place in the 1960 
Memorial Bend fight. Malby and his neighbors “bought their homes in Governor’s Place” 
only “after checking into the [parkway’s] alignment and RELYING ON TEXAS STATE 
HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT MAPS” that showed it would not affect their homes. Only 
after they bought their homes did these Houstonians learn of the decision to build “a 
DIRTY HIGHWAY near a DEVELOPED AREA.”1 Like Memorial Bend residents 
                                                




before them, Malby and his neighbors pushed for the road to be shifted further west, 
away from their homes. Like Memorial Bend residents before them, Malby and his 
neighbors failed to secure a reroute. While Houstonians had gained a greater voice in 
planning efforts, that voice did not guarantee desired outcomes. Elected officials still 
needed to provide mobility to the HMA’s growing and suburbanizing population and they 
embraced the parkway to do so.  
Today about half of the Grand Parkway is completed or slated to open by 2015. 
The remaining segments are to be constructed in the coming decades.2 The route is both 
an artifact and a product of past transportation debates, a situation that gives the road a 
complicated position in the HMA today. With roots in the 1960s, the parkway’s current 
form hews closer to the tenets of an earlier era of planning when the city and the mobility 
options it possessed were quite different than those of today. Like the majority of 
Houston’s transportation structures, the parkway is based not on decisions made in 2014 
to address 2014 problems, but rather shaped by choices made over the course of almost 
sixty years. The technologies and size of the HMA’s transportation structures have 
changed over time, but they continue to prioritize outward growth even as the needs and 
shape of the HMA have changed due to population growth in the central city and new 
conversations about the place of mass transit throughout the metropolitan area. 
The disputed creation of METRO’s light rail system was tinged with overtones of 
both the HARTA and METRO debates. In the late 1990s, METRO announced the 
adoption of “Horizon 2020,” a new long-range plan that made the Main Street corridor 
into a transit route.3 Officials planned to use the corridor as the site for the seven-mile 
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“Red Line” light rail to be built in time for the city’s hosting of the 2004 Super Bowl. 
Mayor Lee Brown combined funds from the city and federal government in a way that 
allowed METRO to avoid a referendum on the line. Construction began in 2001 and the 
Red Line began operating in 2004. While the Red Line was under construction, METRO 
held a referendum to finance a larger system of light rail, the routes of which mirrored the 
proposed legs of the failed 1973 and 1983 rail proposals almost exactly. 
 The vote for the proposal in 2003 unearthed many of the arguments of the earlier 
debates, but the city of the early 2000s brought a new context to the conversation around 
mass transit. Twenty years of suburb-oriented highway development had made Houston 
synonymous with traffic jams by the first decade of the twenty-first century. Unlike other 
auto-centric Sunbelt cities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and Dallas, Houston could 
not point to any non-road transit systems as a sign that were working on addressing that 
congestion. What was more, the makeup of the central city was changing with more and 
more white-collar Houstonians returning to homes inside the inner loop to be closer to the 
resources of the city. This population joined with many African American, Asian 
American, and Latino Houstonians who remained within the loop to seek better 
transportation options. Significantly, by the 1990s, the Houston City Council reflected the 
demographic diversity of the city. In 2000, eight of the sixteen Council members, 
counting the mayor and controller, were African American, Latino American, or Asian 
American, including Lee Brown, the city’s first African American mayor.4 The Council 
and METRO, encouraged by Houston’s growing and diversifying central city, chose to 
buck their suburb-oriented transit practices and embraced the push for light rail. 
                                                
4 For a list of Houston mayors, controllers, and city council people see the city of Houston’s record, 
http://www.houstontx.gov/citysec/mayors.pdf, last accessed March 16, 2014.  
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Proponents of rail pitched the system as a solution to congestion issues, as a way 
to provide mobility to central city residents, and as a method to encourage the economic 
and residential development of the Main Street corridor. Learning from the two previous 
rail debates, supporters also couched the rail system within a package of road 
improvements to entice broader voter support.5 Critics once again attacked METRO for 
spending too much money and argued that rail could never possibly serve the entire 
HMA. The vote for light rail passed in 2003. The first line quickly collected a high 
volume of riders, carrying 32,000 passengers a day between downtown, the medical 
center, and Reliant Stadium by the end of its first year of operation. Because the line was 
at-grade it did have problems with car-train collisions and critics continued to lambast its 
small service area and cost, but METRO declared its original foray a success 
nonetheless.6 
 Rail remains a controversial topic in the HMA because both working-class and 
wealthy suburban voters remain wary of supporting a system they do not believe will 
serve their needs. In November 2012, HMA voters drastically altered the rail system’s 
future in a referendum that effectively prevented METRO from funding two planned 
extensions.7 More than just about the extensions, the vote also reflected the continued 
contest over taxes in the HMA. After 1988, all METRO jurisdictions received a slice of 
the Authority’s revenue to pay for general mobility projects. This money has become 
indispensible to the budgets of every city in the METRO service area, including Houston. 
The 2012 vote would have given control of those funds back to METRO, a result that 
                                                
5 METRO, “Metro Solutions,” 2003, H-MTA-Rail 2000s Vertical File (VF), Houston Metropolitan 
Research Center (HMRC). 
6 Lucas Wall, “Rail Ridership Breezes Past Other Cities,” Houston Chronicle, January 17, 2005, H-MTA-
Rail 2000s VF, HMRC. 
7 David Crossley, “If You Want More, Better Transit, Vote No on Metro,” Houston Chronicle, October 29, 




local officials considered anathema to growth. This led them to campaign against the 
change. The outcome of the referendum maintained the revenue-sharing system and made 
the possibility of a full rail system less likely. Despite this blow METRO pushed on with 
three rail extensions approved before the vote. In December 2013, the first opened, 
adding another five miles of track to the original Red Line. In 2015, two more extensions 
will come online bringing the city’s total mileage to just over twenty-two.8 While 
divisions over the place and purpose of rail in the city remain, the new lines offer options 
that promise to reframe many residents’ conceptions of mobility.   
Houstonians face a significant challenge in trying to make existing transportation 
systems work for the changing demands of the twenty-first century city. Physical 
mobility, a concept redefined in the postwar period by its links to automobiles and 
highways, today encompasses more modes—walking, bicycling, and mass transit—and 
overlaps significantly with broad planning concepts and urban issues—transit-oriented 
development, affordability, sustainability, and immobility. Moreover, the very shape and 
pattern of urban growth is shifting and cities are becoming increasingly diverse. In recent 
years Houston’s outward suburbanization has continued, but that movement has been 
balanced by the movement into the central city of a wealthier class of former 
suburbanites and recent arrivals.9 As central cities gentrify, pushes to improve the 
livability of these areas dominate planning theory and practice.10 Working to encourage 
centralization and quell the adverse ecological effects of expansive urbanization, 
                                                
8 Kevin Wilcox, “Houston Significantly Expands Light-Rail Line,” Civil Engineering, February 2014.  
9 Joel Kotkin, “Houston Rising—Why the Next Great American Cities Aren’t What You Think,” The 
Daily Beast, April 8, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/, last accessed March 6, 2014. Steve Inskeep, 
“Fighting Gentrification With Money In Houston,” National Public Radio, September 17, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112888084NPR, last accessed March 6, 2014; Lori 
Rodriguez, “Gentrification Revives City But Displaces Minorities,” Houston Chronicle, May 6, 2001. 
10 On recentralizing neighborhoods see, Steve Belmont, Cities in Full: Recognizing and Realizing the 
Great Potential of Urban America (Chicago: Planners Press, American Planning Association, 2002). 
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planning practitioners have attempted to construct neighborhoods that foster greater 
density and wean Americans off their overreliance on automobiles.11 These approaches 
successfully demonstrate that cities can become more sustainable while still developing 
economically. The simultaneity of continued expansion and recentralization presents 
Houstonians, and urbanites across the United States, with a difficult set of questions 
about whether current transportation systems provide adequate and equal access to 
mobility for residents throughout metropolitan areas. This problem is particularly acute in 
southwestern cities where auto-centric development has created sprawling urban areas 
and even the best bus and rail systems struggle to meet the needs of transit-dependent 
riders. 
For all their recent accomplishments, most smart growth and livability projects 
have not adequately addressed issues of social equity that arise during their 
implementation. Many fail to incorporate the perspectives of a wide population of 
urbanites, especially the opinions and needs of the poor and ethnic minority communities. 
Resources and consequences are still distributed unevenly, raising concerns about social 
and environmental justice.12 Just as suburban areas received more city services in the 
1960s, today’s gentrifying, higher-income neighborhoods in Houston and other cities 
have more amenities than lower-income areas. This reality has contributed to a variety of 
                                                
11 Tim Beatley, “Sustainability in Planning: The Arc and Trajectory of a Movement, and New Directions 
for the 21st Century City,” in  Bishwapriya Sanyal, Lawrence Vale, and Christina D. Rosan, eds., Planning 
Ideas that Matter: Livability, Territoriality, Governance, and Reflective Practice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2012), 91-124. 
12 Scott Campbell, “Green Cities, Growing Cities, Just Cities?: Urban Planning and the Contradictions of 
Sustainable Development,” Journal of the American Planning Association 62 (3) (Summer 1996): 269-313; 
Todd Litman and Marc Brenam, “A New Social Equity Agenda For Sustainable Transportation” paper 
presented at the 2012 Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, published at 
http://www.vtpi.org/equityagenda.pdf, last accessed March 6, 2014. 
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negative health and lifestyle consequences for residents without access to public 
transportation, walkable spaces, or other resources.13  
Current planning and governance practices have begun to tackle these equity 
issues. Particularly in cities with progressive planning regimes and tightly controlled 
land-use regulations such as Portland, discussions of mobility and access to it are 
increasingly connected to conversations about housing, infrastructure, and economic 
development.14 Houston, and other southwestern cities with expansive corporate limits, 
are working to bring elements of this type of planning to their cities. In addition to the 
light rail, Houston is currently in the midst of operating a bike-share program and 
constructing a 150-mile long network of trails along its bayous meant to encourage 
walking and bike commuting. The project will cost $215 million and open by 2020.15 
While problems facing immobile or carless populations—the poor, the transit dependent, 
the elderly, the disabled, and the young—persist, across the nation governments and 
planners, often at the insistence of citizens, are working to address these and other 
interconnected issues like air pollution and incompatible land uses. These actions are 
deepening definitions of mobility and incorporating previously underserved 
                                                
13 Litman and Brenam, “A New Social Equity Agenda”; Michael Greenberg and John Renne, “Where 
Does Walkability Matter the Most? An Environmental Justice Interpretation of New Jersey Data,” Journal 
of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine 82 (1) 2005: 90-100; Kevin M. Leyden, 
“Social Capital and The Built Environment: The Importance of Walkable Neighborhoods,” American 
Journal of Public Health 93 (2003): 1546–1551; Lawrence D. Frank, James F. Sallis, Terry L. Conway, 
James E. Chapman, Brian E. Saelens, and William Bachman, “Many Pathways from Land Use to Health: 
Associations between Neighborhood Walkability and Active Transportation, Body Mass Index, and Air 
Quality,” Journal of the American Planning Association, 72 (1) (Winter 2006): 75-87. 
14 Center for Transit-Oriented Development, “Why TOD? Why Now?” Reconnecting America; Federal 
Transportation Administration, 2007, http://ctod.org/ctod-research.php, last accessed March 6, 2014; 
Center for Transit-Oriented Development, “Station Area Planning: How To Make Great Transit-Oriented 
Places,” Reconnecting America; Federal Transportation Administration, 2008, http://ctod.org/ctod-
research.php, last accessed March 6, 2014; Eric Dumbaugh and Wenhao Li, “Designing for the Safety of 
Pedestrians, Cyclists, and Motorists in Urban Environments,” Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 77 (1) (2006): 69-88. 
15 Anna Clark, “The Lone Star Progressive: Annise Parker Sells Houston on Brass-tacks Urbanism,” 
Forefront, March 10, 2014, http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/forefront-excerpt-the-lone-star-progressive. 
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constituencies into the planning process. Officials and citizens must strive to make 
decisions that encourage participatory planning and that reflect urban residents’ shifting 
expectations for mobility.16 At the same time, they must acknowledge that such planning 
is not a panacea to injustice nor easily attained. Ongoing discrepancies in citizens’ access 
to political power and social capital make the goal of democratic planning difficult to 
achieve, but one that should be pursued nonetheless.17 In mobility decision-making, this 
task is all the more pressing due to the long-lasting legacies of infrastructure decisions on 
urban landscapes.18 Just as the choices Houstonians made in 1950 continue to affect the 
city today, so will the choices made in 2014 ripple forward for decades.  
As Chapter Four demonstrated, 1973 stands out as a hinge moment in 
Houstonians’ struggle to imprint their understandings of the politics of mobility onto the 
city’s development. Two decisions that year—an expansion of I-45 and the HARTA 
vote—marked the evolution of transportation decision-making from a relatively opaque, 
undemocratic process to one in which citizens from across the HMA could increasingly 
weigh in on decisions about the direction of the city.  
In 1973, black residents of the Third Ward engaged in a failed protest against the 
expansion of I-45 within the neighborhood. Just before the decision to widen the road 
was made, state highway engineer Dewitt Greer came to Houston to dedicate the final 
section of I-10. Running north of downtown and paralleling the Pierce Elevated, the 
expanse represented the last element of Houston’s contribution to the interstate system 
                                                
16 This is happening in Houston through the efforts of official and non-profit agencies that are soliciting 
the opinions of Houstonians. See for example, Blueprint Houston, http://www.blueprinthouston.org/, last 
accessed March 6, 2014; Houston Tomorrow, http://www.houstontomorrow.org/, last accessed March 6, 
2014; On METRO’s community engagement see, http://www.ridemetro.org/Community/, last accessed 
March 6, 2014.  
17 Susan S. Fainstein, The Just City (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
18 On the long legacies of infrastructure, Alex Marshall, How Cities Work: Suburbs, Sprawl, and the 
Roads Not Taken (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000). 
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until a new segment was designated in the 2010s. To Greer, and other officials standing 
on the road surface to celebrate the opening, the completion of the highway system was 
more than “a dream come true” for Houston; it was “the realization of many dreams.”19 
Greer was only partially correct. The road did meet some Houstonians hopes for 
mobility. But, the fights that predated I-10’s dedication and those that came after proved 
that the “dreams” of which Greer spoke, the notions of mobility he saw represented in the 
freshly poured concrete, were not universal.  
Today, Houston’s politics of mobility remains unsettled. Houstonians have 
inherited a sprawled, auto-centric city that emerged from the contests waged by earlier 
generations of residents over the course of sixty years. They have also received a system 
of participation and governance that affords citizens a greater opportunity to shape the 
city’s future decisions. The challenge for Houston, and other southern and western cities, 
is to confront the issues created by their historical urban form—continued 
suburbanization, auto-dependence, and a lack of walkability—while also addressing the 
mobility needs of residents spread across the HMA. New coalitions and divisions will 
surely emerge as residents reevaluate their expectations for transportation and find allies 
who share those conceptions. New systems will be proposed, debated, dismissed, and 
embraced as Houstonians jockey to define the future of the city. As they make choices in 
the coming years about where the city is going and how it should get there, they would be 
wise to look in their rearview mirror. 
                                                
19 Speech delivered by DeWitt C. Greer on occasion of the Dedication of IH-10, May 17, 1972, Box 
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